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An analysis of causes for human errors reveals that deficiencies in organization and 
management often provide an environment making errors more likely. There is also a 
considerable difference between the operational performance of similar industrial plants. A 
closer analysis often reveals that the differences can be attributed to the managing practices. 
Accepting organization and management as one important precursor for operational safety, the 
aim is to identify good managerial structures and practices as well as characteristics of unsafe 
operational practices. Such information can provide guidance for the operators of the 
installations and also support regulatory agencies. The ultimate aim should be to detect and 
correct organizational deficiencies before an incident or accident brings them into the open. It 
is therefore not sufficient to blame individuals nor training, because management and 
organization establishes priorities, structures, and practices that enable tasks to be accomplished. 
A consultants' meeting organized jointly by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) was held in 
Laxenburg and Vienna, Austria on 18-22 March 1991. The objective of the meeting was to assess 
the extent to which research within the management sciences -can provide guidance for the 
practical problems of managing organizations, where safety is the major concern. The influence 
of organization and management on the safety of complex industrial installations was discussed 
during the meeting and the exchange of ideas and experience between different industrial sectors 
and the academia proved fruitful. In spite of the difference among national and company 
practices it is still expected that there are many possibilities for an exchange of good managerial 
knowledge, experience, and practices. The report collects both the contributions offered by 
members of the Expert Task Force and the findings of the discussions that took place during 
the meeting. 
Specific reference is in the following text made to the nuclear industry with the understanding 
that the issues have a wider application to chemical plants, off-shore installations or more 
generally to industries where safety is a major concern. 
B. Wahlstrom 
IIASA 
E. Swaton 
IAE A 
. . . 
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SUMMARY 
The importance of organization and management has been demonstrated convincingly in all 
modes of operational performance in complex industrial systems. In spite of this awareness there 
have been relatively few attempts to systematically study the components and structures 
involved. This document intends to provide a starting point for systematic approaches by 
interfacing theoretical models with practical experiences. 
The first chapter relates the overall notion of safety to organization and management. It is noted 
that the relative absence of particularly siflcant events at most of the industrial facilities can 
be partially attributed to the ability of the management to provide the resources, guidance and 
decision making capacity ensuing in safely constructed, operated and maintained plants. This 
also means that safety is incorporated into business plans and work designs as an integral part 
for efficient and economical production. However, our understanding of what constitutes 
effective management and organization for safety lags far behind our knowledge of most of the 
more technical issues in plant operation. Thus tools need to be established to develop a 
systematic understanding of management and organization effects on plant safety. Proper and 
objective research will require access to various, until now scattered data sources monitored by 
individual plants, industrial organizations and regulatory bodies and the provision of 
opportunities to collect new data on diverse practices. 
In the second chapter the current state of knowledge on good practices is analyzed. Particularly 
in the nuclear power industry~documents have been issued containing some of the key safety 
related challenges managers are faced with and also provide recommendations on strategies to 
cope with these challenges. However, experience in the industry demonstrates that management 
and organizational aspects still do contribute considerably to operational safety problems at 
installations. Thus, some of the strengths and weaknesses of the good-practice approach are 
addressed and possible improvements in the process for developing and disseminating this 
information discussed. In addition, several significant limitations to "absolute" good-practices as 
opposed to flexible adaptation to changed circumstances are presented. 
The elements to be considered when studying organization and management in general are 
outlined in the third chapter. At present there are only incipient theories available which 
attempt to depict safety management of complex industrial settings. At the onset the multi-level 
nature of the focal system has to be considered where the situation has different aspects on the 
different systems levels. Furthermore, the various productive processes require specific safety 
conditions and thus somewhat adapted safety and management approaches. Emergency 
conditions are a third area of consideration for related practices. In general, only partial theories 
are available for these areas, which do not easily lend themselves to being combined in a 
systematic fashion. Three fundamental elements, namely hierarchical levek, actors and time are 
discussed. 
The fourth chapter is devoted to identify some emerging themes which appear to be applicable 
in most industrial settings. Here the starting point is a closer scrutinization of the process of 
problem-solving and/or adaption. The three most complex and critical phases of this process are 
presented, including the establishment and promulgation of clear safety policies, the systematic 
collection and analysis of data on performance with ensuing generation of adequate solutions 
and also new approaches, and finally the comprehensive implementation of these insights among 
the entire installation staff. 
In the conclusions and recommendations a number of research questions are formulated and 
suggestions for future investigations within complex industrial facilities are made. 
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THE INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ON 
THE SAFETY OF NPPS AND OTHER INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS 
1. Managerial and Organizational Approaches to Safety in . Complex, 
Potentially Hazardous Settings. 
1.1 A broad view of safety. 
The roles of management and organization in assuring the safe performance of complex 
technologies, such as a nuclear power plants, chemicals production, and off-shore installations, 
are now obvious from experience. Among the serious and significant events characterizing the 
history of industrial installations are several where management failures were either primary or 
contributing causes (TMI, Chernobyl, Piper M a ) .  . In a similar sense, the relative absence of 
especially significant events at most of the world's plants can also be partially attributed to the 
ability of plant and utility management to provide the resources, leadership, and decision-making 
that leads to safely constructed, operated and maintained units. But while the importance of 
management and organization is clear, our understanding of what constitutes effective 
management and organization for safety lags far behind our understanding of most of the more 
technical issues facing the operators and regulators of the plants. 
Although it is possible to state the problem succinctly, in practice the issue of 
management and organization for safety is broad and complex. The aim of this working paper 
is to describe the universe of questions, issues, topics, and unresolved problems of this domain. 
As a whole, then, this paper has two goals: First, to suggest frameworks by which conceptual 
models might be further discussed and developed, and second, to provide thereby an agenda to 
organize future work and priorities. 
Today, there is little doubt that managerial practices and organizational structures 
influence the safe performance of complex industrial systems. Instead, we work from the 
assumption that safety of workers and of the public can no longer be regarded as a separate 
industrial function, skill, or concern that must be mandated. Rather, in tandem with modern 
industrial practice, safety matters are integral to every function, from the long-range planning 
in executive offices to the maintenance work being performed on shop floors. This modernized 
view incorporates safety into business plans and work design as an integral part of goals for 
efficient and economical production. 
Although the industry generally subscribes to this view of safety, there is at the same 
time a tendency to believe that the "safety problem" is merely an artifact of the public's 
perception of risk and hazard. The industry also believes that when plants are operating at top 
power production performance, they are simultaneously maximizing safety. That is more a goal 
at the moment, however, than a fact, and one objective of this paper is to contribute to making 
it so. Effective practices occur in every plant, throughout each of the complex industrial systems, 
but currently it is very difficult to use this information effectively. Thus, one of the main issues 
we discuss is: How to structure, organize, and systematize practical knowledge that exists in 
many forms. 
It is evident that higher management has a profound influence on the safety of industrial 
installations. The roles are however different at different levels in the organization. The chief 
executive officer (CEO) of a large industrial conglomerate has one role and the plant manager 
has another, but both should participate in the definition of company approaches to safety. In 
the present report no large difference is made between the different managerial positions with 
the understanding that approaches to safety will be largely similar. 
Thus, when we define management, we must define it broadly to include not only the 
plant manager, but also the line of management extending upward to the CEO, and downward 
to the first line supervisor. We must also recognize that even direct workers, such as those in 
self-managed workgroups may perform some activities that have traditionally been the domain 
of management. Further, we must also recognize that external actors, such as financial holding 
companies or regulators can also take on the role of manager in some specific cases. When we 
investigate or conduct research on management, therefore, we must be willing to accept the fact 
that different organizations, different cultures, and different political systems will distribute the 
management function in different ways. 
* 
An historical perspective is also needed on the very concept of safety in order to 
understand its social evolution and current conceptualization. Today we regard safety as 
consisting of the avoidance of injuries to all employees and the public and damage to the 
environment and property. In the past, we have perhaps been less conscious of the potential, 
threats to employees and the public, and in the future, our concern may be greater still. , ;. 
Along with a sense of history, we must also consider the future. Existing plants are 
aging, and management will be responsible for laying out and implementing a strategy for 
assuring the continued safe performance of existing plants. Similar changes are happening in 
the work force, as the original generation of staff must be replaced with a new, and perhaps 
different type of worker. Many utilities will face potential severe economic challenges in the 
future that will tax the ability of management to assure that resources and skiUs are available 
to operate the plant. At the same time, technology itself is changing, opening new options for. 
existing plants and plants yet to be designed and constructed. These changes will also provide 
challenges to effective management and organization for safety. 
12 Some Issues in Research. 
To develop the tools by which the goal of a systematic understanding of management and 
organization effects on plant safety can be accomplished requires a research perspective on 
managerial and organizational issues. For the nuclear power industry in particular, this 
perspective introduces a new voice into what has been chiefly the purview of regulators, 
especially perhaps in the USA. The arrival of independent researchers - those whose research 
concerns stem from the theoretical interests of several disciplines - represents not only a new 
institutional actor, but one whose objective is understanding rather than criticism. If properly 
and objectively conducted, research can extend management's understanding of how to 
effectively assure plant safety. However, such research will require access to the various 
scattered data sources, maintained by regulatory bodies, by industry organizations, and by 
individual plants. It will also require access to the opportunity to collect new data on 
management and organization practices. Such data are essential for systematizing and recasting 
information in useful ways, but these data are often closely held and unavailable for reanalysis, 
perhaps because of the regulatory atmosphere and attendant antagonisms. 
These data, in their various forms, are needed for developing the conceptual models that 
represent the essential issues involved in managing and organizing daily productive operations. 
The aim of the research community should be to cooperatively develop studies of operating 
practices that are of interest both to broader disciplinary questions and to those plant operators 
eager for validated practical knowledge. Further, the international character of this work opens 
new questions, as we begin to understand better the conflicts among different models of 
operations that rely on different assumptions - most notably, perhaps, the differences between 
tighter and looser regulation of operating procedures and the differences in trust that they imply. 
2. Good Practices: What Do We Know From Experience? 
While it is widely recognized that much has yet to be learned about how to safely 
manage and organize nuclear power plants (NPPs), it must also be recognized that much useful 
industry experience exists to guide this learning process. And, while management and 
organizational factors have been increasingly cited as major contributors to operational safety 
problems, the management and organizational systems of most NPPs appear to operate fairly 
effectively in assuring safe performance. Thus, there would appear to be considerable "good 
practice" information available to augment the "bad practice" information available from analyses 
of events. In fact, many such good practices have been compiled into one or more of the good- 
practice documents related to management and organization (IAEA; INPO). These documents 
identify some of the key safety-related challenges facing NPP managers and provide 
recommendations on specific practices for meeting these challenges. Some of the practices 
reflect the detailed approaches that have led to successful performance at particular plants, while 
others are more general recommendations aggregating the experience of several or many 
utilities. Examples of what some industry experience has identified to be good practices can be 
found in Appendix A. 
The existence of these good practice documents speaks to the fact that considerable. 
information exists on how to organize and manage for safety. However, the experience of the 
nuclear industry world-wide amply demonstrates that management and organizational issues 
continue to contribute significantly to operational safety problems at plants. Thus, it is important 
to consider the current state of good practices, the usefulness of the good practice approach, and 
ways that the process of developing, diffusing, and implementing good practice information can 
be improved. 
Given the existence of such "good practice" information, why do management and 
organization-related safety problems continue to exist? It is clearly the case that current 
understandings of good practice, though highly useful are not sufficient to guide the managers 
of hazardous industrial installations in the very difficult task of continuously assuring safety. In 
this section, we would like to address some of the strengths and weaknesses of the good-practice 
approach, and to recommend both some improvements in the process for developing and 
disseminating information on good practices, and some higher order good practices that do 
appear to be emerging from both industry experience and systematic research. We will refer to 
these higher order good practices as "good principles." Some initial discussion of good principles 
can be found in Chapter 4. 
What lies behind the inadequacy of current good practice information? One obvious factor is 
that much of it has not been systematically collected and verified, and that some of the 
information that exists is not sufficiently precise or accurate. However, there are several more 
significant limitations to the good practices approach to assuring safe management and 
organization. 
In general, expectations for safety performance have increased in most countries over 
time. This has been due both to public/regulator pressures, and to recognition on the part of 
plant operators of the need for enhanced safety based on their operational experience. As the 
expectations for safety performance have increased, additional demands have been placed on 
the management and organizational systems. These increased demands have led to changes in 
what constitutes a good practice. For example, the TMI accident had substantial effects on the 
definition of what constitutes an adequate system for screening the operating experience of the 
industry. What existed as adequate practice before the accident, would no longer be considered 
to be adequate. 
In a similar sense, there have been other major changes in the operating environment 
of many utilities. These have included changes in the cost, quality and availability of labor, 
technical information, fuel, and parts. These "economic" changes have affected substantially the 
management and organization systems required to be economically viable, with resulting effects 
on safety, as well. Thus, these other changes have led to a reconsideration of what constitutes 
a good practice. 
' Plant and organizational aging have also required adjustments in what constitutes good 
management and organization practice for safety. The needs of the mature workforce are not,, 
the same as the needs of the young workforce. The loss of key staff present with the utility since 
construction of the plant requires new systems for retaining plant specific knowledge. The aging 
and replacement of components may dramatically affect existing workflow systems and ,the 
required skill base of the organization. Thus, for several reasons, what constitutes a .  good 
practice will necessarily change with time. 
Even more important, however, is the fact that good practices exist only relative to an 
intact, systematic management system. When good practices are reported, they are necessarily 
abstracted from this more complex system with some substantial degree of information loss. The 
logic of the good practice, however, remains tied to the other elements of the system from which 
it was abstracted. For example, the success of a recommended good practice for root cause 
analysis may depend upon the communications systems, authority relationships and technical 
skillspresent in the organization. Unless similar conditions exist in other organizations, this good 
practice may not be exportable with the same degree of effectiveness. 
There are a number of factors that can cause NPP organizations to vary to the point that 
the transferability of good practices is in doubt. Some of these factors include: 
- Willingness to learn from experience, training 
- Regulatory philosophy and requirements 
- Public attitudes and expectations 
- Economic pressures 
- Labor force characteristics 
- Cultural differences 
- Ownership structures 
- The unique history of the organization 
- Other, existing management and personnel practices 
- Technology 
Specific good practices may well exist among NPP organizations that are similar on these 
dimensions, but to the extent that they vary, particularily good practices can still be hard to 
identify. 
It is extremely important, therefore, for those organizations, such as leading utilities, regulators, 
industry groups, and even the research community, that are in a position to identify and 
communicate good practice information, to recognize that much of the good practice 
information is, in its specific application, context specific. These organizations must be willing 
to learn about the context, and provide advice tailored to that context. Managers of industrial 
facilities in turn, must recognize that the good practice information available may need to be 
substantially adapted in order for it to help at their particular plants. 
3. Elements in the Consideration of Organization and Management. 
Today, good practices as well as all operating actions are guided by implicit traditions, 
assumptions, inferences, theories, understandings, and experience. The role of research is to 
describe, clarify, and systematize them. At times, the role of research is to bring tacitly held 
assumptions up to close scrutiny. Although it is commonly believed that a Probabilistic Risk 
.Assessment model, for example, is only a technical tool, we suggest that it must also be, 
considered as a social product, the end result of a social process that represents the judgments,. 
values, and particular perspectives of its creators or those who apply it. Similarly, many self- 
evident management practices may also need to be reexamined through the eyes of research. 
The appearances of universality need to be modified with acknowledgements of their 
contingency and context-dependence if such tools and practices are to be maximally effective. 
At the onset, one has to realize that at best what we have presently are incipient theories 
that try to cover safety management of complex industrial settings comprehensively. As discussed 
previously, the redress of this situation is seriously hampered by access problems to data on 
managerial practices and organizational processes in real life situations. In addition, the subject 
matter of concern is very complex, spanning several levels of analysis and differing operating 
conditions. 
For example, it is important to note that the multi-level nature of the focal system 
implies that the problems pose themselves differently on different systems levels - the 
governmental/regulatory, the public discourse level, the corporate/company level, the plant and 
operational level, and individual behavior. A developed and verified theory of management and 
organization for safety must be capable addressing the different levels and of describing and 
explaining the ways that the levels are interconnected. 
The picture is even further complicated when the intrinsic cyclical nature of a production 
process such as that of NPPs, sets specific safety conditions for the different systems levels 
depending on the particular phase of the productive process (construction, start-up, production, 
outage, decommissioning). In addition, the damage potential and the speed in which emergency 
situations tend to develop in NPPs, set particular constraints on organizational and managerial 
action models to cope with these requirements. Therefore, what can be offered presently are bits 
and pieces of theoretical fragments which are often hard to relate to each other in a systematic 
fashion. 
Time represents another dimension to be considered using a systems approach. 
Management concerns not only the specific operational needs of the day, but also planning and 
strategic decision-making for the future. The time dimension has further to be sub-divided into 
long-term (production phases) and short-term (operation, 
crisis, restoration) considerations (6. Box 1). 
I I 
Returning to the different levels of analysis, at the I Hierarchical levels . . . . I  
institutional lever we need to be concerned with the way 
in which the nuclear utility fits in the wider organization- 
al environment. This includes aspects of the economic 
system, affecting the profitability of the utility in the 
present, and its economic viability in the future. It also 
includes the role of government including any support for 
the industry that may be forthcoming, the level of control 
that the government exerts over the operation of the 
plant, and whether the relationship between the utility 
and the government is cooperative or conflictual. A thud 
aspect of the institutional level includes the relationships 
between the utility and other organizational members of 
the industry including vendors, suppliers, sub-contractors, 
and the like. 
The nature of the institutional context can vary 
enormously. For example, we have noted variation 
ranging from fragmentation and encapsulation leading to 
interest and pressure groups with specific ideological 
orientations, to other situations where practices of self- 
evaluation and self-policing suggest a greater openness 
and perhaps cooperation among institutional actors. 
What constitutes effective management in a context 
characterized by conflict may be (at least in the short 
run) very different from what constitutes effective 
management in a context characterized by cooperation. 
There are resources that management does not 
- institutional 
- corporate/company 
- plant 
- department 
- group 
- individual 
Actors 
- governments 
- operator (utility) 
- vendors, architect engineer 
- regulator 
- labor unions 
- employees 
- public 
- media 
- researchers 
Time 
(long-term) 
- design and construction 
- start up 
- production 
- outage 
- decommissioning 
(short-term) 
- routine operation 
- emergency and crisis 
restoration 
control, that are set by institutions external to the I I 
organization. Although efforts should be made to negoti- BOX I. Three dimensions on which issues 
ate with the external environment for resources and of organization and management 
relaxation of unduly constraints, management should only have to be considered. 
be held responsible for what they do with the resources 
they can reasonably control. For example, utilities should take a role in creating an intelligent 
partnership with regulators rather than a grudging compliance or antagonistic avoidance. 
A number of safety-related issues operate at the corporate/company level. For example, 
at the corpo~te/company level safety notions often become fragmented and are considered as 
unique variables rather than integrative properties of the whole organizational system. The non- 
systems approach can lead to competitive initiatives within the fm. For example, nuclear safety 
can become disintegrated with the notion of industrial safety. Theoretically based principles can, 
however, be identified in certain industries (such as the petroleum industry) where the notion 
of industrial safety tendentially encompasses risk management both in the area of individual 
hazards as well as environmental damages. 
At the plant level, existing formal (functional) organizational structures and actual 
operational functioning are often not consonant with each other. What is lacking here are 
conceptual tools to relate requirements under different task situations such as routine - crisis 
- emergency situations and requisite resource allocations to each other. A possible theoretical 
approach might entail clarifying the coexisting of tightly and loosely coupled subsystems (Perrow, 
1984). 
Group pmesses. A rich sociopsychological portfolio of concepts relating to group 
processes to help understand and optimize their outcomes in view of task requirements does 
exist (Janis and Mann 1971; Janis, 1972). They must however be adapted to the specific 
situations of industrial installations - e.g. task forces, safety committees, review teams, project 
groups. Similarly, traditional preoccupations with human factor aspects of safety focus on 
cognitive-psychological aspects of individual operators. Largely unexplored remain the social, 
that is, managerial, organizational and cultural dimensions contributing to (un)safe behaviors. 
PRA, as relatively well developed technique, is considered as an important managerial 
tool for improving management of safety of physical assets. The PRA tool has its largest value 
in comparing the risks of alternate projects/processes and should not be used for an absolute 
determination of risks. By and large unnoticed are the social (collective) judgmental processes 
in the development and application of these analyses which determine their outcomes. This is 
but one example of many so-called "technical" analyses that should be reexamined in lightof 
their concomitant social processes. An important unresolved theoretical problem on this level 
is how and whetherprobabilistic models of engineering sciences in PRA and behavioral scientific 
causal &Is of human behavior can be related (J. Rasmussen, 1989). 
Within the various levels of analysis, it is important to be able to characterize the 
primary actors. Among the regulatoy actors there seem to be different implicit "theories in use" 
(Armis, 1970) that guide the development of regulatory frameworks. They can be characterized 
by their extremes: On the one hand we can observe highly differentiated and formalized 
regulatory systems to cope with a wide variety of specifically spelled out risks. On the other 
hand, one can note approaches that are guided by what might be called "performance criteria" 
that can be fulfilled by different means. On the whole one must say that this domain is 
"undertheorized". More theory development is required. A fully developed theoretical 
perspective on the regulatory actions would assist in reconsidering the perceived distinction 
between industrial and nuclear safety. A necessary approach to develop such a theoretical 
framework would be to study the safety theories in use of various high risk industrial settings 
in comparative perspective. 
Vendom, h i g n e m  and architect engineers represent a group of actors with a large impact 
on actual plant solutions. The relations between vendors, designers, regulating agencies and 
utility companies constitute intricate interorganizational networks which clearly have impact on 
safety of NPPs. The interorganizational communication and decision making processes imply 
inordinately long time horizons, the fading in and fading out of different cooperating parties, 
which cannot yet be conceptualized and described on a theoretical level except in approximate 
terms by network theory. The introduction of technological innovations (hardware, software, 
maintenance techniques) poses a large gamut of theoretical and practical problems that are 
exemplified by notions such as artificial intelligence and expert systems. Past experience shows 
that such innovations influence the division of labor between automation and the human systems 
and therefore can have much more profound implications on managerial systems than originally 
thought. 
Labor, including organized labor unions are another group of actors in the picture. 
Taking into account different socioeconomic and industrial relations systems a traditional 
concern of unions has always been to contribute to safeguarding workplace safety and fostering 
accident prevention. Concerns for environmental protection are also growing. Theories of 
bargaining and interest group representation are of relevance here.-Their potential to contribute 
to industrial safety and the conditions of nuclear power operations will have to be explored. 
The employes within the organization are - perhaps the most : important actors for 
implementing a continuing safety. Only commitment and involvement at all levels can bring in 
the necessary adherence to high safety standards. 
The public also provides important interactions between the other actors. Theories of 
risk communication and risk perception (Renn, Swaton, 1984; Jungermann et al, 1990) are 
clearly of relevance in this context. It can be shown from a variety of case studies that public 
opinion climate with regard to NPPs affects reactions of regulatory agencies and of nuclear 
power utilities: increase of rules and regulations, of proceduralization and "regulation overload" 
on the one hand and "play down" of information given to the public on specific events. Both 
contribute to spiraling of public distrust, information hiding, and defensive siege mentalities. 
4. Provisional Frameworks for Organizing Good Management Principles. 
Although the current level of knowledge and the contingencies that face individual 
utilities limit the availability of truly useful good practices information, at a more general level 
there are some emerging themes that appear applicable in most applications. This chapter 
considers some of those themes. 
The modem idea of safety as integral to all productive processes in hazardous industrial 
organizations has several implications for operations. Nuclear power particularly demands an 
attitude that prioritizes safety and quality before quantity; safety has, then, at least equal 
consideration to business factors such as profit or production. An integrated view of safety 
implies furthermore that the long-range perspective should take precedence over short-range 
demands that can result in false economies, along with risk to the public. 
One point of departure for organizing disparate good practices and observations is a 
framework that examines the process of problem-solving or adaptation. This framework 
emphasizes how plants continually improve their practices by internal and external feedback 
systems, rather than the particular content of the practices themselves. We schematize the three 
most complex and critical moments of this process: 
4.1 Setting and Re-Setting Goals/Policies. 
Management's first responsibility is to establish and promulgate clear safety policies for 
and to every level of the organization. A second responsibility is to establish an assessment 
process that evaluates the relationship between policies and practices, in order to improve both 
as needed. On-going programs for safety improvement should be part of the organization's 
regular planning process. 
Management should pay attention both to details and to the big picture in the process 
of setting plant goals. Management should ensure that the goals are clear and understood among 
all affected parties. This requires time for discussion among a broad group including workers 
and regulators. 
Management should assure common understanding of the whole process of setting goals, 
sensing needs for improvements and implementing them. Again, time spent in preparation will 
ensure that affected parties understand the need for new practices and theway in which.:the 
organization has planned a transition from current procedures to new ones. This includes an 
understanding of how goal accomplishment will be measured. 
In the definition goals and policies it is still a need to define responsibilities and 
accountability at each level of the organization. A superficial assessment process cannot be 
expected to function. 
4 2  Sensing and Diagnosing Conditions. 
' Management needs tools that can systematically gather basic data on performance and 
then analyze their significance and organizational implications. Once the implications of the 
analysis are understood, new solutions and new approaches can be generated. More kinds of 
knowledge than are conventionally relied on in technical environments are necessary for 
understanding plant practices, especially data on human organization and management in such 
areas as operations and maintenance. 
Diagnosing current practices requires broad sensing of ,the internal and external 
environment. The industry can no longer think of itself as insulated and protected from the 
environment. Taboos on considering safety and performance relevant information cannot be 
tolerated, either within or outside the plants. Internal to the plant, information should be sought 
across functional areas. Everyone should feel that they have a contribution to make in. 
identifying areas where improvements to safety are appropriate. External to the plant, 
information should be sought from many areas of the environment, including vendors, suppliers, 
regulators, other utilities (of whom those with similar plants, practices, or problems may be most 
informative), public interest groups, and other industries (such as chemical process, airlines, 
military). Mechanisms for information exchange provided by IAEA, INPO, NUMARC, WAN0 
and so forth should be utilized actively. 
The information required for an assessment includes goals and expectations, the 
outcomes or products of practices, the opinions of those in the work system who carry out or 
are affected by the practices, and external information about similar situations in other nuclear 
power plants or other industries. The use of outside observers or the rotation of plant personnel 
to external posts can assist in providing such comparisons. Assessment involves comparisons 
between outcomes and goals or expectations. Trends over time can be particularly valuable, since 
changes in practices have delayed effects on outcomes. The better our understanding of goals 
and outcomes and our conceptual models of plants, the easier it is to attribute changes in 
outcomes to changes in practices. 
A fault-free or blame-free system of error detection and reporting is critical to effective 
safety management. A balance should be sought between, on the one hand, appropriate and just 
sanctions for failing to perform appropriately and, on the other, a managerial environment 
supporting the active search for precursors and unsafe conditions. The detection of problems 
with current practices or with an implementation effort should be encouraged by accepting "bad 
news" as an opportunity for learning rather than an occasion for blame and punishment. 
Punishment tends to prevent the flow of information and thus reduces the capacity of the 
organization to adapt. 
Determining the salience and relevance of each of the many sources of data and 
information requires conceptual frameworks that place them in proper contexts. People in the 
' plant become maximally useful for detecting information and developing solutions to problems , 
when they have a broad understanding of the relationships among work systems. The importance 
of systems understanding for all employees cannot be overemphasized; efforts to provide more 
generalists training, cross-training, etc. will contribute to the goal of transforming data to 
information. Managers with knowledge of systems details and workers with knowledge of the 
larger, more global picture of work systems and the organization are equally important. 
Assessment should provide sufficient detail to distinguish good and bad aspects of any 
management practice. Even systems that are working well may have areas in which improve- 
ments can be made. Also systems that are working poorly may have useful ideas that can be the- 
core of new practices. Assessment practices should have usable outcomes. They should be 
.- 1- . reviewed and used in the process of proposing future plans covering plant safety, worker safety, 
regulatory compliance, resource allocation, and so forth. 
Root cause analysis is presently the chief example of a major diagnostic tool for 
determining the most informative interpretation of operational data, and its further development 
and refinement deserves high priority in both research and practice. 
4 3  Implementation of New Policies. 
Good communications is the key to implementation. This is enhanced by an open, 
- inquiring atmosphere, shared understandings implying some breadth of knowledge, common 
language for discussing safety and organizational issues, and other aspects that are the products 
of management attitudes, personnel systems, and training. Implementation of new practices is 
another opportunity to learn. Follow-ups are essential to capitalize on that learning to improve 
the implementation process. Thus, evaluation of new practices should be built into the system. 
For example, OSART and ASSET are now carrying out follow-up missions that provide further 
information on plants and on the nature of the response to such missions that are useful for 
assessing the missions themselves. 
The implementation process must be designed with an understanding of contingencies 
that affect quality such as (but not restricted to): career paths, union structure, authority beliefs, 
education and skill level of work force, regulatory structure, ownership structure of the utility, 
and strategic resource constraints arising from the market and business conditions of the utility. 
The primary resource for the development, implementation, and use of good practices 
is people who have the skills, commitment, and resources. It is critical that the organization 
place high priority on maintaining and developing human resources. This would include a 
concern for the career path of people in the organization, the conditions necessary to maintain 
commitment, and the long-term integrity of the organizational knowledge base involving 
succession/turnover, skill development, and ways to share and preserve knowledge possessed by 
individuals. For example, if young people see no career prospects in the industry, then only 
lower-quality people will enter the industry, resulting in a degradation of the human resource. 
The additional demands placed upon management, including top management and first- 
line supervisors, to strive constantly for good practices and safety, should be supported through 
management skills development. Management skills development should include goal setting, 
resource allocation, team building, communication, and conceptual frameworks. Pressures on 
first-line supervisors should be recognized, and appropriate resources brought to bear in terms 
of good communications, conceptual frameworks, and skill building. These things take time to 
fully develop. The automatic response of simply adding more managers may be counterproduc- 
tive by adding to the coordination complexity and further reducing available resources..-..-. - -.... 
Implementation should include a self-check system in which workers and managers are 
considered responsible for their own actions. Although there will always be monitoring and 
quality checks, everyone should feel responsible for what they do. Responsibility and 
accountability for performance should be enforced by the entire line organization. Managers 
should look for opportunities to hold people accountable in a constructive way. Managers should 
also demonstrate their commitment to safety through attention and consistent actions. 
The additional demands placed on everyone to process more information should also be 
recognized. Appropriate strategies are to spread information processing over time (permit time 
' for training and skill development), over people (accept input and participation from, and 
delegate responsibility to, those lower in the organization), and provide better mechanisms for 
handling information such as better conceptual frameworks for understanding the plant and 
computer support. 
Resource allocation is an important way of communicating and supporting goals in 
organizations. This does not substitute for the communication of goals by written, verbal and 
other techniques. Thus progress can be made towards achieving goals through good line 
management and supporting line management where resource allocation is required. Resources 
must be allocated appropriately up and down the organizations. 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations. 
Proposals for future action. Apart from the various proposals already made above, the 
following general proposals are made to promote theoretical understanding of industrial safety 
There is a need for providing better access to and analyses of existing data bases 
(reports, quantitative, qualitative, methods) on international, national, company, industrial levels. 
Respecting the needs for anonymity, an awareness of all parties involved should be 
created that the demands of developing adequate theory of safety management requires 
empirical evidence available only through cooperatively developed programs of studies in 
operating plants. 
A program of basic studies of psychological and social processes are necessary for 
understanding the fundamental dynamics involved in such puzzling issues as, for example, why 
the development of safety programs so often depends on the experience of a serious incident 
in an industry. 
There is a need for a better definition of performance in safety oriented organizations 
and the identification of good practices. Because of changes in standards and conditions of 
operations, good practices should always be seen as transitory. They must continually be re- 
evaluated in the context of the day and of developing trends. Because the contribution of a 
practice to safety performance depends upon its relationship with other elements of the 
management and organization system at an NPP, along with the special constraints facing that 
NPP, highly detailed and prescriptive good practices that fit the needs of all or many NPPs are 
unlikely to be identified. Instead, it is more useful to identify "good principles" which must then 
be made operational in the context of the particular NPP with management and organization 
strategies that make sense in that context. 
There are a number of research questions which may be taken up for further 
investigations. At the institutional level such questions are: 
- How does a situation of economic scarcity (or economic bounty) affect the ability of 
management to assure the safe operation of the plant? 
- How does the extent and nature of integration of the industry affect the ability of 
management to assure the safe operation of the plant? For example, what different 
management issues are raised for utilities in highly integrated industries (eg. Japan) 
versus utilities in somewhat less integrated industries (eg. U.S.)? 
- 
- What regulatory philosophies and approaches promote or inhibit effective management 
for safety at the plant level? How can management provide the right kind of buffer 
between the regulator and the day to day operation of the plant? 
Some of the suggestions for future investigations within the companies may include the following 
considerations: 
- The role of chairmanlchief executive in safety, how they communicate their expectations, 
how they demonstrate their own commitment and how they ensure accountability 
throughout their organizations. 
- The use of the root cause analysis technology in identifjing organizational deficiencies 
and in improving organizational efficiency. 
- The design of efficient means of achieving commitment and involvement of employees 
at all levels; what are the best ways of communicating with employees on issues of safety. 
6. References 
Argyris, Ch. (1970), Intervention theory and method, Addison-Wesely, Reading, MA. 
IAEA (1991), Safety culture, International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Series No.75-INSAG- 
4, Vienna. 
Janis, I.L. (1972), Victims of groupthink, Moughton Mifflin, Boston. 
Janis, I.L., Mann, L. (1976), Decision making, a psychological analysis of conflict, choice and 
commitment, New York. 
Jungermann, H., Rohrmann, B., Wiedemann, P.M. (1990), Riskokonzepte, Risikokonflikte, 
Risikokommunikation, Kernforschungsanlage Jiilich GmbH, Jiilich, Germany. 
Perrow, C. (1984), Normal accidents, Basic Books, New York. 
Rasmussen, J. (1989), Human errors and the problem of causality in analysis of accidents, 
unpublished paper. 
Renn, 0. Swaton, E. (1984), Psychological and sociological approaches to study risk perception,. - - 
Environment International, Vol.10, pp.557-575. 
14 
APPENDIX A 
EXAMPLE GOOD PRACTICES 
1. SAFETY CULTURE 
The essential prerequisite for achieving high safety standards is a clear and unambiguous 
policy statement. The policy should address the prevention of ill-health and injury to all 
employees and the public and should make it clear that ALL injuries and events are significant. 
Classification of injuries as not being of safety significance because they are below scale on the 
INES should not be allowed. Otherwise two separate safety systems will exist in one organization 
- a nuclear safety system and industrial an safety system. 
Total commitment to safety by all employees in an organization can only created when 
they recognize their own personal responsibility for safety and believe that there is genuine 
concern by management for their personal welfare. Achievement of total system safety, both 
human and technical is dependent on the existence of a single safety culture which must'be 
properly defined. 
Attention is drawn to the defmition of 
safety culture (6. Box 2) in Safety series No 75- 
INSAG-4. This definition is somewhat restricted 
because it addresses only nuclear safety. It is 
suggested that consideration be given to amending 
"Nuclear plant safety issues" to "All safety issues". 
2. POLICY 
Safety culture is that assembly of characteri- . 
stics and attitudes in organizations and indivi- 
dualSwhichestablishes as an averriding 
priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the 
by their sw,-ce. 
It is extremely unusual to find any other 
type of industry, and particularly in the large 
process industries, where there is such a sharp 
distinction between industrial and technical safety. 
Managers commitment 
- definition of responsibilities 
- definition and control of safety prac- 
policy level commitment 
- statement of safety policy 
- management structures 
- resources 
- self-regulation 
organization I I 
The policy statement in which management 
commitment and objktives are defined should 
include the following features: 
- safety is given at least equal consideration 
to any other business factors such as profit 
or production 
- safety is a line management responsibility 
and must be exercised at each level of the 
- re&ar review of safety perfomance at 2 The definition of Safety Culture and 
each level from the board of directors major components. 
tices 
- qualifications and training 
- rewards and sanctions 
- audit, review and comparison 
Individuals commitment 
- questioning attitude 
- rigorous and prudent approach 
- communication 
downwards 
- On-going programs on safety improvements are included in the annual planning process 
of the organization; progress is regularly monitored. 
- involvement of all employees in safety 
- avoidance of injuries to all employees and the public and damage to the environment 
and property. 
3. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
Implementation of policy requires the following: 
- key performance goals must be set which are realistic and capable of being realized. 
Related performance indicators must be clearly defined. 
- ' All managers must demonstrate their commitment to safety through their actions. , ,.. 
- Audits of safety standards and practices, both internal and external, must be regularly 
carried out. Both management systems and technical systems should be included. 
- The organization should expect contractors operating on its behalf to achieve the same 
standards of safety as itself. 
4. ORGANIZATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
In addition to the policy itself a statement of arrangements for meeting policy 
requirements within the organization should be produced. This should include 
- Statements of line responsibilities and accountabilities at each level in the organization. 
Advisory roles should also be defined. 
- Specific arrangements for the involvement of all employees in safety. 
- Requirement for each unit to have a detailed operating procedures manual including a 
comprehensive safety section. 
- Details of safety review processes. 
- Training arrangements. 
- Use of personal protective equipment. 
- Emergency response arrangements. 
- First aid and ambulance arrangements. 
- Incident investigation procedures including root cause analysis and follow up. 
- Arrangements for communication on safety and reporting of safety performance to all 
employees. 
The policy and arrangements should be communicated and explained to all employees. 
5. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
- Project development and approval must insure full compliance with company and 
regulatory standards for health, safety, and the environment. 
- High design standards must be set and maintained. Standards must be revised in the 
light of experience. 
- High quality safety advisers should be appointed and assignments in safety should be 
regarded as important in career development of potential senior managers. 
16 
APPENDIX B 
ASPECTS OF SAFETY RELEVANT TO MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION 
The role of management in assuring safety performance has been discussed in general terms in 
the main text of this report. However, it is also useful to consider that many aspects of safety 
that can be linked to management and organization. The following list is intended. to 
demonstrate such couplings. 
SAFETY FAILURE MODE POSSIBLE MANAGEMENT FAILURE 
Non-availability of safety systems and equip- Decision to excessively limit preventive 
ment maintenance due to budget considerations 
Human actions leading to the initiation of Inadequate communication between opera- 
plant transients tions and maintenance about the availability _ 
of systems 
Component failures leading to the initiation Inadequate emphasis by management on 
of plant transients taking responsibility for quality 
Human actions leading to the complication Inadequate management support of training 
of transients including simulators 
Component failures leading to the complica- Inadequate management attention to setting 
tion of plant transients maintenance priorities based on risk 
Lack of protection of workers from radia- Lack of management direction in planning 
tion and other workplace hazards of task activities 
Inability to operate in a way that assures Attitude on the part of management that 
regulator and public confidence outsiders have no legitimate concern with 
safety 
Inability to control the volume of waste Short-term orientation on the part manage- 
ment 
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Such researches are of great value not f o r  the USSR on! y 
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This is the second progress report for the MIT International Program for 
Enhanced Nuclear Power Plant Safety. It is our plan to publish two reports 
each year: a mid-year report in January and this annual report. Reports will 
be provided to a l l  program participants and sponsors. 
THE MTT INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM FOR 
ENHANCED NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY 
BACKGROUND 
The MIT International Program for Enhanced Nuclear Power Plant Safety is a 
cooperative research program developed to creak new knowledge of and insight into nudear 
power plant operations so as to enhance safety. The program is international in its scope and 
participation because the issue of nuclear safety is itself an international issue-a serious 
acadent at any specific nuclear plant will have a profound effect on wery nuclear plant in the 
world. And the program focuses upon operating plants rather than new design concepts because 
the creation of improved practices, procedures, policim, and structures can help sustain the 
nuclear option worldwide. Finally, the range of work is much broader than technology but 
encompasses managerial and policy-related research as well. 
The foundations upon which the program is built are fivefold: 
-- The sponsors must be distributed from mund the world and represent all the mapr 
nuclear nations. 
-- Sponsors must be active participants in the program, sharing knowledge,. 
experience, personnel, and aitical judgment. 
-- The research projects must reflect the priorities of the worldwide industry to assure 
relevance as well as interest. 
-- The program must be multidisciplinary to reflect the true dimensions of the problem 
of safe operations. 
-- The focus of the work must be located at a disinterested organization (such as MIT) b 
assure the perception and reality of neutrality regarding specific reearch results. 
There are other national and international organizations with deep interests in nuclear 
safety. Within the United States we have the Electric Power Research Institute and the 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations; the most prominent international organizations are the 
World Association of Nuclear Operators, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD, and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. All of t k s e  organbtions are major contributors to 
improved plant safety and operations. We believe our program fills an important niche and is 
complementary to these existing efforts, and we beliwe it is i m p l a n t  for our program to be 
cooperative with those efforts. The program is a vehicle to conduct research that is relevant to 
safety, that is clpdible to the international nuclear community, and whose results are available 
to all. 
At the initial meeting of program sponsors in June 1990, we presented the three mapr 
program area8 ud a set of projects within the areas. The program areas are: 
(1 The Sdenee ud Technology of Service and Maintenance; 
(2) The Science of Management of Nuclear Power Plants; and 
(3) The Role of Public Policy in the Safe Operation of Nuclear Power Plants. 
The current level of funding for the program supports four projects: thee in the Service and 
Maintenance area and the one in the Science of Management area. As sponsorship funding 
increases, we will begin other propcts. 
i 
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JNTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The Need for This Roiect 
The organization and management component of the The MIT 
International Program on Enhanced Nuclear Power Plant Safety addresses the 
following question: 
How should nuclcrrr power pla.nts organize and manage their human 
and technologicat resources to maximize their safe and efficient 
operat ion ? 
The importance of management and organizational factors is 
confirmed by research on predictors of variation in perfoxnance-and safety. 
The USA, with its large number of utilities and early entry into the industry, 
has the highest diversity among nations in technology and in performance. 
~l though research shows some impact of technology (Beckjord et al., 1987; 
INPO, 1988; Samanta et al., 1988), regulatory structure (Suzuki & Hansen, 
1988), and industrial structure (Lester, 1986), much of the variability in 
performance cannot be attributed to these factors. For example, Swiss and 
Japanese plants operate at similar very high levels of utilization (power 
production as a percent of potential production) and they have very few 
unplanned outages or other safety incidents, although their reactors vary 
substantially in design (Beckprd et al., 1987). 
Yet it comes as a challenge to current organization theory to account for 
organizational and management factors in "high-reliability organizations" 
such as nuclear plants, chemical process plants, nuclear airaaft carriers, and 
air traffic control. Conventional organizational theory, having been 
developed in "trial-and-error" organizations, may need to be modified to 
address the organizational, managerial, and resource issuescentral to the 
safety dynamics of high reliability organizations, which are characterized by 
tightly coupled subsystems whose misalignment bears the potential for grave 
consequences (LaPorte & Consolini, 1989; Perrow, 1984). 
This project is therefore different in several ways from current efforts 
to improve nuclear power plant operations and management. Most take 
place largely within a regulatory framework concerned with evaluating 
individual plant performance through quantifiable indicators that can be 
compared easily aaoss plants. Regulators identify unsafe outcomes such as 
Licensee Event Reports, generic issues backlog, and unplanned outages. Such 
indicators of safe practices are of limited help in improving safety, according 
to dose observers, because "they have been developed inaementally over 
time to deal with specific issues as they have arisen and are not part of a 
broader logical framework" (Marcus et al., 1990, p. 24). Only recently have the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its researchers recognized these 
limitations to the theory and measurement of safety by calling for attention to 
"unsafe behaviors" as well as to unsafe outcomes. 
We see the control, coordination, and communication practices that 
nuclear power plants use in carrying out work as holding the key to a broader 
logical framework through which to improve their organization and 
management for safe performance. Our project, moreover, takes this work 
systems approach within a research rather than a regulatory or evaluative 
mode. Without the implied threats and demands of that mode, we seek to 
describe and understand plant operations and provide systematic information 
about organizational and managerial processes implicated in safe 
performance. This approach is not limited to measures that will have direct 
regulatory usefulness, nor to measures that are quick and easy to develop. 
This report presents some of what we have learned inductively from 
observing and analyzing the control, coordination, and communicative 
processes involved in work systems that are mt ra l  to plant operations. Our 
studies have been supported by the interest in new ideas and willingness to 
cooperate among many nudear power plant operators, industry groups, 
regulatory bodies, and research colleagues. During our field studies, we have 
been impressed with the high levels of conscientiousness and concern with 
continual seif-improvement and learning among power plant staff at all 
levels. 
Currently, the industry relies on dissemination of reports of best 
practice from "successful" plants to improve technical, procedural, and 
managerial practices inaementally. Lists of desirable plant characteristics 
(e.g., Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 1987) have similar intent. 
Although this approach is useful in the absence of a theoretical 
understanding of safety in high reliability organizations, we question its 
assumption that an unsystematic number of "best practices" can cumulatively 
improve safety performance. Similarly, Systematic Assessments of Licensee 
Performance and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) advisory 
services staff their reviews by functional areas and provide recommendations 
and suggestions for improvement by functions, also assuming that functional 
integrity guarantees system integrity. 
Instead, we view ' k t  practices" along with industry traditions, 
assumptions, and experiences, as incipient theories of safe performance. 
Building on these, our aim is to develop a systematic basis for understanding 
variations in the organizational and management characteristics of safe 
performance, and thereby to establish the grounds for changes in 
fundamental organizational paradigms and values. A specific objective is to 
provide "self-design" tools for simulating the processes involved under 
different constraints, so that plant staff can select the most appropriate 
configuration and management policies for their organizational situation. 
The Studv of Work Svstems 
In looking at the social and cultural organization of plants' work 
systems - e.g., preparation of maintenance work packages, planning and 
scheduling, performing surveillances, staff recruitment and training - we 
intend to complement previous work on reducing human error that focuses 
on individual behavior. Rather than focusing on single variables, work 
systems represent the interdependenaes of social and technical systems 
within nuclear power plants (Egan, 1982; Rasmussen, 1988) as well as beyond 
them, to their complex institutional environments. 
We begin by taking note of the dynamics of the production.process 
itself. Plant cycles are defined by antiapated refueling and maintenance 
outages; unplanned outages interrupt normal operations. The additional 
staff needed for planned outages increase the on-site population twe and 
three-fold. Coming down and starting up mark major transitions; shift 
changes signal minor transitions where good communication becomes 
essential. The tempos of work are also fluctuating - even normal operations 
oscillate beyond a steady state now and then, when unexpected minor repairs 
are needed, for example. Such characteristics suggest that management must 
organize the dynamics of transitions, gaps, interstices, and fluctuations that 
are at the center of safe performance. 
The technologies involved in producing electricity also share the 
characteristics of a dynamic system, given the high interdependency among 
components, large and small. These mandate a refined division of labor in 
which the design and operation of components and subsystems are assigned 
to specialists who must themselves collaborate and therefore understand 
enough about each others' area of expertise to communicate dearly. In 
nuclear power plants where the technology is organized as a series of baniers 
against core damage, all employees need to maximize their capacity to 
recognize problems and visualize their systemic implications. The dynamics 
of production therefore also include the tensions in the relationship between 
small details and larger systems, which also must be organized and managed 
to maximize safe performance. 
The dynamics of plant cycles and those of components within technical 
systems demand a high level of attention, vigilance, compliance to 
procedures, communication within and aaoss departments, and 
commitment to safety. The capacity of employees to meet these demands 
calls upon two underlying processes: First, to keep learning from their own 
and from others' experiences, and second, to maintain their "mental maps" 
of plant systems and the complexities of particular tasks in good repair. As 
will be seen in the outline of our second year of work, these two processes 
organize our search for more systematic footing for safe performance in 
nuclear power plants. 
Research Phases 
The overall plan of research consists of five phases or subgoals within 
the overall goal. 
The first step has been to develop preliminary data that 
represent the detail and complexity of the organizational and 
managerial dimensions of nuclear power plants: work systems. These 
desaibe how human and technical resources are related in practice, 
and how they are understood. 
Phase 2: Concevts and Framework 
Weseek to understand these phenomena as being in some ways 
similar to other industrial and technological settings and in some ways 
unique to nuclear power plants. Our concepts must be broad and 
comprehensive enough to include several levels of analysis, such as 
the interactions between the plant, utility, customers, regulators, 
suppliers, unions and the publk the structure and culture of the plant 
and the relationships of its functional groups; the regional and 
national institutions, demography, and culture within which the plant 
operates; the dynamics of operator teams and other work groups; and 
individual decision making. The framework has to include adaptation 
to the internal and external demands on the organization as well as 
factors that enable and inhibit adaptation. 
Phase 3: Rowrties and Configurations - 
The next task is to identify and/or represent patterns in the 
understanding, organization, and management of the production 
process. We will base these on both direct observations and trend data. 
Research procedures involve a range of activities including analyses of 
existing data, opinions of experts, intensive on-site fieldwork in 
selected plants, questionnaires, and studies of group behavior in 
control room simulators as well as in task forces and committees. 
Phase 4: RototvDes /Demonstrations 
Scenarios, configurations, and alignments for various work 
systems during each plant cycle will be desaibed. Using 
questionnaires, interviews, on-site observation, and expert evaluation, 
we will ask those in each work system to review their practices against 
such alternatives. We will design research to follow changes, as 
invited. 
Phase 5: Mana~ement Imvlementation 
The knowledge we obtain from our research must translate into 
practical tools for safety enhancement as well as generating principles 
to guide organizational and managerial policies and practices. These 
are tasks for our sponsors as well as other utilities to undertake. To 
help make this transition, we will participate with them in a phase of 
"technology transfer." 
Project sponsors and scientists agreed that the top priority in the first 
year was to pursue Phase 1 descriptive research and Phase 2 concept 
development. The fieldwork has included in thews ,  on-site observation, 
and examination of existing records in nuclear power plants and associated 
institutions (e.g., corporate offices and regulators) with the aim of developing 
careful portrayals of work systems, organizational processes including aoss- 
boundary relationships, and institutional relationships. 
The goal of fieldwork is not to develop singlesite case studies but to 
outline the topography of nuclear power plants' work systems and activities 
in order to begin to analyze the organizational and managerial principles 
behind them. How a plant internates functions and acknowledges 
interdependencies among work systems has been a focus for team training, 
field observations, and data interpretations, for ewmple: 
- Bridging between departments and shifts (e.g., shift supervisor on 
loan to scheduling department, p b  rotation). 
- Tracking and analyzing plant data and developing plans to deal 
with their implications (e.g., interpreting industrial safety trends). 
- Preparing work packages and scheduling work. 
- Designing continuing training programs in all functions and at all 
levels. 
- Prioritizing resources by functions. 
Research Preparation 
In July 1990, Dr. Perin made reconnaissance visits to two operating 
nuclear plants to consolidate the project's approach to intensive field studies. 
Based on interviews with plant staff about the work systems of various 
departments, we developed fieldwork strategies designed to maximize our 
observations of control, coordination, and communication processes; this - 
work became one component of field worker training and site selection 
(Perin, August 1990; October 1990). Additionally, Dr. Carroll visited the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I offices to investigate the 
Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance process through interviews 
with team members who had just completed the review of a plant. 
During the fall of 1990, Prof. Carroll reauited and trained four research 
assistants to begin fieldwork. Ellen Banaghan, Juan Jaliff, Bhavya Lal, and 
George Roth have varying backgrounds in management research, nuclear 
engineering, and nuclear plant operations. Training included readings on 
organizations, nuclear power plants, and research methods, discussions, 
exercises, and a field trip to a nuclear power plant. Dr. Perin, other 
faculty members, and two visitors with research experiences in nudear power 
plants gave talks during the training phase: Alfred Marcus (University of 
Minnesota, senior author of NUREG/CR.5437 on organization/management 
indicators) and Anne Sutthoff (Science Applications International 
Corporation, who has visited over 40 plants to make assessments of 
emergency planning and organization/management characteristics). 
Fieldwork and Analvsis 
USA Field Site Selection 
A plan to select fieldwork sites was developed, based on several 
:, 
attributes:a comparison of technology (PWR vs. BWR), age (pre- vs. post- " 
TMI), plant-corporate relationship (sole nudear site run by that company vs. 
one of several geographical sites), and operating history. These criteria were 
developed through discussions with faculty, sponsors, and other experts. Due 
to limited resources and the special difficulties of language barriers, site 
selection at this time was Limited to USA plants. Profs. Hansen and Carroll 
contacted approximately 10 utilities to soliat cooperation. 
After considerable negotiation, four utilities agreed to host a researcher 
at a plant: 
Belvedere. Belvedere is a pre-TMI BWR plant that is the only nuclear 
station owned by a utility with several other fossil plants. After several 
years as a troubled plant, Belvedere has improved dramatically in the 
last several years. 
Brinham. Brigham is technically a similar plant to Belvedere, owned 
by a company that manages only this plant. They have had a very good 
operating record, and operate the plant with fewer than one-third of 
the employes on-site at Belvedere. 
Partridge. Partridge is a post-TMI PWR plant. It is one of several 
nuclear plants owned by its utility. It has had a good operating record. 
Potomac. Potomac is also a post-TMI PWR plant but is the only 
nuclear station owned by a utility with several other fossil plants. 
Potomac has had an excellent record of operations. 
Each research assistant spent three to four weeks at one plant, attending 
meetings, interviewing a broad range of staff in the plant and outside the 
plant, collecting relevant written materials, and observing work processes in 
detail. At the end of each day, they transcribed their fieldnotes on laptop 
computers. 
Return visits of 2-5 days duration have already occurred to Partridge 
and Pot- plants, and others are scheduled. During these visits, team 
members examine changes, observe operations in different phases (e.g., 
scheduled outages), and ask new questions emerging during the team's 
analysis of field notes. They also present a summary of observations from the 
fieldwork, as a way of providing feedback, listening for reactions to test our 
understanding and reveal new information, and suggesting alternative ways 
for plant staff to think about their activities. As one plant manager put it to 
his staff, "The value to us of this research is a new perspective on what we 
take entirely for granted." 
Since their return from the field in February, team members have met 
approximately twice a week. Members have organized and expanded their 
fieldnotes to capture important details and make them maximally usable as 
data sources. Our meetings are forums for wide-ranging, inaemental 
discussions about our observations, comparisons across plants, and tentative 
interpretations. Team members have written memos about a range of topics, 
drawing primarily upon their own fieldnotes and experiences. This 
accumulation of memos, discussions and reactions has been coalescing into 
the conceptual framework that will guide our second year of refining issues, 
concepts, and work system configurations. 
Igternational Observations 
To develop an international perspective within the team, Dr. Perin 
accompanied an Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) mission to a 
European plant and an Assessment of Safety Significant Events (ASSET) 
mission to a Latin American plant, as an observer at each under IAEA 
auspices. All IAEA missions are conducted by volunteers recruited from 
operating plants around the world; each team member is an expert in a 
functional area. The three-week OSART mission was one of the largest, with 
17 members from Western and Eastern European Countries and North 
America. The two-week ASSET mission, with an international team of ten 
experts, was held at a newly commissioned plant operating for just eight 
months. Dr. Perin observed plant operations and took note of the 
understandings of safety and plant management and organization underlying 
the team members' assessments. She also interviewed them individually 
about their home plants' operations for their insights into organizational and 
managerial issues. 
At the invitation of the IAEA and the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis -A), Dr. Canoll and Dr. Perin participated in a 
week-long technical workshop in Vienna and Laxenburg on 'The Influence 
of Organization and Management on the Safety of NPPs and Other Complex 
Industrial Systems" (see Section 6.4). The workshop was attended by 
European and Japanese nuclear power and oil industry experts, behavioral 
scientists conducting research in nuclear power plants, and representatives of 
WAN0 and IAEA. The group drafted a report outlining a research agenda. 
In May, the re&archer who had visited the Potomac site will spend 
approximately one week at a German PWR plant. This will provide not only 
information about this plant, but also help us better design longer data- 
gathering visits to plants in France and Japan (see Section 6.0). 
RESEARCH RESULTS 
Based on five person-months of on-site observations at nuclear power 
plants in the USA and abroad, the research results at a first level of analysis 
can best be understood as a set of observations about plants' work systems and 
conceptual or mental models. When organized by plant, these observations 
provide a "case study" of separate plants. Two of our research assistants wrote 
Master's Theses based on their field experiences (Banaghan, 1991; Jaliff, 1991). 
However, the major purpose of the research is not to "assess" plants, nor is 
even one month of study is sufficient to "understand" a plant. More 
importantly, we have been using our collective work to develop hypotheses 
to guide future detailed studies. 
Observations 
In our memos and discussions, team members present observations 
and issues in various ways. The first step is simply to notice something, 
separate it out as an "observation," and present it as interesting or relevant. 
As these are discussed and related observations are brought up, the discussion 
moves toward greater understanding in unanticipated ways. 
- Observation #I: At Potomac, management instituted "generic work 
requests" designed to deal with hot jobs or minor items. The usual 
instructions to an Instrumentation and Control (IhC) technician 
might be "troubleshoot, repair and replace as necessary." These 
came to be overused for all kinds of general activities in order to 
speed up work and reduce paper flow. Craftspeople insist that about 
half of all such work requests ought to be regular ones. 
- Observation #2: At Brigham, work processes depend on face-teface 
contact and knowledge of individuals' skills. The assistant foreman 
of IdrC talks to the Shift Supervisor (SS) upon arrival at 7 a.m. By 
the time Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs) are discussed in the 
daily operations meeting at 8 a.m., work has already begun on some 
items, preceding the paper work. 
- Observation W3: At Potomac, coordination between control room, 
maintenance, and scheduling is carried out by a SS on Loan, who is 
rotated through this position. 
- Observation W4: At Brigham, a position was created in 1989 called 
Operations Planning Coordinator, who must understand the work 
that needs to be done and ensure coordination between workers and 
shift supervisor. The OPC was a Control Room Operator who spent 
a year working for the Maintenance Foreman, and thus was in a 
good position to know the work and the individuals. 
- Observation #5: At Partridge, for easy maintenance work, a Leak 
Crew consisting of an operations person and a maintenance person 
provides a fast way to do these jobs. These jobs are at the disaetion 
of the SS. 
- Observation #6: At Belvedere, Maintenance Work Packages are 
written by a separate Planning group, who are part of a separate 
department reporting to the VP of Nuclear Operations. Belvedere 
locates its Planners next-door to both maintenance and ALARA, 
which enhances coordination. 
- Observation #7: At Brigham, people log MWRs in a log book on 
the SS's desk. This naturally involves some face-to-face interaction 
that can be important in providing extra information, especially if 
key safety systems are involved. Similarly, in a European plant, 
every work package is hand-carried to the control room where the 
aaftsperson and the SS conduct a "face-to-face" so that each has a 
clear understanding of the scope and implications of the work. 
- Observation #8: At Partridge, the MWR procedure has MWRs go 
through a SS and then to an Operating Engineer (there are 3 OEs for 
2 units, each requiring an SRO license). However, there is instead 
an MWR Coordinator who has signature authority for the OEs, and 
who runs a meeting every morning to coordinate reviews among 
ALARA, maintenance, and fire marshall. 
- Observation #9: At Belvedere, operations gets excellent training, 
but aaft are given basic training without systems training (nor do 
clerical staff get systems training). Similarly, at a well-functioning 
~uropeaxi plant, an OSART team found that techniaans skilled in 
one specialty were unconcerned with how it fit with the next. They 
didn't follow through on or regard themselves as accountable for 
the ultimate outcome of the larger piece of work to which they had 
mntributed. 
- Observation #lo: At Brigham, the daily operations meeting is 
attended by foremen and assistant foremen level, who are 
considered "the people who run the plant." Managers who run 
special meetings (ALARA review, Quality Audit &st, outage work) 
facilitate discussion of issues and ask for recommendations of 
workers for proposed actions. 
- Observation #11: At Partridge, there were many separate people' 
and programs working toward improving the plant, scattered all 
over. They began to realize that "if you put the problems in little 
boxes you never find the big problems." Now they are trying to 
slowly incorporate all the investigations of issues into the 
Deviation Reporting process. 
- Observation #12: Many of the procedures at Belvedere were written 
by external consultants; as a result, some procedures ignore plant 
layout or have become outdated. Updates are being done without 
the systematic partidpation of the craft. 
- Observation #13: The BWR speaalist on an ASSET team suggested 
that vacuum breaker failure can result from the presence of 
hydrogen which causes internal explosions. Breaker failures have 
conventionally been attributed to manufacturing defects. His own 
plant had this problem, yet his BWR users group could not accept 
the possibility until one of them also experienced it. 
- Observation #14: At Partridge, there is a very extensive 
performance appraisal process for managers and professionals, 
including assessments of skill development, which has noticeable 
impact on wages. However, the performance appraisal for union 
workers is abbreviated, provides little feedback, and has little impact 
on wages. 
Inferences and Issues 
The discussion of such observations involves trying out various 
comparisons and inferences. These are tested in team meetings, where 
consistent and inconsistent observations are discussed. Building on these 
observations, our analyses evolve into layers of understanding of the nature 
of and relationships among these observations. This particular set of 
observations might generate a set of simple comparisons or first-order 
inferences: (1) the MWR procedure is complex because it involves several 
steps and coordination' among different functional groups; (2) different plants 
set up the structure in different ways. Variations include the number of 
separate groups and the nature of reporting relationships; (3) there-are 
various complaints that people do not know how their own tasks fit into the 
bigger picture of the plant. 
Continued discussion often leads to somewhat deeper understanding, 
or second-order inferences: (1) several plants seem to find liaison or linking 
roles between Operations and Maintenance to be important, and the 
incumbent of this linking role must have sufficient experience and credibility 
to different groups, sometimes provided by p b  rotation; (2) because the MWR 
process is So cumbersome, procedures have been created to expedite simpler 
work; (3) there are several examples of practices (behaviors) that diverge from 
procedures, or where important consequences of the way things are done (e.g., 
face-to-face discussions) are not expliatly recognized in the procedures; (4) 
plants differ in how much participation is encouraged from aaft/union 
employees. 
Going yet further, we might generate third-order inferences from these 
observations and inferences: (1) The continual process of bridging gaps 
formed by the dynamia of the production process occurs on two levels: soda1 
and conceptual. On the social level, organizational mechanisms are used to 
integrate aaoss occupational groupings, organizational units, and 
geographical spaces. On the conceptual level, as specialists, people have to 
live in their "small worlds"; yet, they are called upon to include in their 
"mental models" of their work the interdependencies within a bigger picture. 
Some of this gapfilling is done by linking structures and procedures that 
enforce the exchange of information; some is done by job rotation, aoss- 
training, and systems training; some is done by task forces that assemble broad 
knowledge and aeate aoss-training situations; much is accomplished by 
informal means including personal communication (often face-to-face) and 
the proximity of units to facilitate such communication; (2) There is a 
continual process of adaptation occurring as plants experience their own 
problems or issues and try to deal with them. Plants are frequently 
innovating in structures and procedures, resulting in even more variety 
among plants. This innovation is at every level of the organization, and 
includes situations where more effective and/or efficient practices have 
diverged from procedures. "Compliance" seems to be an overly-simplistic 
way to characterize good plants, because it presumes a higher degree of 
stability than observed. 
From these inferences, we can further distill our observations into 
"issuesj' that seem to capture important concerns or tensions in management 
and organization. Each issue represents a choice or variation: 
- The plant may have cultures that support safety and effective 
operations or that place safety in a lesser role. Cultures may be 
carried by employees having different occupational histories, such 
as those previously working in the Navy or in fossil plants or those 
trained in the Midwest work ethic, or cultures may be defined 
within the plant by the values and standards of managers and other 
key personnel. 
- Plant employees may value excellence and continual improvement, 
or they may be satisfied with the status quo, what is often called 
"complacency." 
- The plant management may respond to corporate demands for 
effiaent power production and profit or it may demand recognition 
of the special needs and circumstances of nuclear power. 
- Plant employees may see the ihstitutional environment as full of 
opportunities and proactively manage this environment by 
selectively adopting elements provided by the NRC, INPO, 
consultants, or they may see that environment as posing threats 
that must be defended against or minimally responded to. 
- Plant management may understand safety as an "add-on" to 
production technology or as being integral to all activities. 
- Plant employees are continually managing normal operations, yet 
must prepare for transitions to outages; they must act in both 
"worlds" at the same time. 
- Plants are structured as functional organizations, yet their daily 
work systems cut aaoss functions and require constant interfaces of 
departmentalized groups. 
- Plants can rely on proceduralization, with procedures written by 
those who have the authority to write them, or plants can trust the 
skills and training of employees by permitting those closest to the 
work to determine the details of activities and to contribute to 
procedure writing. 
- Plants can have easy communication between groups or have 
barriers arising from bureaucratic procedures, different "mental 
models," or physical location that prevent the flow of information. 
- Plants can base their training on a systems perspective that 
recognizes that all employees should understand how their work 
fits into the bigger picture, utilizing cross-training, job rotation, or 
other mechanisms, or can maintain a specialist focus to assure 
efficiency. 
- Plants can create an atmosphere in which errors are avoided and 
information about problems is concealed, or can structure 
inaentives to reward error-acknowledgement in the interests of 
continual improvement, without encouraging error. 
The case of an "Unusual Event" observd at one of our four plants 
illustrates the kinds of questions our research approach to work systems can 
raise about the dynamics of daily operations and safe performance. Although 
reportable in that category by NRC regulations and therefore a factor in the 
NRC's future Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance (SALP), this 
event occurred in the balancesf-plant and did not degrade any barriers to 
nuclear safety systems; the plant responded well. Especially because it is only 
an 'Unusual Event," we see it as an important pointer to broader questions 
for our study, which we raise below. 
Roof Fire in Turbine Building 
A ceiling fan installed over two feedpumps in the turbine building fell down. The fan 
bounced off a steel beam on its way down and hit the floor, not the equipment. No one was 
injured. The other two fans were then sxud  with rope, on the theory that continuous 
vibrations had weakened the third fan's supports. The feedpumps were protected with 
scaffolding. 
Maintenance and En-g debated how to repair the remaining fans, given the 
complication that no spare parts were available from the original manufacturer. To replace 
them required a Permanent Design Change, but with all the f u u  out of serviae, the plant 
manager was comrned that power reduction would become ~ r y  unless the primary loop 
water chemistry stayed within certain bounds. If no f u u  were working, plant procedures would 
prevent the Hydrogen Water Chemistry Control system from being activated for injection, a p b  
xheduled to occur in about 15 days. A week had been used in the debates, and one manager 
commented, "Many people have their fingers in it, but there is no owner. It's like a football, 
between Engineering and Maintenam." 
Maintaining power generation had priority over costs, and funds were authorized for 
whichever alternative was selected. An intermediate step between repair and replacement of 
the two fans was decided on: To weld them in place until a permanent solution was arrived at. 
Because welding replaced bolts, a Temporary Modification had to be initiated and pmcesd 
within five days, the Main tmce  Work Package prepared, along with a Joint Pmess Control 
sheet from Engineering for the welding procedure, a Hot Work Permit approved by Fire 
. ,J?rotectian, and so on. The.work was carried.out ona bitterly cold Friday night withsnow 
falling and 30 mph winds. The fire watch obsenbg the welding saw smoke and gave the alert. 
The whole organhition and the local Fire Department made a goad response. The smoke 
indicated a smolder, without flames. The Unusual Event was declared at 9 p.m. and it was 
secured 30 minutes later. 
The following Monday the Maintenance Section M a ~ g e r  led a critique meeting, which 
about 30 people attended, including those involved in processing the work package and those 
who handled the Unusual Event. In an open, blamefree ahnosphere, several conclusions were 
agreed on: 
-- The potential for ignition had not been recognized by any reviewer, although the 
drawings and the welding proaxlure were available. 
-- T k  welding prwedu~ had been changed from stitch to mntinuous the day betore 
the work. 
-- A Temporary Modification is &wed less thoroughly than a Permanent Design 
Change. 
-- Review responsiiilities do not overlap and people downstream tend to rely on tho* 
upstream. 
This event points up several questions that illustrate in a single work 
system the relationship between control, coordination, and communication 
processes and safe performance on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
significance of mental maps for problem anticipation: 
- Managerial criteria used in deciding what to do did not overtly 
include the quality of the performance of this single task. A 
generally lower priority to performance quality is reflected by the 
sudden change of welding procedure, the apparently prevalent 
practice of reviewing Temporary Modifications less thoroughly, and 
the performance of this outdoor task during unfavorable weather. 
The task seems not to have been viewed in terms of what was best 
for the plant as a whole. 
- A surprisingly large number of people partiapated in the review of 
the event, rather than, as might be expected, a lesser number of key 
people who are accountable. Although this level of participation is 
important to plant-wide, timely feedback and continuous learning, 
it seems also to reflect unclear delegation of responsibilities. 
Neither Maintenance nor Engineering owned or was instructed to 
own the problem. 
- The organizational system permits each reviewer to act 
independently of every other, rather than explicitly acknowledging 
functional interdependencies by requiring overlap among reviews 
and reviewers. As a consequence, the working image of the system 
as a whole tends to blur. 
Mental Models 
Embedded in such observations and issues is evidence for the 
fundamental importance of the mental models with which plant staff 
understand and recognize problems. 
The definitions, categories, and theories in daily use form an 
infrastructure of allowable causality that structures attention and resources. 
Some of the most fundamental of these defihitions are in dispute - safety, 
risk. root cause. Definitions regarded as being technical can be cultural and 
institutional as well - for example, the equivalence often made between 
availability and safe performance. 
An international team of experts performing root cause analyses found 
it difficult to use the zero safety-related category of the International Event 
Rating Scale: They could not disallow any activity a place in their native 
theories of causation. Another team found it difficult to accept one plant's 
separation between "industrial safety" practices and "plant safety" practices. 
Nor was the conventional Quality Assurance distinction between "plant" and 
"balance of plant" clear-cut to some experts: They believe that events in the 
balance of plant can affect reactor safety systems. 
Subtle definitions can have large consequenm. Two workers at a 
European plant made an incorrect cable connection on a Friday night under 
pressure to start up one reactor after a scram. h mvestigation found that 
although the control room had been consulted while planning the work, 
because this was defined as an "informal" meeting, no notes were taken and 
the log books were not updated. Moreover, the participants put this in the 
category of a "minor" repair only because it came after the completion of a 
"major" replacement of steam generators. 
Differences in the occupational cultures of project/design engineers 
and systems engineers can result in differences in their causal 
understandings, the one grounded in long-range time horizons and 
individual components, the other in daily concerns and the relationships of 
components in action. The scarcity of hands-on, systems engineers may be 
based on a social logic that accords higher prestige and pay to project 
engineers, especially those who are "outside the fence." Or a plant may use a 
cultural logic that assigns functions.different rankings in a hierarchy of value, 
as when Operations has a higher rank than Maintenance, but without 
considering the consequences for communication and morale. How 
employees see relationships between the "little picture" of their particular 
task and the "big picture" of the system in operation is another way these 
logics influence the quality of work. One European plant has instituted a 
mandatory "face-to-face" between aaftspeople and the control room staff to be 
sure they know where their task fits in, and to get their suggestions before 
work begins. 
Organizational and managerial criteria used in OSART missions are, by 
the program's own admission, less well developed than those used in 
reviewing functional and technical areas. One source of this neglect may be a 
widespread tendency to define "human error: as only jndividual or personal 
error, rather t h d  including collective ornanizational and manaperial policies 
and practioes in causal analysis. The categories used for analyzing human 
performance in root cause analyses, for example, presently are personnel, 
procedures, and equipment, unmediated by organizational and managerial 
poliaes. But these are also human practices that can be in "error." 
CONCLUSIONS AND SECOND-YEAR GOALS 
Our understandings of work'systems lead us to conclude that a 
theoretical approach is needed that takes account of the unique characteristics 
of the production processes of nuclear power plants, the information- 
processing and communicative skills they require, and their status as high 
reliability organizations. Our continuing field studies and other data 
collection in the USA and abroad will concentrate on evaluating and 
extending this preliminary conceptual framework by examining 
organizational learning activities and by discovering the contents of mental 
models governing technical practices and organizational systems 
Buildinn a Concevtual Framework 
The analysis of nuclear plant management and organization typically 
focuses on standardization and control as in, for example, the Brookhaven 
National Laboratories' Nuclear Organization and Management Analysis 
Concept (Haber et al., 1988). Ideally, top management is the source of policies 
that will be translated into standards of operation; the engineering groups 
develop these policies into aiteria or guidelines; the middle line of managers 
interpret these into standards for roles, tasks, and procedures; operations, 
maintenance, and other functional groups implement these standards, with 
layers of monitoring to ensure compliance. The image is of a machine, or a 
machine bureaucracy, centrally controlled from the top. 
This image of plants assumes: (1) standardization of technical work is 
the key to safety; (2) compliance to standards is a major concern; (3) standards 
are developed by technical specialists; (4) control is from the topdown, 
embodied in the rules and standards; (5) what matters is the rational division 
of labor; the organization can be analyzed into parts that can be separately 
rationalized and then combined according to the demands of their particular 
tasks; (6) the structure and procedures remain static unless they are 
deliberately changed, typically as a result of external information from NRC 
or INPO that is interpreted through top management and engineering into 
new standards; and (7) slack can be driven out. 
Based on our research into work system practices and our reading 
about the demands on other high reliability organizations, we believe an 
adequate framework must recognize the dynamics and cornpledties of the 
production process, analogous to an image of a living organism in a dynamic 
ecological setting: (1) Self-assessment and adaptation are the keys to safety; 
standardization is a way to make that process easier, but not at the expense of 
rigidifying. the organization or stifling its aeativity; (2) creating a technical 
and social system in which compliance takes place is critical, but compliance 
must be accompanied by intelligence and vigrlance to maintain a continuous 
adaptation process; (3) standards and practices must be developed collectively, 
acknowledging interdependencies and distributed knowledge; (4) there are 
many kinds of control in complex organizations, and the interdependencies 
among groups may ovemde conventional hierarchies of roles and functions; 
(5) the division of technical labor is socially otganized; the understandings 
people have of the place of their work in the organization matter a great deal 
to performance; the wider contexts of work provide meaning and external 
interdependencies; (6) nuclear power plants are continually adapting their 
routines, driven by external information and the problems and innovations 
of other plants, internal information and innovation from within, continual 
readjustments in a "living" organization, changes in the workforce, cultural 
attitudes, technology, regulation, plant cycles, etc.; (7) resource investments 
must be made for an uncertain future, typically by investing more in people 
than is required by the immediate tasks. 
A good example of this image of the nature of management and 
organization spontaneously arose during one research assistant's return visit 
to the Potomac plant. The researcher presented the generic diagram of 
nuclear power plants represented by a mostly-hierarchical form with large 
technical supporting groups and smaller administrative supporting groups. 
Managers at the plant recognized the model, but they felt it missed some 
aspects of the organization they thought were important. Their alternative 
was a portrayal of the organization as a set of intersecting circles. Some, they 
said, may be more "central" in the sense that they interact with more groups 
or in more intensive ways. However, the impression was of interconnections 
and interdependencies rather than the hierarchy, linearity, and boundedness 
of the machine bureaucracy image. Each image leads to different expectations, ' 
which influence the capacity to recognize problems and invent solutions. 
Ornanizational Contexts for Safety 
Our field studies make it clear,. first, that data on plant operations must 
be characterized by the phase of operations because each demands somewhat 
different organizational and managerial activities. The* differences may be 
crucial t o  optimal safety performance. Talking about the differences between 
being on-line and in outage, operators say, 'We live in two different worlds." 
In our work from now on, we will make observations across the cycle, with 
special attention to their intersections and transitions., 
Second, our observations of plant work systems and other data confirm 
that the operations and activities of plants differ within each phase by the 
tempo of work. We postulate three tempos: Routine, Escalating, and 
Emergency (we may find others). In a well performing plant with an 
excellent safety r-rd, when an extra pump was suddenly needed to drain 
water, the call went out to bring an extra on-site "pump" but in the rush of 
events it was heard as a call for "the pumper" supplied by the local fire 
department; this miscommunication under high tempo activated the 
emergency response system and unnecessarily involved the local 
community. 
Third, the occupational cultures of executives, managers, supervisors, 
engineers, operators, and craftworkers can differ enough to affect 
communication, coordination, and morale, and whether staff members come 
from a Navy or fossil tradition introduces further complications. Project or 
design engineers maintain a "hands-off" attitude, aloof to operating needs; 
skills in handsan systems engineering can be scarce. Craftpersons' expertise 
may be discounted and degreed engineering expertise ovewalued. Quality 
control procedures may require aaftpersons to supervise one another, yet, as 
buddies (or as relatives), they may avoid doing so. Our studies will note these 
dynamics and how they relate to recruiting, training, socializing, and 
rewarding employees, and to other organizational policies and practices. 
Finally, the contexts for safe performance are also influenced by 
regulators, industry groups, IAEA, and vendors. We will examine their roles 
in the ecologies of work systems and whether they inhibit or facilitate these 
high reliability organizations in meeting the demands of adaptability, 
interdependence, and vigilance. 
Organization and Mananement for learn in^ From Performance 
From our first year of observations, we entertain the hypothesis that 
the ability to utilize feedback effectively and seek sources of relevant 
information is a key characteristic of plants that are successful and safe in the 
long run. Studies of Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Bhopal, and Challenger 
accidents have made it apparent that most of the information needed to 
prevent them was available but had not been absorbed into operating 
practices (Marcus et al., 1990). In practice, nuclear power plants are 
continually adapting to internal and external pressures. Numerous 
mechanisms exist in the regulatory and industry environment to provide 
feedback and to identify and disseminate technical and procedural issues and 
advances. Plants and utilities have various formal and ad hoc groups to 
investigate events, collect suggestions, and identify and prioritize potential 
improvements. 
Yet whether and how management and staff foster adaptive and 
flexible environments is only one part of the story in nuclear power plants. 
There is scattered evidence of unintended consequences of regulators' 
disaplinary threats on organizational learning. Employees at all levels and in 
all functions may do only the minimum required in order to avoid 
reprimand; they may se exmsive proceduralization as implying distrust, 
which may foster low morale and ineffiaency, as when a a f t s p p l e  se their 
skills reduced to rote performance. In some European countries whose 
regulators are moving away from an "envelope approach to performance 
standards and the greater trust of aaftspeople that it implies, this issue is 
particularly salient. At the same time, however, regulators as well as industry 
groups (INPO, WANO) and the LAEA put a high priority on free information 
exchange and continual improvement of both practices and employees' levels 
of skill. 
Internal pressures are also important: Although there are many 
instances of interplant exchanges of staff and ideas, there is also evidence that 
plant management can be closed to new or different ways of operating. A 
European plant manager observed that "surprisingly few USA plant 
managers" had taken up his offer to visit and exchange operating experiences; 
a UK shift supervisor recounted that his plant management had not until 
very recently exchanged operating experiences with a "sister plant" about 200 
miles away. Moreover, the flow of information into plants is so great that 
each has some system of saeening and prioritizing it. The task of translating 
operating experiences from other plants to one's own situation can be 
difficult. When oontextual data are lacking, the translation may not even be 
undert &en. 
We are also interested in studying managerial practices to reinforce 
continual learning, such as delegating accountability, exercising vetoes, 
encouraging problem-ownership, allocating slack to avoid .crises, and building 
consensus. Feedback between organizational levels is important. Job rotation 
is another method for assuring continual learning. For example, in one plant 
where compliance and work quality had been troublesome, management 
introduced more stringent proceduralization not only to fulfill regulatory 
requirements, but to assure greater accountability as well. Middle-level 
managers were designated procedure "owners" with decision-making 
authority over writing and updating. But the aafts were left out of the loop, 
despite the likelihood that their hands-on experience would feed forward into 
procedure improvement. 
Continuous learning is especially evident in the ways that plants adapt 
external management consultants' recommendations to their own 
experiences and expertise. We have noted several instances where 
conventional 'management models are implemented, only later to be found 
unsuitable for nuclear power plant operations. One European manager 
questioned whether an employee improvement suggestion program, with 
nonsalary rewards and incentives, is appropriate "when safety ooncerns 
should be part of everyone's pb." At one plant in the USA, for example, a 
surveillance procedure involved going in and out of the same fire-proof 
rooms several times, climbing up and down stairs. Outside consultants had 
written the procedures-based on system schematics without having seen the 
actual room layouts. 
Current management paradigms advocating decentralization, 
marketization, and computerization have also been widely adopted; not 
always with the expected results. Despite having computer access to trend 
data, for example, managers can fail to use them diagnostically. At one 
European plant, a rising rate of industrial accidents was not further evaluated 
for its possibly wider implications for reactor safety system operations. 
Mental Models and Root Causes of Performance 
Experts recognize that each incident or event in a plant is the product 
of a variety of causes, rather than a single cause. Thus, TMI involved a stuck 
valve and operator misunderstanding, but also inadequate instrumentation, 
incorrect procedures and training, and failure to transmit information within 
the industry about this type of event. Not only are there combinations of 
causes (e.g., operator error, mechanical failure), but each "cause" is embedded 
in a causal chain in which it is produced by some "deeper" cause (e.g., 
operator error by improper training, in turn caused by failure to transmit 
information; mechanical failure due to poor maintenance, which can be 
blamed on poor supervision, etc.). 
The ability of plants to anticipate and recognize problems, utilize 
performance information, And predict future states of the plant depend on 
how well current "mental models" or "plant models" (including PRAs) can 
assimilate new data. How problems are acknowledged and explained depends 
in part on shared understandings of plant functioning already in place, which 
represent beliefs about cause-effect relations. Some beliefs are substantiated by 
documentation, while others remain conjecture, such as sources of 
component failures or the risk interactions of components and operators. 
Mental models to confront such uncertainties develop over time and make 
use of plant and industry experience. 
The mental models even of the most expert of plant staff, regulators, or 
consultants are not necessarily correct or complete. Studies of the general 
human processes involved in causal attribution suggest that two mechanisms 
are often at work: "Functional blindnessw and "self-protection" (cf. Nisbett & 
Rose, 1980; Fiske & Taylor, 1984). In nuclear plants, functional blindness 
might take the form of seeing the plant from a narrow perspective, thereby 
identdymg as causal factors only those things that are salient within one's 
expertise. Self-protection can take the form of blaming others or of denying a 
problem. For example, when faced with a problem, one plant manager 
exclaimed, "We have a SAW 1 rating - how could anything be wrong?' 
FURTHER SKJDIES AND OTHER A-S 
We operationalize those two main concerns into sets of spedfic work 
plans for data collection. Insofar as they lend themselves to reanalysis, we 
will also examine archival records for their possible contribution to 
evaluating and extending our conceptual framework (e.g., SAW reports, 
IAEA's Inadent Reporting System, OSART and ASSET public reports). 
We will be carrying out work abroad and at previous and new USA 
nuclear power plant sites. Arrangements are cunently being made to send 
Dr. Carroll and a research assoaate to France. After approximately one week 
at Paris Headquarters, one research associate will spend approximately five 
weeks on site at a power station. Similarly, arrangements are underway to 
send a research associate to Japan, with the plan of spending several days at 
the Tokyo headquarters of two utilities, followed by three weeks of fieldwork 
at one site and one week at a second site. 
We hope to observe directly some organizational learning activities, 
including changes and failed change efforts in return visits to the 
organizations we are already familiar with. We will solicit the participation 
of new sites that have a special interest in the second-year studies. 
Studies of Organizational - Learning Activities 
In order to compare across plants and countries, at each site we will be 
characterizing these major issues and activities in terms of the detailed tasks 
they entail: 
A. Procedure rewriting, component and systems walkdowns, and 
dissemination; 
8. Feedback reviews, based on internal and external performance 
information, including links with contractors and vendors; 
C Job rotation, aoss-training, and succession plans and practices; 
D. Resource flows among site and off-site engineers; 
E. Adaptation of external consultants' recommendations for 
organizational and managerial structures and practices. 
We will investigate these activities through a combination of onsite data 
collection and analyses of industry reports. At each plant, we will interview 
key actors, aollect relevant records, and observe how these activities are 
carried out and evaluated by partidpants. 
Studies of Mental Models 
To document the contents of mental models by occupation and 
organizational role, we will draw on several data sources and methods: 
A. Content analyses of plant archival materials (e.g., plant safety 
committee inadent analyses; HPES reports) and, external to plants, 
SALP, OSART, and ASSET reports, and INPO's '"Lifted LRads." The 
goal is to establish a set of causal categories and their relative 
frequencies (perhaps subdivided by certain factors such as type of 
event, type of plant, country), describe the linkages among 
categories (i.e., what root causes typically underlie which surface 
causes), and also create hypothetical scenarios to use in further 
judgmental studies. 
8. Inteniews with appropriate plant staff and experts to examine how 
their assessments of causal categories are linked to their everyday 
work and the design of work systems. These interviews would 
explore a range of routine activities and decisions, such as 
prioritizing maintenance work backlogs and interpreting various 
kinds of organizational data. 
C Discussions of realistic scenarios, including suggested concrete 
corrective steps. In a more structured,' experimental environment, 
these basic scenarios would be varied by manipulating particular 
factors (presence of a design flaw, incorrect procedure, classic 
human error, etc.). The analysis would examine whether 
differences in causal judgments tend to cluster and whether they are 
associated with various characteristics of the individuals such as 
professional background, years of experience, and national culture. 
D. At an organizational level, this '%eliefsN assessment would allow us 
to ask whether organizations with overall judgment patterns of a 
particular sort also exhibit safety-relevant behaviors, where 
variations of judgment patterns exist (e.g., managers attribute cause 
differently from workers, systems engineers from maintenance 
people), and to find out what is associated with the degree and 
nature of such intraorganizational differences. 
E Participation in technical workshops with IAEA staff responsible for 
the International Incident Reporting System, which is reconsidering 
its categories. 
Comparisons with Other Industries 
To k p  refining the distinction between the safety concerns of nuclear 
power plants and those of other types of complex industrial organizations, we 
will undertake several comparative activities. We will be observing fossil 
power plant operations. Under Kent Hansen's direction and at the request of 
the U.S. Department of Energy, we are developing a study of organizational 
and managerial issues in nuclear waste management at DOE sites. We are 
keeping abreast of work in other kinds of high reliability organizations and 
with MIT colleagues' on-going research in industries where safety and health 
are important considerations (e.g., chemical industries). 
Planning for a Scientific Conference on Ornanizational and Managerial Issues 
for Safe Performance 
Members of this research project have participated in several 
conferences organized by organizations with "missions." This includes the 
annual meeting of NRC contractors and the workshop on organization and 
management at IAEA/IIASA. Each such conference has been disappointing 
because the opportunities to exchange information and &oughts about 
organization and management were very limited. These limitations were 
due to restrictions on the numbers of partiapants, the range of topics, 
pressure to produce a particular product, or time constraints. 
We have become aware of more relevant and interesting work that 
makes valuable connections to our own. Some of this work is in the nuclear 
industry, but some is in chemicals, airlines, and military, for example. Even 
NRC contractors have expressed a wish to "open up" their ideas in a forum 
that would be more receptive to issues without requiring immediate 
regulatory relevance. 
Accordingly, we believe that a conference would be an important 
intellectual event and that our auspices could maximize its value. The ideal 
time would be in the late summer or fall of 1992. We envision two or three 
days of activities, with approximately 25 participants. 
The conference should be predominantly self-funding (partiapants pay 
their own travel and a nominal registration fee). Our project can provide 
travel reimbursement for the truly indigent and host events such as acocktail 
party and dinner. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, the research question concerning the role of organizational factors in 
nuclear power plant (NPP) safety has changed substantially. The question is no longer, "Do 
organizational factors influence plant safety?" Numerous incident investigations and 
empirical analyses within the nuclear and other safety-sensitive industries have answered this 
question in the affirmative (NUREGICR-3737; Perrow, 1984; Starbuck and Milliken, 1988). 
Nor is the question exclusively, "How do organizational factors affect plant safety?" While 
much has yet to be learned about the nature and size of organizational influences under 
varying conditions, several theoretical discussions and empirical analyses have been published 
recently that constitute good progress in answering this question (NUREG/CR-3215; 
NUREG/CR-5437; Haber, et al., 1988; Osborn and Jackson, 1988). Instead, the research 
question must be increasingly phrased as follows: "Given that organizational factors are 
crucial to plant safety performance, what should be done to assure that organizational factors 
contribute to, rather than detract from safe performance?" 
The initial reaction to this question is frequently to attempt to develop a model standard for 
organizational factors for the industry. Such a standard would include detailed guidance on 
reporting relationships, the configuration of tasks within departments and departments within 
the plant, limits on spans of control or the number of vertical ranks, required coordination and 
communication mechanisms, and the like. However, such an approach is of limited use either 
for utility management or for regulatory purposes. Existing organizational theory and 
research very strongly suggest that effective organizations can and must take substantially - 
different forms depending on the demands of the specific organizational context and the 
history of the specific organization. To apply common, detailed design and management 
requirements to all nuclear power plants would not be sensitive to the real need of the 
individual utility to respond to the contingencies of size, local culture, labor relations, 
ownership structure, and the countless other factors that management must take into account 
when devising a workable organizational strategy. Thus, while an idealized model can inform 
and guide the regulatory process, it does so more by providing an inventory of organizational 
factors and relationships among those factors for consideration on a case-by-case basis. 
In addition to attempts to develop a formal model of organizational influences on safety, work 
is also being conducted in an attempt to identify organizational factors that inhibit or promote 
improvement in performance. In many ways, this research area may be even more fruitful, 
both for operators and for regulators. From the regulatory side, interest in management and 
organization is highest when performance has slipped to the point that it is no longer 
acceptable. It then becomes management's role to institute organizational systems to assure 
performance improvement. Regulators need a sophisticated understanding of what types of 
programs are likely to work within particular organizational contexts if they are to have the 
confidence that performance will actually improve. From utility management's side in this 
situation, existing practices have proven inadequate, and new knowledge is needed in order to 
understand the best strategy and implementation plan for achieving improvement. 
The issue of organizational improvement, however, is not limited to the case of the problem 
plant. Industry and regulatory performance standards seem to be steadily increasing. What 
was acceptable performance ten years ago is now no longer considered to be adequate. 
Further, many utilities are pursuing excellence or total quality as a goal, and the demands 
placed on the organization for continuous improvement are much greater than in the past. 
Understanding the organizational constraints and strategies for achieving continuous 
improvement in the nuclear power industry remains an unmet need. 
However, the very process of improvement is, in itself, not well understood. Few objective 
criteria exist for evaluating alternative plans and strategies. Further, organizational theory 
and utility experience indicate that the process of improvement or learning can not be reduced 
to the development and application of formal improvement programs. While these programs 
are essential in a degraded plant, detailed attention must also be applied to more general 
organizational factors including management attention and values, availability of technical and 
other resources, and the nature of inter-departmental relations, if the formal programs are to 
meet with success. 
The purpose of this paper is to consider the following questions: 
What is the relationship between organizational learning and safety 
performance in the context of the nuclear power plant? 
What does the process of learning look like? What are its essential elements? 
What organizational factors appear to promote or inhibit organizational 
learning? 
APPROACH 
Several sources of information are used to support the discussions in the following sections. 
One source is a systematic review of eight Diagnostic Evaluations @Es) conducted by the 
Office For the Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD), of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC). The DEs are intensive investigations of the root causes of 
actual or potential performance problems at selected NPPs. In most cases, a plant is selected 
for a DE when it displays subaverage performance over several years. The exact nature of 
the DE depends on the performance problems triggering the NRC's concern. Thus, different 
investigation protocols have been used for the different DE's leading to some differences in 
the types of organizational factors evaluated and the level and type of information available to 
address the issues surrounding organizational learning. Nonetheless, the DEs provide a rich 
and generally consistent source of information about management and organization factors in 
general, and the problems associated with organizational learning in particular. 
The review consisted of abstracting from the DEs any information associated with plant 
improvement programs, operating experience review programs, equipment performance and 
trending programs, root cause analysis, plant safety analysis review programs, and quality 
assurance programs directed at plant performance, including corrective action programs. Also 
abstracted from the DEs was information on any organizational factors that were specifically 
cited as contributing to the level of performance of the various learning-oriented programs. 
The second basic source of information comes from a series of case studies of organizational 
learning. These case studies were devised to get directly at the process of learning and the 
management strategies and organizational factors that either promoted or inhibited learning at 
the various sites. As opposed to the DEs, these case studies tended to focus on average or 
better than average performers. Thus, these case studies are more useful for presenting 
information on the positive, or success aspects of learning. 
The case studies include three commercial nuclear power plants and one DOE research 
reactor. In all cases, the organizations had a recent history of sound performance. All of the 
organizations were small by industry standards, with the three commercial units highly similar 
in basic design and operating philosophy. Thus, the successes and strategies derived from 
these case studies may not be generalizable to the broader range of plants (e.g., larger, newer, 
more complex operating environments). Nonetheless, valuable, if initial information is 
available from these case studies. 
The method used at each site involved interviews of approximately 10 individuals including 
plant management, the heads of major plant functions (e.g., operations, maintenance, 
engineering, QA), and individuals charged with responsibility for the major plant 
improvement programs (e.g., HPES, operating experience review, equipment history 
programs). In addition to basic questions about the organization and performance of the 
plant, the individuals were asked questions concerning the nature of the plant improvement 
programs, if they had contributed to improved performance, how this contribution was made, 
where the programs had failed and why, and how the programs could be improved. From 
these questions, considerable information on the organizational context of learning was 
derived including information on the role of inter-department cooperation in learning, the 
significance of corporate support and resources, the need for prioritization, and strategies for 
follow through. 
Finally, the information from the DE's and the case studies has been augmented with lessons 
learned from other organizational studies conducted by the authors and others. Several of 
these studies concern organizations within the nuclear industry, and more specifically, 
facilities within the Department of Energy. 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF LEARNING TO PLANT SAFETY 
The theoretical discussions in NUREGICR-3215, NUREGICR-5241, and NWREGICR-5437 all 
point to the significance of learning in assuring plant safety performance. In the case of 
NUREGICR-3215, the case is made in terms of the need for innovation. The nuclear 
technology is an incomplete technology in the sense that much is still being discovered 
relative to such factors as: 
The risk significant interactions of components and systems; 
Factors contributing to the wear and aging of components; 
The performance of components and systems under extreme conditions; 
The interaction of the operator and the rnaintainer with plant hardware. 
While it has been argued that within a complex, tightly coupled system, there will never be 
adequate understanding of the relationships among components and systems (Perrow, 1982), 
NUREGICR-3215 argues that the more innovative the plant -- the more it can learn from 
research, from industry experience, and from its own operating experience -- the fewer safety 
significant problems it will experience over time. This perspective is adequately illustrated by 
the TMI-2 accident -- an accident that may have been avoided had the utility been better able 
to learn from industry operating experience. 
The argument made in NUREGICR-5241 is somewhat different. Here, there is an additional 
concern with the role of learning in managing backlog. Plant systems are constantly 
degrading through use. As plants age, the burden of maintaining the plant as-built becomes 
increasingly demanding as more and more components reach the end of design life. Only 
through effective preventive and corrective maintenance can the plant stay ahead of the 
effects of aging. However, the ability to stay ahead is strongly influenced by the ability to 
learn from operating experience. In cases where inadequate design or incorrect maintenance 
or operation lead to premature failure of the component, the burden of maintenance is 
unnecessarily increased. Organizations that can learn from operating experience and solve 
root causes of premature failure, have relatively more resources to apply to preventive and 
necessary corrective maintenance activities. Organizations that cannot learn from operating 
experience see their maintenance and corrective action backlogs grow to the point where they 
are sometimes overwhelmed by the volume of work to be conducted, and enter a significant 
downward performance spiral. 
This scenario is illustrated by several of the DEs. In four cases, poor root cause analysis and 
management support for corrective actions were viewed by the reviewers as significant 
contributors to the continued material degradation of the plant and the inability of the plant to 
avoid what were fundamentally avoidable performance problems. In three cases, plant 
operators had reached the point of no longer requesting maintenance on certain key items 
because they felt that either the maintenance would not be preformed, or that it would be 
performed in a manner such that the underlying problem would not be fixed. 
Finally, in NUREG/CR-5437, another aspect of the relationship of organizational learning to 
plant safety is introduced. Here, problem solving on the part of plant personnel is introduced 
as a potentially significant type of activity for managing human relations and behavior in the 
plant. By emphasizing problem solving and improvement, management is able to 
communicate a series of values that have potential positive effects on plant safety. For 
example, the workers involvement in problem solving may have some as;.ects of job 
enrichment inherent in it. Being part of the process of discovery is inherently rewarding, and 
can offset some of the tedium associated with other aspects of some jobs in nuclear power 
plants. The problem-solving orientation may also increase the worker's attention to the job, 
as the worker tries to understand the implications of his own and the system's performance. 
The worker may also derive satisfaction and commitment from the experience of being 
listened to as an expert by management and co-workers. Thus, the emotional benefits 
accruing from a problem solving orientation in the plant, may have more generalizable 
positive effects on worker performance and plant safety. Among the high performing plants 
that comprised the case studies, numerous examples of these positive effects were noted. 
The DEs also provide support for this perspective, although in the negative. In several of the 
plants, workers cited management as being unresponsive, or even punitive when problems 
were brought to their attention. The reviewers noted that this type of management reaction 
significantly lowered morale and communicated to the workers that safety was not valued, 
and that worker care in their jobs and for the plant was not warranted. In several of the case 
studies, workers cited problem solving activities and management support for worker 
participation in problem solving as key aspects of plant success and key contributors to staff 
morale. 
To summarize, then, there are several ways that learning contributes to plant safety 
performance: 
By avoiding unnecessary, repeat failures, either through a review of the 
plant's own operating experience or through a review of outside 
experience and research 
By fostering innovation and discovery to offset existing design 
deficiencies 
By promoting work attitudes and behaviors that are consistent with safe 
performance in general. 
4.0 THE PROCESS OF LEARNING 
Understanding the role of learning in nuclear power plant safety first requires a discussion of 
what is meant by learning. Several different, though related approaches can be taken to the 
concept. 
Learning can be defined objectively at the organizational level in terms of organizational 
outcomes. An organization can be said to have learned if it manifests a change in a particular 
outcome. From the safety perspective, an organization has learned if it avoids repetitive 
errors and failures, either in terms of a general class of phenomena (e.g., a decline in the 
number of scrams) or a more specific class of phenomena (e.g., a decline in the number of 
scrams induced by poorly written operating procedures). This approach to assessing learning 
underlies the statistical analyses conducted under other tasks in this project. 
However, learning can also be manifest in other outcomes that may be more difficult to 
measure. For example, an organization that searches its environment and learns from the 
operating experience of others, theoretical discussions by experts, and other sources may end 
up avoiding problems in the future that have not yet manifested themselves as events. Thus, 
the error or failure rate may not change, but learning has happened. While this aspect of 
learning is conceptually straightforward, it causes some significant measurement problems -- 
how to assess the number of failures avoided. Understanding this type of learning may 
depend on the observation of learning-relevant behavior. 
This leads to the third perspective on learning -- learning as a process. This perspective 
focuses on the various organizational processes that, if effective, lead to changes in outcomes. 
Figure 1 provides a description of these activities, and serves as point of discussion. 
4.1 Problem Recognition 
The first stage in the learning process is problem recognition. In order to start the learning 
process, it is necessary to identify a deviation from a desired state. If everything appears to 
be working normally, or within expected parameters, learning is unnecessary, and learning 
behavior is largely inefficient. If there is a deviation from expectations, however, both the 
stimulus and the need for learning may be present. 
Problem recognition, however, is itself a complex phenomena. Nuclear power plants vary 
substantially in their performance on this aspect of the learning process. Nor is this variation 
due to the number of problems experienced. Some problem-laden plants are unable or 
unwilling to recognize the number of problems they have. On the other hand, some of the 
high performance plants observed in this study were highly active in the problem solving 
area. 
Of primary concern is the value placed on problem recognition, and nuclear power plant 
organizations vary substantially in the degree to which they promote problem recognition. A 
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significant contrast is between those organizations that view problem recognition as a first 
step to improvement and those that view problem recognition as an impediment to the normal 
conduct of business. Among the case studies and the DEs, considerable variation was 
observed in the basic orientation to problem recognition. In the case of one DE plant, 
inoperable equipment was so common that it had ceased to be viewed as a problem important 
enough to warrant action. In two other cases, workers reportedly feared that the identification 
of problems would lead to punishment by management. In one of the case study plants, 
several respondents stated that their long history of good performance had led to 
overconfidence, resulting in a series of avoidable forced outages. The respondents indicated 
that they had temporarily lost their ability to identify developing problems. 
Another key aspect of this difference is the "problem-space" that is searched to identify 
problems. For example, some plant organizations search only that problem space represented 
by their own operating experience. These organizations are essentially blind to the lessons to 
be learned from the operating experiences of other nuclear power plants and related 
industries. This pattern of behavior was evident in one DE, where the plant had not even 
adopted the lessons learned from the Diagnostic conducted two years earlier in another plant 
in the same utility. Apparently, the organization was not motivated to learn from external 
experience. In another case, the operating experience review was so ineffective and poorly 
staffed that the relevant parts of the organization were not gaining access to information abaut 
external operating experience. Thus, while the organization may have been properly 
motivated, it was not effective in bringing external operating experience into the problem 
space. 
Other plants, however, have complex systems for expanding the problem-space searched to 
other plants, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, and expend considerable resources in this 
activity. In general, this characterized all of the case study plants and at least one of the DE 
plants. In these cases, plant personnel were highly involved in owner's group committees, 
INPO supported data bases, EPRI projects, and so forth. This involvement reflected a 
recognition that there was plant-specific value in reviewing the experiences of other utilities. 
Interviews from the case studies supported the notion that this investment, if properly 
managed, improved the safety performance and operating efficiency of the plant. 
A second way that the initial problem-space can vary is in terms of the types of failures that 
trigger problem recognition. In some plants, problems may g o  unrecognized until some 
external agent, such as INPO or the NRC brings them to the plant's attention. Some plants 
may only recognize that a problem exists when major equipment failure causes an 
unscheduled shutdown. At the other extreme, in some plants problem-recognition is triggered 
when an operator realizes that he almost made a mistake (e.g., left out a step in a procedure), 
and the problem solving apparatus is activated to try to understand why the mistake nearly 
happened. 
In terms of the formal definition of the problem, plants vary in terms of the degree that they 
search human performance as  well as  equipment performance problem-space, and the extent 
to which they search failure or failure precursor problem space. Several of the poorly 
performing D E  plants, for example, had not established any variant of INPO's Human 
Performance Evaluation System (HPES). All of the case study plants had strong HPES 
programs in place. Similarly, most of the poorly performing DE plants were cited for having 
insufficient root cause analysis programs. Specifically, they were found to have exerted little 
or no effort in tracing back from the proximate cause of equipment failure to the root causes 
of the failure. This placed them in a situation of making repeated errors and never 
recognizing or fixing the underlying problem. 
The social and technical organization of the plant can also influence the approach to problem 
recognition. For example, certain systems (e.g., balance of plant systems) can be placed 
outside of the normal problem-search space. The existence of the non-safety related category 
of components can lead to certain types of problems, including safety-related root causes from 
remaining undetected. At times, regulatory pressures and initiatives have had the effect of 
excessively limiting the problem space searched by a particular utility, either by creating 
categories of problems that are outside of regulatory concern, or by emphasizing a particular 
type of problem to the point that the utility is distracted from other aspects of the legitimate 
problem space. 
Similarly, in a plant dominated by operations culture, maintenance-related problems may be 
placed outside of the problem space. A preliminary conclusion from the case studies is that 
plants that maintain a balance of influence among plant functions (e.g., operations, 
maintenance, and engineering), and that have positive working relationships among these 
functions along with effective means of communication seem to be in a good position ta!:.mre 
systematically and comprehensively recognize and characterize the nature and cause of 
problems. Organizational rank may also be a factor, with management activities placed 
outside the problem space and direct worker activities placed within. 
Thus, in many ways, the social and technical organization of the plant, its culture, and the 
regulatory and business environment it faces can shape the way that problems are defined at 
the plant level. To assure that problems are fully identified, at least within acceptable 
costbenefit limits, these barriers to problem identification must be overcome. 
4.2 Problem Diagnosis 
The second stage in the learning process is problem diagnosis. While it has some obvious 
overlap with problem identification, organizations vary substantially in the amount of effort 
put in to understanding the nature of the problems noted. This activity goes beyond the 
discovery of the existence of the problem to the clarification of what the problem is. This 
clarification has both a technical basis and an organizational basis. The technical basis 
involves establishing fact: what caused the failure, what was the precise nature of the failure, 
what were the effects of the failure on related systems and components?. To  answer these 
questions, technical input from a variety of sources (e.g., chemical analyses, design engineers, 
human factors experts) may be required. The process of providing these inputs, however, is 
an organizational one affected by the level of resources available to support problem 
diagnosis, the skills of the technical staff, and the ability of the organization to assimilate 
relevant technical information from outside the organization. 
The organizational basis of problem diagnosis, however, also involves establishing the 
organizational meaning of the problem; what individuals or groups are "to blame", who 
should have input into defining the nature of the problem, what type of evidence qualifies as 
fact, and so forth? Such factors as the nature of labor-management relations, relations among 
plant groups, and the relative power of different groups help condition how organizational 
interpretation of the problem is established for the problem. 
Problem diagnosis can be divided into three types of activities: 
Classification: the problem fits into a particular category of problems. It is like or 
unlike problems previously encountered. 
Causal analysis: the problem resulted from prior conditions and actions. 
Consequence analysis: the problem is important or not important for specifically 
identified reasons. 
In the cases reviewed, the activities of classification, causal analysis, and consequence 
analysis were handled in different ways, were subject to different impediments, and 
contributed differently to long-term safety performance. 
One key area of difference was the. availability and quality of technical resources. One of the 
primary deficiencies noted in the Diagnostic Evaluations was the level of technical support for 
problem diagnosis. Many of the plants experienced poor equipment performance, including 
significant numbers of repeat failures. All eight of the plants reviewed were evaluated as 
having poor root cause diagnosis systems. A number of factor contributed to the inadequacy 
in root cause analysis system: 
Inadequately trained or inexperienced engineering support 
Lack of onsite engineering support coupled with poor support from corporate 
engineering 
& 
Inadequate staffing of engineering support relative to the backlog 
Lack of training in root cause analysis, including human error analysis 
Lack of root cause analysis skills and technical knowledge among maintenance, 
operations, or quality assurance staff 
Lack of equipment history data to support trend and pattern analysis 
Poor communications among departments, leading to a restriction of 
information flow concerning failure and cause information 
Lack of trust between departments or between management and labor leading 
to blame placing or the hiding of root cause information 
Lack of interest on the part of workers to get to the bottom of recurring 
problems due to-past lack of management follow through in the past 
The case study plants, on the other hand, present a nearly opposite picture. In all of the 
plants visited, repeat failures were uncommon, and the root cause analysis efforts appeared to 
be well developed, supported, and successful. Some of the factors that appeared to contribute 
to this success were: 
Strong, onsite engineering 
Low turnover among plant personnel, leading to a high level of resident plant 
knowledge 
Very good communications among departments, leading to the open sharing of 
failure and cause information 
Formal programs for broadening workers' experience and plant knowledge 
including SRO training for plant engineers, involvement of maintenance in the 
design support for plant modifications, involving operators in root cause 
analysis and other task force activities, involvement of plant staff in industry 
activities such as owners groups, and job rotation for management personnel. 
Good labor management-relations leading to labor buy-in with improvement 
programs and a non-punishment orientation toward personnel errors. The non- 
punishment orientation was viewed by managers of the high performing plants 
to be a necessary condition for the type of open flow of information that allows 
for the discovery of true root causes. 
High credibility and trust of the individuals responsible for the various root 
cause programs, based on plant knowledge and experience, good people skills, 
and technical ability. 
Well developed equipment history data programs, and a high level of 
participation on the part of workers in recording information on equipment 
failures. 
A manageable backlog of problems so that technical support for the root cause 
analysis program was not overburdened. 
Well developed systems for identifying the importance of a failure so that 
appropriate resources could be directed toward it. 
Good work attitudes, including a sense of ownership in the plant and the 
equipment. 
The ability of the plant to successfully diagnose the nature, causes, and consequences of 
problems, therefore, is strongly tied to organizational factors. Where management does not 
allocate sufficient technical resources in a way so that they are brought to bear on the 
problem, where communications among departments and between labor and management are 
inhibited by organizational structure or a lack of trust or respect, and when plant personnel 
are taught by the system to take a very narrow view of their roles and responsibilities, root 
causes do not get discovered, and the problem diagnosis stage of learning is inadequate. 
4 3  Solution Formulation and Implementation 
As in the cases of problem identification and diagnosis, the development and implementation 
of solutions to operational problems have both a technical and an organizational basis. The 
case study plants and the DE plants provide several important points of contrast in terms of 
how, and how effectively solutions are formulated and implemented. 
4.3.1 Technical Solutions 
One of the major weaknesses reported among the DE plants was their inability to develop and 
implement solutions to ongoing equipment and programmatic failures. One of the major 
causes of this failing was the lack of availability of appropriate technical expertise for the 
development of technically sound solutions. In contrast, one of the obvious strong points of 
the case study plants was the uniform availability of this technical expertise. This contrast 
can be made in three more specific areas: engineering expertise, the technical expertise 
present in QA, operations and maintenance, and the ability and willingness of the organization 
to access the technical expertise and experience of the wider industry. 
The availability of engineering support, itself, has several dimensions. One key dimension is 
the quality of that expertise. Such expertise was clearly lacking in two of the DE plants. All 
of the case study plants and several of the DE plants, however, were noted for having highly 
qualified engineering expertise within the company. In the case study plants, this meant not 
only that degreed engineers were available, but that they had extensive plant knowledge and 
experience. In three of these plants, engineering support was located on site, and the average 
plant experience level of the engineering staff was quite high. In the fourth case study plant, 
certain aspects of engineering support were located offsite, a fact that was judged to constitute 
a programmatic weakness by several of the department managers interviewed at that site. 
One of the most consistent findings from the DE plants, in fact, is that the location of 
engineering support offsite significantly and negatively affects the quality of engineering 
support provided to the plant. Because offsite engineers frequently lack plant knowledge, and 
because the drawings, specifications, and procedures with which they must work are 
frequently poor or out of date, the solutions that are developed offsite frequently are judged 
by onsite personnel as being unworkable or inadequate. When plant personnel are confronted 
by these inadequate solutions, they are less likely to foster the open communication with 
engineering necessary to promote improvement of the solutions, leading to even less access to 
engineering support in the future. Thus, the quality of technical support for solution 
formulation is very much dependent on the physical and organizational location of plant 
engineering, and the quality of relations and communications between engineering and the 
other plant functions. 
Engineering is not the only potential source for technical solutions to problems. In fact, all of 
the high performing case study plants were characterized by the involvement of personnel 
from all or most departments in the development and implementation of technical solutions. 
Management in these plants provided two key resources that made the wider involvement in 
solution formulation possible and. effective. 
The first resource is access to the process of solution formulation. At the high performing 
plants, operators, maintainers, and others were not only expected to assist in the development 
of solutions, but organizational resources and mechanisms were provided to assure that they 
did. This included the creation of special task forces, with operators and maintainers working 
with engineers to diagnose the problems and come up with consensus solutions. It also 
included making staff time available for operators and maintainers to participate in these 
activities. 
The advantages of opening up the process to staff other than engineers are several. 
Respondents at two of the case study plants indicated that this strategy leads to better 
technical solutions, since the people with hands-on experience frequently have information 
and insights not available to the engineering staff. These people are also frequently most 
aware of the operating history of the problem equipment, including its typical failure modes. 
Another advantage is that by involving plant staff in the development of the technical 
solution, they are more likely to assist in the implementation of the solution. When staff are 
not involved in the development of the solution, as suggested by several of the DEs, they are 
more likely ignore or actively oppose the implementation of the solution. 
The second major resource that management makes available to plant staff to assist in their 
participation in solution formulation is technical training. In one of the case study plants, 
several mechanisms were used to expand the technical knowledge available to both 
engineering and non-engineering staff. One of these mechanisms was to provide financial 
support and encouragement for operators to earn engineering and science degrees. A second 
mechanism was the provision of SRO training for engineering staff. A third mechanism was 
to provide opportunity for job rotation among managers and supervisors to give them wider 
exposure to the plant and the organization. A forth mechanism was to recruit and assign 
individuals with engineering and plant experience to the Quality Assurance organization. 
Taken together, in the context of a team approach to solution formulation, higher levels of 
technical expertise could be directed to the solution of problems. 
In contrast, several of the DE plants were criticized for not involving non-engineering staff in 
the solution of problems. For example, seven of the eight plants were evaluated as having 
poor teamwork among the plant functions. One was specifically mentioned as having a 
significant lack of technical ability within the maintenance organization, and an inability of 
the maintenance organization to compensate for this weakness by working closely with 
engineering. 
The third area where the DE plants and the high performing case study plants varied was in 
the ability of the organizations to search the experience of the wider industry to find solutions 
that could be adapted for the specific problems facing the plant. All of the case study plants 
had displayed a management philosophy that promoted learning from the environment. This 
included positive working relationships with INPO, EPRI, vendors, and vendor groups. Staff 
at these plants were well aware of vendor developed solutions for hardware problems, and the 
current status of key research and development issues (e.g., advances in predictive 
maintenance). Management supported participation by plant personnel in conferences and 
workshops, participated with EPRI in developmental projects, and even appeared to relatively 
open to input from INPO and the NRC concerning operational deficiencies. On the other 
hand, plant personnel appeared to be intelligent consumers of industry experience. Rather 
than accepting particular approaches uncritically, plant management and staff evaluated the 
applicability of the industry experience to their situation, and evaluated the benefits of the 
solution relative to the costs. 
In contrast, the DE plants typically were not prepared to identify and adapt solutions from the 
wider industry. For example, one plant was cited for a weak level of attention to vendor 
notices. Another was cited for failing to adopt improved procedures for the maintenance of 
motor operated valves. A third was cited for failing to make the improvements resulting from 
an earlier diagnostic at its sister plant. At the other extreme, one plant was also cited for 
being too quick to react to external pressure from the NRC or INPO by adopting the solution 
that they perceived to be the favorite one of the outside party, without thinking through 
implications and necessary adaptations for the plant's unique situation. 
43.2 Organizational Constraints 
The development and implementation of sound technical solutions must take place within an 
organizational context that can either facilitate or inhibit the effectiveness of the solutions. 
Some aspects of this context have already been discussed in the previous section. One of the 
most important elements of this context, however, concerns budgetary resources. The size of 
the budget relative to need will determine the ability of technical solutions to be developed 
and implemented. Among the case studies and the DE plants alike, budgetary issues play a 
significant role in the effectiveness of solution formulation and implementation. 
No plant in the nuclear industry is immune from resource limitations. This is particularly true 
as deregulation has increased competition among utilities, as Public Utility Commissions have 
become more aggressive in limiting rate increases, and as increases in operating costs have 
eroded the cost advantage once held by nuclear over other fuels. Even among the high 
performing case study plants, the potential exists for having inadequate resources to develop 
and implement solutions to important operational problems. However, among these plants, 
several steps were being taken to assure that, to the extent possible, resources were available 
for important improvements. These included: 
Systematic methods for establishing priorities among competing needs. These 
methods included risk-based assessments (based on PRA, RCM, etc) of the 
significance of the operational problem, cost-benefit analyses of alternative 
solutions, and detailed, forward looking performance goals to organize and - 
direct budgets. These mechanisms helped assure that scarce resources were not 
being wasted on low priority items. 
Bottom-up budgeting, with resource expenditures planned on the basis of inputs 
from those individuals and groups with first-hand experience with plant needs. 
In one case, management was experimenting with a variation on zero-based 
budgeting. 
Group decision making concerning budget allocations for improvement 
programs to help establish the plant priorities and to facilitate buy-in on the 
part of all plant personnel as to the programs that are supported and those that 
are deferred. 
Widespread educating of plant personnel as to the nature of the budgeting 
process, and methods for determining the costbenefit of improvement 
programs. 
Among the DE plants, however, the budgeting process frequently was not as well managed. 
Several of the DE plants were criticized for having inadequate resources available for solution 
formulation and implementation. This included inadequate staffing of the engineering 
function, resulting in high levels of backlog for design change requests, root cause analysis 
and procedure modifications. This, in turn, resulted in slow or inadequate development of 
technical solutions. The DE plants also suffered from inadequate resources to implement 
solutions once they were developed. Nor was this problem simply a matter of funds 
available. 
These plants also suffered from one or more of the following: 
Corporate management being distracted by other projects 
The lack of systematic mechanisms for assessing the importance of competing 
needs: no risk-based models for prioritization, no plant level goals, poor 
teamwork among plant functions in developing priorities. As a consequence, 
plant management frequently was not allocating resources toward the most 
important problems. 
Excessively large backlogs of unresolved items, making the need for a priority 
system and for management attention particularly important. 
Lack of involvement of plant staff in the budgeting and resource allocation 
process. 
In addition to resource issues, the effective plants paid particular attention to the 
organizational issues associated with solution implementation. Plant management typically 
expended considerable effort to involve organized labor in the planning stages, thus achieving 
labor buy-in with the solutions. In general, solutions were formulated with the input and 
review of all affected parties. The DE plants apparently did not engage in similar types of 
behavior. 
One area where both the DE and the case study plants appeared to have problems was when 
the solution to the performance problem involved a reorganization of the plant. These 
reorganizations were typically disruptive in the short run at the better plants, and in the long 
run among some of the other plants. The reorganizations, at minimum, seemed to cause a 
loss of morale on the part of managers who lost responsibility and authority during the 
reorganization, and in general caused concern on the part of the workforce about the direction 
of the plant. Among some of the DE plants, this disruption was severe. This indicates the 
need for care and skill on the part of upper management when reorganization is considered. 
4.4 Assessment and Feedback 
Assessment and feedback are also important stages in organizational learning. Once solutions 
have been identified and implemented, there remains the question of whether the solutions 
will be effective. To address this issue, organizations must have effective programs to 
continually monitor key aspects of performance, and outputs of these programs must find 
their way into decisions about whether new solutions are needed (problem identification). 
Again, the high performing, case study plants approach the processes of assessment and 
feedback considerably differently than do the DE plants. 
One of the key areas where the case study and the DE plants differ concerns the level of 
development of the formal systems for tracking performance. In general, the case study 
plants had developed and were using a wide range of plant performance indicators. In most 
cases, the indicators exceeded considerably the list recommended by INPO. Of particular 
importance to learning, however, were the highly developed and effective programs for 
tracking corrective actions. In general, these programs indicated a very low level of 
corrective action backlog, indicating that problems that were being identified were also being 
solved. Technically competent staff with knowledge of the organization a s  well as  the plant 
were employed to lead the task of tracking corrective actions. In general, it appears that these 
individuals served as facilitators for improvements, as well as monitors of whether the 
improvement schedule was being met. 
In contrast, the DE plants appeared to have much less well developed assessment systems. 
This included generally weak QA programs, and lack of corrective action tracking systems. 
In addition, several of the DE plants were evaluated as having weak management involvement 
in oversight of the various improvement programs. 
Shaping the effectiveness of the formal systems are several organizational factors. First, the 
nature of vertical communication appears to be very important in assessment and feedback. 
Where information is not allowed to flow up to management, relevant facts on plant and 
program performance will not be available for management decision making. Such 
communication is particularly inhibited when lower ranks and management lack trust of each 
other. 
Another important organizational factor for assessment and feedback is the nature of 
interdepartmental relations. Where these relations are good, feedback on the effectiveness of 
new programs or technical solutions can flow freely. Where the relations among departments 
is bad, or not well developed, this information is not exchanged. In one of the case study 
plants, and in several of the DE plants, the existence of a large number of independent, non- 
integrated tracking programs, each the unique possession of a part of the organization, 
inhibited the effective use of performance information in plant improvement. 
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
For nuclear power plant organizations to be in a position to learn, they must have in place the 
technical and analytic skills and the formal information management programs necessary to 
characterize problems, define solutions, and measure the success of the solutions. However, 
for these technical skills and information management programs to be successful, the nuclear 
power plant must provide an organizational context that allows for a focused application of 
these resources and programs. In determining whether plants can improve from degraded 
levels of performance, therefore, we must be able to evaluate the organizational context and 
management strategy present in the plant, in addition to the quantity and quality of technical 
resources and the sophistication of formal information management programs. To do this, we 
must be able to assess the following specific items: 
The level and quality of technical resources available relative to the need for 
these resources 
The ability of the organization to deliver those resources to the other line 
organizations (operations, maintenance) 
The ability of the organization to direct the technical resources to where they 
are most needed through a sound process of establishing priorities among 
competing demands 
The ability to facilitate the flow of information among departments, groups, 
and ranks in the organization 
The ability to involve all affected personnel in the definition of the problem 
and the development and implementation of solutions 
The exact strategies to be used may be highly plant specific. Certainly, we can anticipate that 
strategies effective in one country or for one utility may not yield the same high level of 
results when transplanted to another utility in a substantially different context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Insofar as is humanly possible, the technical systems of nuclear 
- 
power plants are designed to narrow the range of human 
fallibilities that might interfere with their optimally safe 
operations. At the same time, however, it is humanly impossible 
to engineer day-to-day social.and cultural dynamics, which include 
of course timely responses to the unanticipated fallibilities of 
aatomated and technical systems. Human intelligence, experience, 
imagination, and cooperation remain ultimate guarantors of the 
safe performance of every kind of complex technological system. 
Based on field observations and data collection, this study 
will begin to identify the social and cultural logics of nuclear 
power plant operations. As the human analogues to plant safety 
and control logics, these are unique links in the causal chain of 
safety performance. Ultimately, the understandings we are after 
should suggest a new class of indicators of conditions conducive 
to safety performance (Carroll and Cebon 1990: 32-34). 
I welcome your ideas about how best to carry out these 
field studies, which I soon outline, to minimize their impacts on 
normal operations and maximize the possible benefits of our on- 
site involvement and comparative perspective. 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LOGICS 
Speaking of organizations in general, their social logics are 
represented in their basic architecture: How they frame and 
distribute accountability and responsibility, how they classify 
and assign the workload between human and technical resources, how 
they define rewards and sanctions, and how they recruit, train, 
and socialize their members. Management can only initiate the 
social logics of hierarchies, functional divisions, resource 
allocations, and make available the control and coordination 
mechanisms that tie it all together. How people carry out their 
tasks day by day brings to life the static social logics of 
organizational charts. One of our aims is to describe the social 
logics of nuclear power plants and the dynamics of each plant 
cycle. 
Cultural logics can't easily be charted, partly because 
they're taken so much for granted that we're unlikely to think 
twice about them. Cultural logics consist of a linked series of 
implicit agreements about what matters, what means what, and why. 
They provide the grounds on which people live in groups of all 
kinds. They guide both behaviors and expectations in every 
domain. Until they 're made explicit, they can't be renegotiated 
and are unlikely to change. 
For example, we're all born into a basic social contract 
between ourselves and our family. But once we begin to think 
about who to invite to a wedding, and how much each relative adds 
to its cost, we've begun to rethink the implicit agreement about 
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what familyw means. Then when we begin to list the friends we 
want to include and consider the relatives we might exclude, we're 
beginning to rethink the grounds of friendship as well as kinship. 
We may find ourselves assigning degrees of kinship or judging 
friends on criteria that had never before occurred to US -- or 
wanted to acknowledge. These are cultural logics having major 
consequences not only in our personal.lives, but in society as 
well, as courts and legislatures are today renegotiating long 
standing agreements about the meaning of family. 
Nuclear power plant safety may depend on equally 
consequential cultural logics. Studies of aviation accidents show 
that our unstated agreements about the relationship between 
politeness and rank affect cockpit behaviors. That is, we expect 
more politeness going up the chain of cornnand than down. Studies 
of cockpit conversations after aviation accidents reveal that 
captains may not hear -- that is, not take in -- what crew members 
are telling them. actors comply with procedures and read 
signals turns out to be as significant as compliance per se. 
An Allegheny Airlines flight to Rochester overran the 
runway by 728 feet, and at landing, the aircraft was going 
considerably £aster than the recomnended speed. The crew survived 
and the National Transportation Safety Board interviewed members 
about their cockpit actions. "The captain reported that he did 
not remember being excessively over recomnended airspeed and had 
no explanation either for flying at excess airspeed or for not 
noticing it. [ ~ u t ]  the copilot mentioned in his interview that he 
'tried to warn the captain in subtle ways, like mentioning the 
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possibility of a tailwind and the slowness of flap extension. 
The black box recording bore him out. About the flaps, the 
copilot had said, "Yeah the i) flaps are slower than a t)," to which 
the pilot said, "We'll make it, gonna have to add power" (Linde 
1988: 379). 
The co-pilot's subtle, indirect, and polite compliance with 
procedures -- reading the signs and giving a warning -- the pilot 
did not hear. The co-pilot deferred to rank, and so did the 
captain, who wasn't tuned in to what a subordinate was trying to 
convey. 
Implicit agreements themselves are important, but equally 
important are the ways in which people interpret, use, and 
renegotiate them, for we also make agreements about how to do 
those things. Here are examples of varying degrees of direct and 
polite speech in the cockpit: 
--Direct speech, copilot to captain: "The visibility is 
dropping." 
--Somewhat polite speech,. copilot to captain: " ~ e t  ' s take 
the shortest route to the airport." 
--Very polite speech, off-duty captain to captain, when 
discussing a possible emergency landing: "If I might make a 
suggestion -- you should put your coats on -- both for your 
protection and so you'll be noticed so they'll know who you are." 
And finally, an example of what linguists call "aggravated 
speech" and I call rude talk, which Americans agree should only go 
down the chain of command: Here is captain to flight engineer 
discussing possible emergency landing: "YOU just haul ass back 
there and do whatever needs doing" (Linde 1988: 383). 
This study, funded by NASA to investigate "aviation 
accidents caused wholly or in part by problems in crew 
commrnication and coordination," confirms statistically several 
important hypotheses about the influence of the cultural logics of 
politeness on commrnicative success (linguists call it 
"mitigation"). Communicative failure means that the message was 
not received as the sender intended it. 
(1) Utterances going up the chain of comnand are more 
mitigated than those going down, showing that mitigation is 
sensitive to social rank. (2) Utterances introducing a 
new topic are more likely to fail if they are mitigated 
than if they are direct. (3) Suggestions by a crew member 
to the captain are more likely to fail if they are 
mitigated than if they are direct (Linde 1988: 375). 
Although it's clear that direct speech in the cockpit is 
more conducive to communicative success than indirect speech, its 
link to safe performance is not entirely clear, given a parallel 
finding that crews designated as being "high in safety performance 
have a higher rate of mitigation than poor crews" (ibid: 395). We 
need to look beyond cockpit activities to their wider context. 
The cultural logics of mitigation and status etiquette also smooth 
the crew's close, of ten long-term relationships ; they prevent 
animosities. Crews that maintain higher levels of politeness may 
therefore also have a higher level of solidarity and cooperation 
that translates into high safety performance. 
Besides training crews in direct expression, then, this 
study concludes, "it would also be necessary to train in forms of 
communication that can challenge a superior's assessment of a 
situation, while indicating respect for the superior's position. 
At present, we know very little about how subordinates 
respectfully and successfully challenge superiors" (ibid: 396). 
Reading narratives of the TMI-2 accident, 1'm struck first 
by the absence of graphic images to portray the network of actors 
and their comrmnication. They identify the chief actors 
categorically, but not interactively or systematically. They 
designate them by job title alone, which by itself conveys no 
sense of their rank or their level of expertise. There is no 
depiction of their comrmnication patterns in both normal and 
abnormal situations nor of the ~lant's spatial organization. The 
actors aren't situated, that is, in terms of their reciprocal, 
systematic relationships as senders and receivers of information 
and interpretations. 
In general, talking and listening, asking questions and 
answering them, and understanding and misunderstanding are 
fundamentally organized by social and cultural logics. For 
example, women have known for some time what studies of meetings 
have begun to document: Even with equal rank, what they say is 
likely to evoke frowns and what men say, smiles and nods of 
approval. Their ideas are unlikely to get a hearing until a man 
repeats them. Women are more likely to be interrupted than are 
men. Such conditions, I suspect, may also hold true for men in 
junior or subordinate positions and for newcomers to 
organizations, for example. 
On the other hand, ranked relations yield to the 
imperatives of safe behavior on aircraft carriers, for example. 
The social distance between order givers and takers narrows "as 
the tempo of operations increases ....[ £]orma1 ranklstatus declines 
as a reason for obedience. Hierarchical rank defers to technical 
expertise often held by those of lesser formal rank. Chiefs 
advise Commanders, gently direct Lieutenants, and cow Ensigns. 
Criticality, hazard, and sophistication of operations prompts a 
kind of functional discipline, a 'professionalization' of the work 
teams. Feedback and (sometimes conflictual) negotiations increase 
in importance; feedback about 'how goes it' is sought and valued" 
(La Porte and Consolini 1989: 13). 
* 
FIELD STUDIES 
The most fertile source of social and cultural logics at work is 
in to be found in the ways people conceive of and carry out their 
work. We are interested in describing work systems during each 
plant cycle and in collecting data on routine problem-finding 
behaviors during these normal times. Work systems I define as the 
people and tools involved in carrying out specific tasks, whether 
confined to a single function or across functions. We are equally 
interested in administrative and technical work systems. 
1 Work Systems Studies 
To acquire data with which to describe and systematize the social 
and cultural logics of nuclear power plants, we need to observe 
and describe each work system or a sample of work systems during 
each plant cycle, through all shifts. Making the work system the 
basic unit of data collection will permit comparison across sites; 
they will vary of course by the technology. The data needed to 
describe work systems are both objective and subjective. 
Objective Data on Work Systems: 
Program: The program of a work system is composed of its 
mission and tasks, the inputs it requires and the outputs others 
expect from it. 
People: Demographic and organizational information about 
each work system and its members (i.e., numbers, training, sex, 
organizational role, pay range, incumbency and turnover). 
Performance: Current performance appraisal systems 
applying to each role and the rewards and sanctions in force. 
Tools and Setting: Por each task in the work system, how 
people, tools, and the physical environment are arranged and 
rearranged for each cycle. 
Emplo~ees' Perceptions of Work Systems: 
Routine and Nonroutine Tasks: How employees describe their 
day, week, and month dividing between more and less routine 
activities. 
Authority and Responsibility: Employees' understandings of 
how these are distributed and exercised formally and informally. 
Images of Plant Organization: How do they see the 
organization and interdependencies of work in the plant as a 
whole? How do their images or theories of the organization map 
onto actual interdependencies? 
Work Conmunication Networks: Who do they regard as being 
essential to their work, whether or not they are in their 
function, in their formal workgroup, within or outside the plant? 
How often are they in contact, what are the the topics at issue, 
and how critical are they? Where are they physically located and 
what channels do they use (telephone, computer, memo, meeting)? 
What is the character of each comnicative event, e.g., 
gettinelgiving information or advice, checking or verifying 
information? Who initiates conmunication? (We expect these 
networks to cross not only functional boundaries but also plant 
boundaries -- peers in other plants, MC staff, union staff, 
academics.) 
These data will allow us to specify the nature of the 
social and cultural logics of nuclear power plants. They will 
also allow comparisons between assumed and actual 
interdependencies and of the relative importance of formal and 
informal channels of conarmnication by topic. On the basis of 
these initial data we will design further detailed studies, which 
may use survey' methods; 
2) Problem Recognition Studies 
TMI-2 accident narratives dramatize the centrality of problem 
recognition. Reading various signals, actors found them so far 
out of pattern and so foreign to expectations, that they dismissed 
the original events as "not credible." Heard as a "thud," the 
significance of the hydrogen spike was unappreciated for a day and 
a half, "written off" as an instrument malfunction. Actors 
disbelieved the valve signals yet believed the temperature 
signals. 
In being so alien, these signals elicited rejection instead 
of curiosity -- people are prone to behave this way toward any 
event or object that doesn't fit what they expect, when the degree 
of difference is great. They avoid the problem instead of 
approaching it, as they are likely to do when the difference is 
smaller. The signals were literally unrecognizeable and 
unthinkable in the cognitive and interpretive frames that actors 
habitually used. The question of interest here is whether and to 
what extent their technical and procedural logics are, as in 
cockpits, accompanied by social and cultural logics. 
To collect data with which to pursue that question, we will 
ask a sample of employees to provide detailed accounts of 
situations where they recognized, interpreted, and communicated 
about unexpected, nonroutine events, whether or not they saw them 
as being directly related to safety. Who did they talk to? What 
did they do (e.g., refer to manuals, seek new information)? How 
did they interpret each event's meaning? These accounts of 
responses to out of pattern events are likely to provide 
spontaneous evidence of social and cultural logics not normally 
displayed and voiced. Studying "simple" cases may help us to 
understand the nontechnical logics involved in more complex 
sequences where recognition and interpretation are crucial to 
safety performance and behaviors. We hope also to observe such 
events in real time. 
How they tell their stories about handling exceptions is 
also important data about more general interpretive and 
sensemaking practices. These accounts will also help us learn how 
employees use feedback loops, how learning occurs, and how they 
balance initiative, innovation, and creativity with procedural 
compliance. 
We expect therefore to be able to speak to management and 
training issues as well. Do employees need special training to 
acknowledge rather than reject out of pattern information and 
events? Do they need a larger store of schemata or scripts, in 
order to interpret the significances of unexpected signals? In 
discussing their inferences and checking their observations with 
one another, do they reveal tendencies not only toward customary 
patterns of social deference, but toward closing out alternatives? 
Do their communicative patterns suggest a knowledge hierarchy that 
only partially maps onto the authority hierarchy? 
CONCLUSION 
This research strategy does not propose to codify social and 
cultural criteria for safety performance, but instead to flag 
comrmnicative and social conditions under which safety behaviors 
are likely to flourish. Ultimately we should be able to identify 
organizational conditions that stand a good chance of reducing 
misrecognition, miscomrmnication, misinterpretation, and incorrect 
inferences. 
As engineers, operators, and managers confront warning 
signals and discuss their interpretations and check their 
inferences with one another, they may also be relying on cultural 
logics alongside their technical knowledge. They may be drawing 
not only on their national culture, but on plant culture, 
occupational culture, and regional culture as well. Local plant 
rules and procedures that take into account these many cultures 
remain essential because clear communication depends on implicit 
agreements of such depth and density that nontechnical logics may 
vary even plant to plant, no matter how universalized the 
technical operations may be. There are hints in the literature, 
for example, that different regions of the USA work from different 
agreements about what constitutes politeness -- an experience 
we've all had, I'm sure. Cross-national comparisons are for this 
reason also important, not only to test that proposition, but as 
well to learn how organizational policies and operating procedures 
adapt to national and regional cultures -- and vice versa. 
Finally, in focusing on work systems and communicative 
networks, this anth.ropologica1 approach emphasizes the social 
contexts that influence individuals' behavior. Being appreciated, 
encouraged, and trained appropriately provides the basic 
motivation to work responsibly. That support is a social product 
that individuals transform first into a personal resource and then 
into feelings of loyalty and involvement. Human factors 
specialists tend to measure individuals' relationships to tools, 
without factoring in the constraints and opportunities of their 
social and physical environments. Organizational psychologists 
may emphasize personal traits over peer influences. Compensation 
systems may reward individual performance when management expects 
superior team performance. 
Although we generally agree that ultimately individuals as 
responsible for their behaviors, we can all cite situations that 
bring out the best and worst in us, 1 'm sure. Complex, tightly 
coupled, and highly consequential technological systems create 
work situations that can afford only to bring out the best in 
people, depending as they do on human systems that have no 
alternative but to operate at the highest levels of cooperation, 
e 
alertness, and open conmunication. 
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1. WANO 
The benefit of nuclear power can be brought to mankind only if safety is kept at 
the highest level. The ultimate safety responsibility for nuclear electricity 
generation rests upon the organisation that operates the nuclear power plant. 
Each nuclear utility has an individual responsibility to guarantee safety. The 
utilities also have a collective responsibility to work together to improve their 
performance and to upgrade continually the safety of operating plants. 
One proven effective way of promoting the safety and reliability of nuclear 
ower is the mutual exchange of information on nuclear power plant operations 
petween utilities. In this way, the utilities can all learn from one another, they 
can help one another, and they can raise the performance of all to the standards 
of the best. 
For these reasons, the World Association of Nuclear Operators was created. 
WANO was incorporated in the UK on 9 May 1989 as a company limited by 
guarantee under the Companies Act 1985, and was inaugurated at the first 
meeting of the General Assembly held in Moscow on 15-16 May 1989. 
2. The Mission of WANO 
The mission of WANO is to maximise the safety and reliability of the operation 
of nuclear power plants by exchanging information and encouraging 
communication, comparison and emulation among its members. 
In carrying out its mission WANO will strive to: 
- Promote bilateral and multilateral exchange and use of operating 
experience information among members. 
- Provide members with early notification and follow-on information 
on significant events. 
- Screen and analyse events that occur at nuclear power plants world- 
wide in order to identify possible precursors of more serious events 
and disseminate lessons learned. 
- Identify and promote the use of good practices among members. 
- Encourage comparisons of operations and emulation of high 
standards among members through sponsorship of exchange visits. 
Encourage shanng of methodologies among members through 
sponsorship of workshops and seminars. 
- Collect, maintain and use data on selected performance indicators to 
im rove nuclear plant performance in area such as nuclear plant P sa ety and reliability, plant efficiency, and personnel safety. 
- Maintain cooperative relationships with international organisations, 
such as IAEA, working to promote safety and reliability of nuclear 
power plants. 
- Effectively manage WANO resources. 
3. Oreanisation 
3.1 Structure 
The structure of WANO consists of a General Assembly, a Governing Board, a 
Coordinating Centre in London and four Regional Centres located in Atlanta, 
Moscow, Paris and in Tokyo. 
3 3  General Assembly 
Each member of WANO is entitled to appoint one official representative to the 
General Assembly. 
The General Assembly ratifies changes to the Charter of WANO and advises on 
other matters put to it by the Governing Board. 
3.3 Governing Board 
The Governing Board of WANO manages the activities of WANO and consists 
of either eight or nine voting members as follows: 
- The Chairman of the Governing Board of each Regional Centre 
- One member of the Governing Board of each Regional Centre 
- A Chairman who may or may not be elected from among the eight 
Regional Members 
3.4 Coordinating Centre 
The Coordinating Centre is under the direction of the Governing Board of 
WANO. 
The primary function of the Coordinating Centre is to assist the Regional 
Centres in coordinating their work and in communicating efficiently to carry out 
the mission of WANO. 
3.5 Regional Centres 
Each Regional Centre is under the direction of the Regional Centre Governing 
Board. Each Regional Centre operates independently. 
4. WANO Members 
4.1 Membership 
A member of WANO may be either: 
- an individual operator of nuclear power plants 
- an organisation representing a group of operators 
An operator or operator organisation cannot be a member of WANO without 
belonging to a Regional Centre. Each operator or operator organisation is free 
to join the Regional Centre or Centres most suited to its need. 
Recognising that the safety of each individual plant affect the viability and 
acceptability of nuclear power plants throughout the world, all members accept: 
- their individual responsibility for the nuclear power plant they 
operate 
- their collective responsibility to inform, help and emulate other 
nuclear operators, 
by the provision and effective use of operating experience. 
Te facilitate the free flow of information within WANO each member 
undertakes to safeguard the information it receives and release information 
outside WANO only if authorised to do so by the originating WANO member. 
4.2 WANO Members 
The Regional Centres have the following members. 
Atlanta Centre: 
- United States NPPs 
- Canadian NPPs 
- Mexican NPPs 
- Yugoslav NPPs 
Moscow Centre: 
- Soviet Union NPPs 
- IVO for Finland 
- Bulgarian NPPs 
- Hungarian NPPs 
- Czechoslovak NPPs 
- Polish NPPs 
- Cuban NPPs 
- German(East) NPPs 
Paris Centre: 
- French NPPs 
- Belgian NPPs 
- TVO for Finland 
- Spanish NPPs 
- Swiss NPPs 
- Brazilian NPPs 
- Argentinean NPPs 
- South African NPPs 
- Italian NPPs 
- Dutch NPPs 
- German(West) NPPs 
- British NPPs 
- Swedish NPPs 
Tokyo Centre: 
- Japanese NPPs 
- South Korean NPPs 
- Taiwanese NPPs 
- Indian NPPs 
- Pakistani NPPs 
- Chinese utilities are observers 
5. I m ~ l e m e n t i n ~  WAN0 activities 
Each Regional Centre operates independently. The members of each Regional 
Centre decide how their centre is organised and operated. 
The Coordinating Centre is to assist the Regional Centres in coordinating their 
work and in communicating efficiently to carry out the WANO mission. 
In order to have consistency of the implementation of WANO activities, the 
WANO Charter and the Policy Guidelines define the WANO programme. 
Whereas the Charter and the Policy Guidelines specify the basic WANO 
programmes, the WANO planning process begins with the Long Term Plan. 
From this broad statement of overall goals of the organisation, two year goals are 
developed. Annually, specific, measurable objectives are established to meet the 
two year goals. Regional and Coordinating Centres develop their own objectives 
and work plans that are in harmony with, and support, the achievement of the 
WANO goals and objectives. 
6. WANO Proerammes 
The following four major programmes are being developed. 
- Operating Experience Information Exchange Programme 
- Operator to Operator Exchange Programme 
- Good Practice Programme 
- Performance Indicator Programme 
6.1 Operating Experience Information Exchange Programme 
The Operating Experience Exchange Programme is an event reporting system 
through WANO NUCLEAR NETWORK. There are two types of reporting. 
- To provide early notification of significant events 
- To provide follow-up analysis reports including cause analysis and 
actions to be taken 
The criteria for issuing reports are specified in the relevant Policy Guideline. 
6 3  Operator to Operator Exchange Programme 
To exchange information about plant operation, management organisation, 
maintenance, chemistry, radiological protection, emergency preparedness, 
technical support, public acceptance, good practice and so on through following 
activities: 
- technical exchange visits 
- seminars 
- workshops 
- direct information exchange through NUCLEAR NETWORK 
6 3  Good Practice Programme 
In order to share the ood performances of plant operation, good practices are 
collected through exc g ange visits, workshops, seminars and documentation 
reviews, and disseminated among the members of WANO. 
6.4 Performance Indicator Programme 
Ten WANO Performance Indicators have been adopted to provide a 
quantitative indication of nuclear plant performance in the areas of nuclear plant 
safety and reliability, plant efficiency, and personnel safety. 
These indicators are intended for use by nuclear operating organisations to 
monitor performance and progress, to set challenging goals for improvement, to 
gain additional perspective on performance relative to that of other plants, and 
to provide for the indication of a possible need to adjust priorities and resources 
to achieve improved overall performance. 
WANO performance Indicators are intended to support the exchange of 
o erating experience information and to allow consistent comparisons of nuclear 
p P ant performance. 
It is e ected that the WANO performance indicators will encourage emulation 
of the 't est industry performance and further motivate the identification and 
exchange of good practices in nuclear plant operation. 
7. WANO NUCLEAR NETWORK svstem 
In order to help WANO members to share information relative to the safe and 
reliable operation of nuclear ower lants, WANO uses an electronic mail J J system which is the WANO UC AR NETWORK. 
The information is classified in the following Topics permitting different 
cammunication channels between members and Regonal Centres and including 
data base. 
WANO Topics 
- Communication among Regional Centre and Coordinating Centre 
- Coordination within each Regional Centre 
- Coordination within WANO 
- WANO Event Reports 
- Miscellaneous Event Reports 
8. Fundine and Centres' Staff 
WANO is a non-profit making organisation. The costs of WANO are fully 
funded by its members. 
The Coordinating Centre and each Regonal Centre operate with the minimal 
staff necessary including seconded engineers to the Centre from its members. 
Most of the information exchange is ensured by the electronic mail system or by 
direct contacts between operators during technical exchange visits, workshops or 
seminars. 
9. Summary 
WANO is now well established as an organisation. 
WANO was created by operators, for operators and has their full support. 
WANO operates with the minimal staff necessary. 
The WANO NUCLEAR NETWORK has been established. 
Operator to Operator direct communication system has been established. 
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I. THE IFiEA SAFETY ACTIVITIES 
The ~ n t e r n a t i o n a l  Atomic Energy Agency was assigned two main r o l e s  a t  
i t s  c r e a t i o n  i n  1957: 
- Prevent d i v e r s i o n  o f  nuc lear  ma te r i a l s  f o r  m i l i t a r y  purposes 
- Promote development o f  peaceful a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  nuc lear  energy i n  
areas such as b io logy ,  medicine, a g r i c u l t u r e ,  e t c . . .  and genera t ion  
. o f  e l e c t r i c i t y .  
Dur ing  t h e  three-past decades, safe use o f .  nuc lear  energy f o r  
e l e c t r i c i t y  genera t ipn  became an i n c r e a s i n g  concern o f  t he  p u b l i c .  (acc ident  o f  
Chernobyl, Windscale, Three M i l e s  Is land,  Goiana, e t c . . ) .  Th i s  l e d  t o  t h e  
development o f  a s t i l l  growing work fo rce  w i t h i n  the IAEh under the 
superv is ion  o f  t h e  D i v i s i o n  o f  Nuclear Sa fe ty ,  
The sa fe ty  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t he  IAEA a re  t h r e e f o l d :  
- Produce sa fe ty  guides f o r  regu la to ry  and ope ra t i ng  organ iza t ions  
Recently, these e f f o r t s  were concluded by the  bas ic  sa fe ty  
p r i n c i p l e s ,  Safety Ser ies No. 75 INSAG-3 1988 fo l lowed by Safety 
Ser ies  No. 75-INSAG4 1991, a document dea l i ng  w i t h  sa fe ty  c u l t u r e .  
The nex t  s tep  should advise on techniques o f  assessment o f  
o p e r a t i o n a l  sa fe ty  a t  NPPs. 
- Promote exchange o f  experience on the  numerous aspects o f  p l a n t  
sa fe ty  . 
T h i s  cont inuous e f f o r t  i s  made through o rgan iza t i on  o f  meetings by 
the  IAEA o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  meetings organized w i t h i n  t h e  nuc lear  
community. I t  i s ,  however,recognized t h a t  t h i s  process does n o t  
i n v o l v e  h i g h  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  NPPs opera tors .  
- Provide serv ices  t o  nuc lear  power p l a n t  i n  o rde r  t o  assess and 
recommend enhancement o f  ope ra t i ona l  sa fe t y .  
The Se rv i ces  o f f e r e d  by t h e  I-AEA a r e  meant t o  exchange f i r s t  hand 
t e c h n i c a l  exper ience  on  t h e  f i e l d  where ope ra to r s  a r e  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  d a i l y  
s a f e t y  i s sues  d u r i n g  p l a n t  ope ra t i on .  
11. THE IAEA SERVICES TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
The IAEA o f f e r s  t h r e e  types o f  se rv ices  t o  address p l a n t  s a f e t y  i n  t he  
f o l l o w i n g  areas:  
- Design 
- Opera t i on  (OSART) 
- Management o f  t h e  p l a n t  programme f o r  p reven t i on  o f  i n c i d e n t  (ASSET) 
S ince  1991, i n  t h e  frame o f  t he  p r o j e c t  devoted t o  o l d e r  r eac to r s ,  
rev iews o f  d e s i g n  i d e n t i f y  weak po in t s ,  assess t h e i r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  s a f e t y  
and reco~~unend hardware m o d i f i c a t i o n s  . 
Since 1983, r ev i ews  o f  o p e r a t i o n a l  p r a c t i c e s  by Ope ra t i ona l  Sa fe t y  
Review Teams (OSART) i d e n t i f y  shortcomings, assess t h e i r  impor.tance t o  s a f e t y  
and recommend improvements o f  procedures and work ing p r a c t i c e s .  
S ince  1986, r ev i ew  o f .  ope ra t i ng  exper ience by Assess~nent o f  Sa fe t y  
S i g n i f i c a n t  Events Teams (ASSET) i d e n t i f y  o p e r a t i o n a l  i ssues  r e l e v a n t  t o  
sa fe ty ,  r a t e  t h e i r  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  conduct r o o t  cause analyses and reco~r~~nerid 
c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  t o  improve management o f  o p e r a t i o n a l  s a f e t y  by enhancing 
p r e v e n t i o n  o f  i n c i d e n t s .  
The g rowing  p o p u l a r i t y  o f  t he  systemat ic  ASSET i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
methodology among IAEA Member S ta tes  has l e d  t o  numerous reques ts  f o r  t he  
ASSET s e r v i c e s  (m iss ions  and t r a i n i n g  sess ion) .  S ince 1990, t h e  IAEA i s  be ing 
requested t o  t r a i n  s t a f f  o f  o p e r a t i n g  and r e g u l a t o r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  on t h e  use 
o f  t h e  ASSET t o o l s :  INES r a t i n g  of s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  sa fe t y  and ASSET r o o t  
causes a n a l y s i s .  
App rop r i a te  management of t he  p l a n t  programme f o r  p r e v e n t i o n  o f  
i n c i d e n t s ,  o p e r a t i o n  and design, a r e  the  most important aspects  addressed by 
t h e  ASSET s e r v i c e s  w h i l e  r ev i ew ing  p l a n t  o p e r a t i n g  exper ience.  
The optimum achi-eved-through-operational p r o v i s i o n s  made a t  p l a n t s  t o  
compensate f o r  t h e  weak po i r t t s  of  the  des ign  i s  t he  cha l lenge  addressed by t he  
ASSET approach. 
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III. THE INTERNATIONRL NUCLEAR EVENT SCALE (INES) 
On 28 March 1990 a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  a  g e n e r a l  consensus, t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
N u c l e a r  Even t  S c a l e  was accep ted  f o r  a t r i a l  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  p e r i o d  a t  t h e  end 
o f  w h i c h  t h e  INES l e a f l e t  and t h e  U s e r ' s  Manual  m i g h t  be  amended t o  i n c l u d e  
e x p e r i e n c e  g a i n e d .  
As o f  3 0  December 1990, 25 c o u n t r i e s  had a l r e a d y . i n f o r m e d  t h e  IAEA 
that t h e  S c a l e  i s  o f f i c i a l l y  implemented t o  r a t e  t h e  s a f e t y  s i g n i f i c a n c e  and 
accep ted  t o  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  IAEA w i t h i n  24 h o u r s  d e l a y  a l l  t h e  n u c l e a r  e v e n t s  o f  
l e v e l  2  and aboue, f o r . w o r l d w i d e  d i s s e m i n a t i o n .  
Beyond t h e  i n i t i a l  p u b l i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  purpose,  t h e  s a f e t y  concept  
conveyed by t h e  s c a l e  r e p r e s e n t s '  a .ma jor  s t e p  f o r w a r d s  t o  r e d i r e c t  managerial 
a t t e n t i o n  t o  enhancement o f  p l a n t  programnies f o r  p r e v e n t i o n  o f  i n c i d e n t s ,  t h e  
m a j o r  c o r n e r s t o n e . f o r  l o n g  t e r m  o p e r a t i o n a l  s a f e t y .  
The S c a l e  i s  n o t  a n  a n a l y t i c a l  t o o l .  The S c a l e  i s  a r a t i n g  t o o l  based 
o n  seven l e v e l s  and t h r e e  s a f e t y  a t t r i b u t e s :  o f f - s i t e  impac t ,  o n - s i t e  inrpact 
and d e g r a d a t i o n  o f  de fence - in -dep th .  The l e v e l s ,  t h e i r  d e s c r i p t o r s  and 
d e t a i l e d  c r i t e r i a  a r e  shown t o g e t h e r  i n  t h e  I N E S . l e a f l e t  w i t h  exa~np les  o f  
c l a s s i f i e d  n u c l e a r  e v e n t s  w h i c h  have o c c u r r e d  a t  n u c l e a r  power p l a n t s .  The 
larder l e v e l s  (1-3) a r e  termed i n c i d e n t s ,  and t h e  u p p e r  lcsvels (4-7) 
a c c i d e n t s .  Even ts  w h i c h  have no s a f e t y  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a r e  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  Below 
S c a l e / L e v e l  Ze ro .  I n d u s t r b i a l  a c c i d e n t s  o r  o t h e r  eve r i t s  w h i c h  a r e  n u t  r e l a t e d  
t o  n u c l e a r  p l a n t  o p e r a t i o n s  a r e  n o t  c l a s s i f i e d  o n  t h e  s c a l e ;  t h e s e  a r e  termed 
Ou t  o f  S c a l e .  
The m a t r i x  o f  t h e  INES l e a f l e t  e x p l a i n s  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  l o g i c  o f  t h e  
S c a l e .  Key words i n d i c a t e  g e n e r a l l y  t h e  s a f e t y  s i g n i f i c a n c e  and a r e  n u t  
i n t e n d e d  t o  be  p r e c i s e  o r  d e f i n i t i v e .  
The f i r s t  sa fe ty  a t t r i b u t e  app l ies  t o  events r e s u l t i n g  i n  releases o f  
r a d i o a c t i v i t y  o f f - s i t e .  Understandably, the  p u b l i c  i s  most concerned w i t h  
such e x t e r n a l  re leases.  Level  7, the  h ighes t  i n  t h i s  column, corresponds t o  a  
major nuclear  acc ident  w i t h  widespread h e a l t h  and environmental consequences. 
Level  3, t h e  lowest p o i n t  i n  t h i s  column, represents a  very smal l  
re lease t h a t  would r e s u l t  i n  a  r a d i a t i o n  dose t o  the most exposed members o f  
t he  p u b l i c  equ iva len t  t o  a  f r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  prescr ibed annual dose l i m i t  f o r  
t he  pub l i c .  Such a  dose i s  t y p i c a l l y  -about a  t e n t h  o f  t he  average annual dose 
from exposure t o  n a t u r a l  background r a d i a t i o n .  
The second sa fe ty  a t t r i b u t e  considers the on-s i te  impact uf the event.  
The range i s  from Leve l  5, t y p i c a l l y  represent ing a  s i t u a t i o n  o f  severe damage 
t o  -the nuclear  reac to r  core, down t o  Level  3 a t  which the re  i s  i i iajor 
contaminat ion and/or over-exposure o f  workers. 
The t h i r d  sa fe ty  a t t r i b u t e  app l ies  .to events i n v o l v i n g  the degradat ion 
o f  p l a n t ' s  defence-in-depth. A l l  p lan ts  a re  designed such t h a t  a  succession 
of  sa fe ty  systems a c t  t o  prevent nlajor on-s i te  and o f f . - s i t e  impacts. The 
defence-in-depth cons idera t ions  c l a s s i f y  event as Levels 3 through 1 .  
An event which .has char .ac ter is t i cs  represented by more than one sa fe ty  
a t t r i b u t e  i s  always c l a s s i f i e d  a t  the  h ighest  l e v e l  accord ing t o  any one 
c r i t e r i o n .  
'the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Nuclear Event Scale prov ides f i n a l l y  a  comnlon 
understanding on the  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  accidents, i nc iden ts ,  dev ia t i ons  and on the 
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a  th resho ld  o f  s i gn i f i cance  f o r  each o f  t he  th ree  safety 
a t t r i b u t e s .  
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I V  . M E  ASSET BASIC PR.INCIPLES: Prevent ion o f  inc idents ,  t h e - p a t h  t o  
excel lence i n  ope ra t i ona l  sa fe ty .  
The p u b l i c  demands sa fe  genera t ion  o f  e l e c t r i c i t y  by nuc lear  power 
p lan ts .  P r o b a b i l i s t i c  cons idera t ions  t h a t  imply poss ib le  occurrence o f  
acc idents,  even a t  low l i k e l i h o o d ,  a re  met w i t h  rese rva t i on  by the publ- ic.  
Accidents a r e  unacceptable. I n c i d e n t s  must be prevented. 
According t o  t h e  sa fe ty  concept conveyed by t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Nuclear 
Event Scale (INES), a p l a n t  i s  operated i n  a f u l l y  safe manner when each o f  
t he  t h r e e  sa fe ty  a t t r i b u t e s ;  o f f - s i t e  impact, on-s i te  impact, degradat ion o f  
defence-in-depth, a r e  kept  below t h e  s p e c i f i c  thresholds o f  s ign i f i cance  t h a t  
d e f i n e  t h e  lower boundary o f  t he  Scale. 
Any exceedance o f  one o f  t h e  th ree  thresholds i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  safety 
and considered as an i n c i d e n t . o r  an acc ident  t h a t  i s  c l a s s i f i e d  from l e v e l  one 
t o  seven on the  bas i s  o f  t he  event consequences o f f - s i t e ,  on-s i te  o r  on p l a n t  
defence-in-depth, 
Below Scale events a r e  no t  s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  sa fe ty  and a r e  considered t o  
be dev ia t i ons .  However, dev ia t i ons  re levan t  t o  t he  th ree  sa fe ty  a t t r i b u t e s  
remain t h e  main concern o f  p l a n t  managements t h a t  a r e  dedicated t o  prevent ion 
o f  i nc iden ts .  Dev ia t ions  a r e  precursors t h a t  p rov ide  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  f u t u r e  
occurrence o f  i n c i d e n t s  i f  remedies a re  n o t  sys temat ica l l y  implemented t o  
e l i m i n a t e  r o o t  causes. 
Sound des ign  and adequate ope ra t i on  a r e  p r e r e q u i s i t e s  f o r  e l e c t r i c i t y  
genera t ion  w i thou t  i n c i d e n t  b u t  not. s u f f i c i e n t .  
E f f e c t i v e  management o f  a comprehensive p l a n t  programme f o r  prevent ion 
o f  i nc iden ts  i s  t h e  key f a c t o r  f o r  long term safe ope ra t i on  as demonstrated by 
numerous nuclear  power p l a n t s  worldwide t h a t  d i d  n o t  and w i l l  n o t  experience 
any acc ident  and i n c i d e n t  c l a s s i f i e d  on the  Scale. The p l a n t  progranune f o r  
p revent ion  o f  i n c i d e n t s  ensures t h a t  t h e  th ree  bas ic  elements t h a t  c u r r e n t l y  
i n t e r a c t  i n  any i n d u s t r i a l  process a re  a t  the optimum l e v e l  o f  q u a l i t y  i n  
o rde r  t o  per form as expected: Man (personnel p ro f i c i ency ) ,  Machine (equipment 
o p e r a b i l i t y ) ,  Man-Machine I n t e r f a c e  (procedures adequacy). 
Three successive b a r r i e r s  under c lose c o n t r o l  o f  p l a n t  management 
enable t i m e l y  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  a l l  l a t e n t  weaknesses t h a t  may lead t o  i n c i d e n t  
o r  acc ident  under adverse circumstances: 
- A systematic q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  programme t o  ensure t h a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
q u a l i t y  requ i red  f o r  personnel, equipment procedures, . is  achieved 
p r i o r  t o  be used i n  p l a n t  operat ion.  
- An e f f e c t i v e  p reven t i ve  maintenance programme t o  ensure t h a t  t h e  l e v e l  
o f  q u a l i t y  requ i red  i s  mainta ined.dur ing ope ra t i on .  
- A comprehensive p l a n t  su rve i l l ance  programme t o  ensure t h a t  any 
f o r t u i t o u s  degradat ion o f  the l e v e l  o f  q u a l i t y  requ i red .  i s  t i ine ly  
detected and promptly res tored.  
Enhancement o f  t i g h t n e s s  o f  these three successive b a r r i e r s  i s  t h e  aim o f  
p l a n t  s t r i v i n g  f o r  exce l lence i n  opera t iona l  sa fe t y .  
Prevent ion o f . i n c i d e n t s  i s  a  dynamic process t h a t  can on ly  be succevsfu l  
through systematic i d e p t h  ana lys i s  o f  a l l  d e v i a t i o n s  below INES fo l lowed by 
implementat ion o f  t h e  necessary improvements t o  c lose  the ope ra t i ng  experience 
feedback loop.  
The ASSET (Assessment o f  Safety S i g n i f i c a n t  Events Team) r o o t  cause 
ana lys i s  method prov ides the  powerfu l  t o o l  needed by p l a n t  management t o  b u i l d  
up sa fe r  opera t ion .  
The ASSET approach o f f e r s  a  systematic way t o  handle sa fe ty  issues i n  
o rde r  t o  address both, the  t e c h n i c a l  and the managerial  aspects o f  nuc lear  
power p l a n t .  
The ASSET approach promotes an adequate response t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
Safe ty  C u l t u r e  g i v e n  by the  Safety Ser ies No. 75-INSAC-4 1991: 
+> SAFETY CULTURE +> 
IS THAT ASSEMBLY OF ~ ~ C S  AND ATlTIVJlES IN ORGANEATIONS 
AND INDIVIDUALS WHICH ESTABLISH THAT, AS AN OVERRIDING PRIORITY, 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY ISSUES REmrW THE ATTENTION 
WARRANTED BY THEIR SIGNIFICANCE. 
SA FEW SERIES NO. 75 1NSAG-R- 1991 
- 
THE ASSET RESPONSE 
SAFETY ISSWS ARE IDENTIFIED THROUGH A COMPFUZHENSIVE PLANT 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMME CAPABLE OF TIMELY DETECTING ANY LATENT 
WEAKNESS AMONG PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, AND PROCEDURES. 
Q SIGNIFICANCE TO SAPerY IS ASSESSED ON THE BASIS OF THE 
DJTEWVATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENT SCALE m). 
Cl ATTENTION IS PAID THROUGH SYSTEMATIC ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS OF 
ALL DEVIATIONS BELOW SCALE TO ENHANCE PREVENTION OF INCIDENTS. 
V .  THE ASSET APPROACH 
The ASSET approach i s  based on the fo l lowing:  
EVENTS (DEVIATIONS,. INCIDENTS o r  ACCIDENTS) occur always because o f  a 
FAILURE (OCCURRENCE) t o  perform as expected due t o  a 
LATENT WEAKNESS (DIRECT CAUSE) [poor preparat ion p r i o r  t o  operat ion o r  
degradation dur ing operation] which was no t  promptly e l iminated owing t o  a 
def ic iency i n  the p l an t  programme of 
SURVEILLANCE (ROOT CAUSE) [detect ion o r  res tora t ion]  o f  equipment, 
personnel o r  procedures. 
The main concern i n  the ASSET approach i s  therefore w i t h  the 
ef fe5t iveness o f  the po l i cy  f o r  the prevention o f  inc idents a t  nuclear pouor 
plants, which i s  the cornerstone o f  long term operat ional  safety.  
Provisions made a t  p lants  f o r  m i t i ga t i on  o f  accidents are meant t o  
p a l l i a t e  f o r  un re l i ab le  prevention and are therefore out  o f  the scope o f  the 
ASSET approach. 
The ASSET approach i s  based on commonly shared pr inc ip les ,  as out l ined,  
f o r  example, i n  IAEA Safety Series No. 75-INSAC-3, the I n te rna t i ona l  Nuclear 
Safety Advisory Group's Basic Safety Pr inc ip les  f o r  Nuclear Power Plants 
(1908). and No 75-INSAC-4 1991: Safety Culture (1991). Safe operat ion and 
good performance a t  nuclear power plants requ i re  a r e l i a b l e  i n t e rac t i on  o f  the 
three basic elements: p ro f i c i en t  personnel, operable equipment, and adayuate 
procedural guidance . 
I n  the ASSET programme, i t  i s  recognized t h a t  personnel, equipment o r  
procedures should no t  necessari ly be held responsible f o r  f a i l u r e  t o  
performing as expected dur ing on-line operation. Inc idents  may demonstrate 
.' only t ha t  these basic elements were not  w e l l  enough prepared, maintained o r  
restored t o  ensure safe and r e l i a b l e  operation. Plant  management con t ro l  i s  
dec is ive and .huinan perfonilance i s  c r u c i a l  i n  car ry ing out  a c t i v i t y  re la ted t o  
safety . 
Rn occurrence or failure to perform as expected results always from 
the existence of a latent weakness (direct cause) that was not timely 
eliminated due to a deficiency of the plant surveillance programme 
(root cause). 
A latent weakness results always either from poor control of quality 
of the final products prior to be used in oper-ation or from 
degradation due to poor preventive maintenance during operation. 
Deficiency of.plant surveillance programme, due to either poor 
detection capabilities or poor restoration process when a latent 
weakness is detected, results always from ei.ther inadequate 
surveillance policy or inappropriate implementation of the 
surveillance progra~ame. 
Inadequate plant surveillance policy results from a lack of a clear 
safety objective in management of plant operational safety performance. 
Incidents classified on the IhlES result therefore from a failure of 
the plant management process in the area of prevention of incidents. 
Management of the plant programme for prevention of incidents 
concentrates therefore on .improvement of the tightness of the three successive 
barriers : 
- "Quality control" prior to operation and "preventive maintenance" 
during operation to prevent latent weaknesses. 
- "Surveillance" to timely eliminate latent weaknesses resulting from 
untightness of the two first barriers. 
The plant surveillance programme: 
- is the ultimate barrier for prevention incidents, 
- is expected to provide plant managers with early signals for timely 
cor3r.ec tive activns . 
- is comprehensive and updated systematically on the basis of operating 
experience and new studies. 
- includes two types of monitoring: 
(1) periodic testing of the level of quality of the three basic 
elements involved in plant operational safety. 
* testing of personnel proficiency 
* testing of equipment operability 
* testing of procedures adequacy 
(2) trending of safety indicators to assess results of plant 
managerial practices under the three safety attributes: 
* off-site impact 
* on-site impact 
* degradation of defence-in-depth 
- includes low thresholds acceptance criteria In order to identify 
' deviations. 
- requires systematic root cause analysis of all deviations even the 
most benign. 
- requires systematic implementation of corrective actions to restore 
the. level of quality required and improve, if needed, the capability' 
of the plant surveillance programme. 
V I  . THE ASSET INVESTIGATION METHODOLOGY 
The pr imary o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  address the  p l a n t  managerial  p r a c t i c e s  
regarding p reven t i on  o f  i n c i d e n t s .  This i s  achieved through a d e t a i l e d  rev iew 
o f  pas t  ope ra t i ng  experience intended t o  prov ide conclus ions on 
appropr iateness and completeness of  c o r r e c t i v e  ac t i ons  implemented. 
The rev iew o f  p l a n t  ope ra t i ng  experience i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  accord ing t o  
the  ASSET i n v e s t i g a t i o n  methodology as fo l lows:  
- I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  events re levan t  t o  sa fe ty  
- Rat ing  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  the events r e l e v a n t  t o  sa fe ty  
- S e l e c t i o n  o f  sa fe t y  issues s i g n i f i c a n t  o r  r e c u r r e n t  
- Root cause anal.ysis o f  selected sa fe ty  issues 
6 . 1  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n - o f  events re levan t  t o  safety 
The rev iew concentrates- on the opera t iona l  events repor ted  according t o  
the  Regulatory Body r e p o r t i n g  c r i t e r i a .  
F i r s t l y ,  the  Regulatory Body r e p o r t i n g  c r i t e r i a  a re  reviewed- t o  v e r i f y  
if they a r e  a t  l e a s t  cover ing  a l l  aspects connected w i t h  the  t h r e e  sa fe ty  
a t t r i b u t e s - o f f - s i t e  -impact; on-s i te  impact and degradat ion o f  de fence- in4upth .  
Secondly, r e p o r t i n g  th resho lds  a re  reviewed i n  o rder  t o  make sure t h a t  
n o t  on ly  acc idents  and i n c i d e n t s  b u t  a l s o  dev ia t i ons  below sca le  a r e  
repo r tab les .  
'Thirdly,  p l a n t  compliance w i t h  the  Regulatory Body r e p o r t i n g  c r i t e r i a  
i s  v e r i f i e d  through a few examples. 
I f  conclus ions o f  one o f  t he  th ree  previous v e r i f i c a t i o n s  a r e  negat ive,  
t he re  i s  a need t o  complement the l i s t  o f  ope ra t i ona l  events t o  be reviewed. 
I f  conc lus ions  o f  t h e  p rev ious  v e r i f i c a t i o n s  a r e  a l l  t h r e e  p o s i t i v e ,  t h e  
o p e r a t i o n a l  events  r epo r ted  a r e  reviewed i n d i v i d u a l l y  t o  i d e n t i f y  those t h a t  
had consequences o f f - s i t e ,  on -s i t e  o r  on t h e  defence- in-depth accord ing  t o  
d e f i n i t i o n s  p rov ided  by t h e  Use r ' s  Manual o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Nuc lear  Event 
Scale:  
- O f f - s i t e  impact:  * Rad ioac t i ve  re leases  (gaz, l i q u i d ,  s o l i d )  
- On-s i te  impact:  * Rad ioac t i ve  doses t o  workers ( i r r a d i a t i o n ,  
e x t e r n a l  and i n t e r n a l  con tamina t ion) .  
* Contaminat ion o f  . p l an t  (su r faces ,  atmospheric)  
- Degradat ion o f  defence- in-depth : 
* Degradat ion o f  t i g h t n e s s o f  t h e  sa fe t y  f u n c t i o n  
."BARRIERSu ( f u e l  c ladd ing ,  p r imary  boundary, 
- 
conta inment) .  
* Degradat ion of o p e r a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  sa fe t y  f u n c t i o n  
"PROTEC'lION" ( c o n t r o l  o f  r e a c t i v i t y ,  c o o l i n g  
f ue l ,  confinement o f  r a d i o a c t i v e  p roduc ts ) .  
.n Degradat ion of  o p e r a b i l i t y  o f  s a f e t y  f u n c t i o n s  
"SUPPLY" ( e l e c t r i c a l  power o f f - s i t e ,  e l e c t r i c a l  
power on--si  te ,  servi .ce water,  c o n t r o l  and 
ins t rument  a i r ) .  
* Degradat ion o f  p r o f i c i e n c y  o f  persor lnel  
( v i o l a t i o n s  o f  o p e r a t i o n a l  l i m i t s  and 
cond i t i ons ,  v i o l a t i o n s  o f  maintenance and 
o p e r a t i n g  procedures) .  
* Degradat ion of adequacy o f . p rocedu res .  
* Degradat ion of e f f ec t i veness  o f  p l a n t  
su r .ve i l l ance  (more f o r t u i t o u s  e v e r ~ t s  than  
d e v i a t i o n s  de tec ted  by s u r v e i l l a n c e )  . 
Th is  rev iew i s  expected t o  i d e n t i f y  two groups o f  events among the  
.popu la t i on  o f  operbat iona l  events reported; the  events t h a t  a r e  sa fe ty  re levan t  
and t h e  events t h a t  a r e  o u t  o f  Scale. 
A d d i t i o n a l  conclus ions a r e  provided on the  sa fe ty  r e l e v a n t  events 
- rega rd ing  na ture  o f  occurrences (equipment o r  personnel o r  procedure f a i l u r e ) ,  
. d i r e c t  causes, r o o t  causes, c o r r e c t i v e  ac t i ons  implemented, gener i c  lessons 
and suggested areas f o r  improvement. 
6.2. - Rating o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  events re levan t  t o  sa fe ty  
The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Nuclear Event Scale i s  used as r a t i n g  t o o l  t o  
categor ized the  events re levan t  t o  safety i n  two groups: the  events below 
scale t h a t - a r e  n o t  sa fe ty  s i g n i f i c a n t  and the  events s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  sa fe ty  
t h a t  a re  c l a s s i f i e d  on the  Scale. 
The lower boundary o f  the  Scale t h a t  de f i nes  the  border  between sa fe ty  
s i g n i f i c a n t  and non-safety s i g n i f i c a n t  events corresponds most ly  t o  the  l i m i t s  
o f  the au thor ized f u n c t i o n a l  domain (opera t iona l  l i m i t s  and cond i t i ons  t h a t  
inc lude t e c h n i c a l  s p e c i f  i c a t i u n s )  . 
The r a t i n g  procedure requ i res  t o  consider f i r s t  t he  o f f - s i t e  impact o f  
the event, then the  on-s i te  impact, then the impact on the  p l a n t  
defence-in-depth and t o  take  the  h igher  r a t i n g  as f i n a l  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .  
Most o f  t he  events r e l e v a n t  t o  sa fe ty  a r e  however ca tegor ized under the  
sa fe ty  a t t r i b u t e  "degradat ion o f  defence-in-depth". The s i g n i f i c a n t  ones a r e  
c l a s s i f i e d  a t  l e v e l s  1, 2, o r  3 .  
The r a t i n g  procedure i s  based on the combinat ion o f  two concepts: t h e  
i n i t i a t o r  frequency (expected, possib le,  l i k e l y )  and the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  the  
sa fe ty  func t i ons  ( f u l l ,  w i t h i n  ope ra t i ona l  l i m i t s  and cond i t ions ,  adequate, 
inadequate). 
Th is  approach enables t o  ass ign  a weight  t o  t he  degradat ion  o f  
de fence- in4epth  which corresponds t o  l e v e l s  1, 2 o r  3 on the  Scale. 
I t  should be noted t h a t  the  r a t i n g  procedure assumes t h a t  t he  sa fe ty  
func t i ons  a r e  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  designed t o  cope w i t h  the  i n i t i a t o r s  taken i n t o  
account i n  the  p l a n t  s tud ies  and t h a t  the  ope ra t i ona l  l i m i t s  and cond i t i ons  
a r e  adjusted accord ing ly .  
A wide v a r i e t y  of systems a r e  usua l l y  provided t o  ensure the  sa fe ty  
f u n c t i o n  "PROTECTION" ( c o n t r o l  o f  r e a c t i v i t y ,  c o o l i n g  o f  f u e l ,  confinement o f  
r a d i o a c t i v e  products)  and t h e  sa fe ty  f u n c t i o n  "SUPPLY" ( e l e c t r i c a l  power 
o f f - s i t e ,  e l e c t r i c a l  power on-site, serv ice  water, c o n t r o l  and i ns t ru~ i ren t  
a i r ) .  The l i s t  and frequency o f  i n i t i a t o r s  considered f o r  des ign ing  sa fe ty  
f u n c t i o n  vary a l s o  f rom one p l a n t  t o  another according t o  the  s p e c i f i c  
environmental cond i t i ons  and p l a n t  design fea tures .  
The r a t i n g  procedure o f  events r e l a t e d  t o  degradat ion o f  
defence-in-depth does n o t  i nc lude  there fore  any c r i t i c a l  rev iew o f  t he  
completeness o f  t he  l i s t  and frequency of i n i t i a t o r s  considered and o f  the  
appropriateness o f  t h e  design of the  safety func t i ons  (redundancies, e t c . ) .  
* 
6.3 S e l e c t i o n  o f  s a f e t y  issues f o r  r o o t  cause ana lys i s  
The o b j e c t i v e  o f  t he  t h i r d  stage o f  the  ASSET' i n v e s t i g a t i o n  methodology 
i s  t o  s e l e c t  sa fe ty  issues t h a t  prov ide a n a c c u r a t e  p i c t u r e  o f  the  main sa fe ty  
concerns a t  t he  p l a n t .  
Th is  s e l e c t i o n  i s  made from the  popu la t ion  o f  events r e l e v a n t  t o  
sa fe ty .  The events most s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  sa fe ty  a r e  no t  neces'sar i ly se lected 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  c o r r e c t i v e  ac t i ons  implemented a re  app rop r ia te  and complete. 
The bas ic  idea i s  t o  s e l e c t  sa fe ty  issues t h a t  a r e  s t i l l  pending because 
c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  a r e  e i t h e r  inappropr ia te  o r  incomplete. Use fu l  
reconlmendations based on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  opera t ing  experience can the re fo re  be 
o f f e r e d  t o  cope w i t h  the  problem. 
As an ASSET i s  always l i m i t e d  i n  time, t he  s e l e c t i o n  i s  o f ten  r e s t r i c t e d  
t o  three, pending sa fe ty  issues o f  c r u c i a l  i n t e r e s t .  S e l e c t i o n  o f  sa fe ty  
issues i s  most ly  based on a combination o f  two c r i t e r i a :  recurrence and 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  . 
Non-compliance w i t h  procedures,  i n s u f f i c i e n t  d e t e c t i o n  c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  
t h e  p l a n t  s u r v e i l l a n c e  programme a r e  examples o f  s a f e t y  i ssues  s e l e c t e d  on t h e  
b a s i s  o f  t h e  . c r i t e r i o n  r ecu r rence .  
I n s u f f i c i e n t  p r e v e n t i o n  o f  f i r e s  that may a f f e c t  s a f e t y  systems, r i s k  o f  
damage w i t h i n  t h e  p ressu re  boundary as a  r e s u l t  o f  l o c a l  su rp ress i on  due t o  
exp los i ve  r ecomb ina t i on  o f  r a d i o l y t i c  hydrogen a r e  examples o f  s a f e t y  i ssues  
s e l e c t e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  
Sa fe t y  i s sues  s e l e c t e d  f o r  r o o t  cause a n a l y s i s  a r e  u s u a l l y  r e l a t e d  t o  
t h e  t h r e e  f o l l o w i n g  a reas :  
I. Management of t h e  p l a n t  programme f o r  p r e v e n t i o n  o f  i n c i d e n t s .  
such as  i n s u f f i c i e n t  d e t e c t i o n  c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  p l a n t .  
s u r v e i l l a n c e  programme 
such as r i s k  o f  damage w i t h i n  t h e  p ressure  boundary as a  r e s u l t  o f  
l o c a l  su rp ress i on .due  t o - - e x p l o s i v e  recombina t ion  o f  hydrogen, 
111. Opera t i on  
such as  non-compliance w i t h  procedures 
A s p e c i f i c  even t  i l l u s t r a t i n g  each o f  t h e  s a f e t y  i ssues  s e l e c t e d  i s  
chosen f o r  i n  d e p t h  r o o t  cause a n a l y s i s .  
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6 . 4  The hSSET r o o t  cause a n a l y s i s  method 
The events  se l ec ted  a r e  analysed acco rd i ng  t o  t h e  %SET g u i d e l i n e s  and 
hSSET o p e r a t i n g  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  which p r o v i d e  b o t h  p r a c t i c a l  gu idance f o r  
de te rm in i ng  t h e  mechanisms o f  even ts  and a c o n s i s t e n t  b a s i s  f o r  conc lus i ve  
assessment . 
The hSSET r o o t  cause a n a l y s i s  i s  made acco rd i ng  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  seven 
s teps : 
6 . 4 . 1 .  D e s c r i p t i o n  and s ta tement  o f  t h e  s i q n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  even t  
How was t h e  even t  de tec ted?  What were i t s  consequences and what 
a c t i o n s  were taken? What i s  t h e  a c t u a l  and p o t e n t i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  
event? 
Conc lus ions a r e  p rov i ded  on t h e  f o l l o w i n g  aspec t s :  
* I n i t i a l  s t a t u s  o f  t he  p l a n t .  
* How t h e  even t  was de tec ted?  
B r i e f  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e - c h r o n o l o g i c a l  sequknce. 
* F i n a l  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  p l a n t .  
h c t u a l  consequences o f  t h e  event  o f f - s i t e ,  o n - s i t e  and on 
defence-in-depth. 
* Immediate a c t i o n s  t aken  t o  i n t e r r u p t  t h e  even t  sequence and t o  
r e s t o r e  s a f e t y .  
* hssessment o f  t h e  s e v e r i t y  o f  t h e  even t  on  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Nuc lea r  Event Scale ,  
6 . 4 . 2  S e l e c t i o n  o f  the-occurrences t o  be analysed 
What i s  t h e  occurrence o r  t he  combination o f  occurrences most 
s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  sa fe ty  i n  t he  sequence o f  the event? 
T h i s  s e l e c t i o n  i s  made through the  f o l l o w i n g  process: 
* Establ ishment  o f  t he  chrono log ica l  sequence o f  occurrerlces 
( f a i l u r e  o f  personnel, equipment, procedure t o  per form as expected) 
* Establ ishment o f  t he  l o g i c  tree'  o f  occurrwnces 
* Assessment o f  t h e  sa fe ty  s ign i f i cance  o f  each occurrence 
* S e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  occurmnces f o r  r o o t  cause 
analy s i s 
6 . 4 . 3  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  d i r e c t  cause o f  each occurrence se lec ted  
What 1atent.weakness was a f f e c t i n g  the element (personnel, equipment 
o r  procedure) t h a t  f a i l e d  t o  perform as expected? 
Th is  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  c a r r i e d  ou t  as f o l l n w s :  
* Nature o f  t h e  occurrence (personnel, equipment o r  procedure 
f a i l u r e )  
* I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t he  l a t e n t  weakness o f  t he  element t h a t  f a i l e d  
t o  per form as expected ( r e l i a b i l i t y  i n  operat ion,  f i t n e s s  t o  
work ing cond i t i ons ,  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  f o r  the  task)  
* I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t he  con t r i bu to rs  t o  ex is tence o f  t h i s  l a t e n t  
weakness ( inadequate prepara t ion  o f  t h e  element p r i o r  t o  be used 
i n  ope ra t i on  o r  degradat ion du r ing  operat ion)  
* Conclusions on e f fec t i veness  o f  bo th  the  p l a n t  programme f o r  
c o n t r o l  o f  q u a l i t y  p r i o r  t o  opera t ion  and t h e  p l a n t  progrannne fur 
prevent ive  maintenance du r ing  opera t ion  
6 . 4 . 4 .  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f . t h e  r o o t  cause o f  each occurrence s e l e c t 4  
Why was t h e  l a t e n t  weakness ( o f  the  element t h a t  f a i l e d  t o  per form as 
expected) n o t  detected e a r l i e r  by the p l a n t  su rve i l l ance  ( d e t e c t i o n  o r  
r e s t o r a t i o n )  programme and e l im ina ted? 
Th is  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  as f o l l o w s :  
* I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  de f i c i ency  o f  the  p l a n t  su rve i l l dnce  
programme t h a t  d i d  n o t  e l im ina te  t h e  l a t e n t  weakness before  the  
event (inadequate de tec t i on  programme o r  inadequate r e s t o r a t i o n  
process f o l l o w i n g  d e t e c t i o n  o f  weakness) 
* I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t he  con t r i bu to rs  t o  the  de f i c i ency  o f  t he  p l a n t  
s u r v e i l l a n c e  programme ( inappropr ia te  su rve i l l ance  p o l i c y  o r  
inadequate implementation o f  t h e  p l a n t  s u r v e i l l a n c e  progcan~me) 
* Conclusions on e f fec t iveness  o f  t he  p l a n t  su rve i l l ance  programme 
(de tec t i on  and res to ra t i on ) ,  on p l a n t  s u r v e i l l a n c e  p o l i c y  and 
implementat ion o f  p l a n t  su rve i l l ance  programme. 
6 . 4 . 5  Determinat ion o f  c o r r e c t i v e  ac t i ons  f o r  each occurrence selected 
I n  what areas a r e  improvements needed and what c o r r e c t i v e  ac t i ons  a r e  
* 
needed t o  enhance bo th  the  q u a l i t y  and the s u r v e i l l a n c e  o f  q u a l i t y  f o r  the  
element t h a t .  f a i l e d  t o  perform expected? 
C o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  sho.u.ld.address a l l  the  items invo lved i n  bo th  the 
d i r e c t  cause and t h e  r o o t  cause o f  each occurrence as f o l l o w s :  
* E l i m i n a t i o n  o f  the  a c t u a l  consequences o f  the  event 
* Repair :  E l i m i n a t i o n  o f  t he  l a t e n t  weakness ( d i r e c t  cause) o f  the  
elements t h a t  f a i l e d  t o  perform as. expected 
- by r e s t o r i n g  t h e  l e v e l  o f  q u a l i t y  o f  the  elements t h a t  f a i l e d  
- by m i t i g a t i n g  the  con t r i bu to rs  t o  the  ex is tence o f  t he  l a t e n t  
weakness 
* Remedy: E l i m i n a t i o n  o f  t he  de f i c i ency  o f  the  p l a n t  su rve i l l ance  
programme ( r o o t  cause) t h a t  d i d  n o t  e l i m i n a t e  the  l a t e n t  weakriess 
- by enhancement o f  t he  p l a n t  d e t e c t i o n  programme 
- by enhancement o f  the  p l a n t  r e s t o r a t i o n  progrcllnme 
- by m i t i g a t i o n  o f  the  c o n t r i b u t o r s  t o  the  de f i c i ency  o f  t he  
p l a n t  s u r v e i l  lance programme ( p o l i c y  and managemer~t) 
* Conclusions on the  appropriateness and completeness o f  t h e  
c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  implemented by t h e  opera t ing  o rgan iza t i on  f o r  
each occurrence. 
6 . 4 . 6 .  Generic lessons on prevent ion  o f  i nc iden ts  a t  t h e  p l a n t  
What a r e  the  gener ic  lessons learned f o r  more r e l i a b l e  prevent- ion o f  
i nc iden ts?  
* Conclusions a r e  provided on the  p l a n t  programme f o r  p revent ion  o f  
i n c i d e n t s  w h i l e  addressing the  th ree  successive t a r r i e r s  ( p l a n t  
subprogrammes) as f o l l o w s :  
* Conclusions on p l a n t  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  programme t o  q u a l i f y  
equipment, personnel and procedure p r i o r  t o  be used i n  opera t ion .  
* Conclusions on p l a n t  p revent ive  maintenance progranbme t o  prevent  
degradat ion o f  q u a l i t y  o f  equipment, personnel and procedure 
d u r i n g  opera t ion .  
* Conclusions on p l a n t  su rve i l l ance  programme t o  d e t e c t  and r e s t o r e  
any degradat ion o f  equipment o p e r a b i l i t y ,  o f  personnel p r o f i c i e n c y  
and o f  procedures adequacy d u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n . .  
6 . 4 . 7 .  Suqqested a c t i o n  p lan  t o  enhance prevent ion  o f  i n c i d e n t s  a t  t h e p l a n t  
What s p e c i f i c  a c t i o n s  a r e  suggested t o  enhance safe operat ion? What 
a r e  the  . a l t e r n a t i v e s  and what i s  the schedule f o r  implementation? 
Th is  s e c t i o n  i s  expected t o  o f f e r  a r e a l i s t i c  a c t i o n  p lan  based on 
sho r t  term a c t i o n s  addressing the  d i r e c t  cause o f  the event (removal o f  l a t e n t  
weaknesses), medium term a c t i o n s  addressing t h e  r o o t  cause o f  t h e  event 
(improvement o f  t h e  p l a n t  programme f o r  p revent ion  o f  i nc iden ts )  and long term 
ac t i ons  addressing i n t e r n a t i o n a l  co-operation (improvement o f  ope ra t i ng  
experience feedback). 
Short term actions are covering the following aspects when applicable: 
* Improvement of equipment operability 
- design, manufacturing, installation 
- qualification tests prior to be used in operation 
- periodic testing &ring operation 
* Improvement of personnel proficiency 
- recruiting criteria 
- training, retraining, licensing prior to be used in operation 
- periodic testing during operation 
* Improvement of procedures adequacy 
- corrterrt and forinat 
- validation prior to be used in operation 
- periodic. review during operation 
Medium term actions are covering the following aspects when applicable: 
Improvement of ~~mnagenrent of the plant progr-amme for prevent ion of 
incidents. 
* Quality control programme of the final products of plant 
activities directed to the achievement of the required level 
of the quality for equipment, personnel, procedures 
* Preventive maintenance programme to keep at the level required 
equipment operability, personnel proficiency and .procedures 
adequacy. 
* Surveillance programme to timely detect and promptly restore 
any degradation of the level of quality of equipment, 
personnel, and procedures 
* Systematic root cause analysis of all deviatons 
Long term actions a r e  covering the following aspects when appl icable:  
* Relationships w i th  the nuclear community f o r  operating experience 
feedback. 
* Use o f  the IAEA services 
- Train ing on use o f  the ~ n t e r n a t i o n a l  Nuclear Event Scale. 
-   raining on root  cause analysis. 
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V I I  . THE RSSET SERVICES 
Since 1986 the  IAEA ASSET Services have been p r o v i d i n g  opera tors  w i t h  
the  oppor tun i t y  t o  exchange on t h e  f i e l d  very va luab le  experience on p o l i c i e s  
f o r  p reven t i on  o f  i nc iden ts  a t  nuclear  power p lan ts ,  t h e  major  cornerstone f o r  
long term sa fe  opera t ion .  
Three main op t ions  are o f f e r e d  t o  regu la to ry  and ope ra t i ng  
organ iza t ions :  
(1) Seminars on t h e  systematic ASSET' i n v e s t i g a t i o n  methodology (5 days 
maximum,.3 ASSET l e c t u r e r s )  t o  f a n i i l i a r i z e  s t a f f  i nvo l ved  w i t h  a 
r a t i n g  t o o l  t o  assess s ign i f i cance  t o  sa fe ty  (INES) and w i t h  a 
power fu l  a n a l y t i c a l  t o o l  enabl ing an easy i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t he  
under l y ing  r o o t  causes o f  sa fe ty  issues.  
Such ASSET t r a i n i n g  sessions a re  appropr ia te  f o r  recent  nuc lear  
* 
power-p lants i n  t he  course o f  s e t t i n g  up an e f f e c t i v e  programme 
f o r  p reven t i on  o f  i nc iden ts .  No s p e c i f i c  p repara tory  work i s  
requ i red  from p a r t i c i p a n t s .  
2) Review o f  a s i n g l e  sa fe ty  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c i d e n t  (5 days maximum, 
Team o f  7 experts)  t o  prepare, on t h e  bas i s  o f  t h e  lessons 
learned, recommendations t o  the nuc lear  commun.ity a p p l i c a b l e  t o  
management o f  any nuc lear  power p l a n t s .  
Such ASSET workshops are  genera l l y  requested by r e g u l a t o r y  and 
ope ra t i ng  organ iza t ions  o f  count r ies  t h a t  cons ider  impor tan t  t o  
share t h e i r  own experience w i t h  a view t o  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  
enhancement o f  prevent ion o f  i nc iden ts  worldwide. The preparatory 
work requ i red  from p l a n t  operators f o r  an ASSET workshop i s  
r e s t r i c t e d  t o  p rov id ing  a summary o f  t h e  r o o t  cause a n a l y s i s  
r e p o r t  i n  Eng l i sh .  
3)  Review o f  p l a n t  ope ra t i ona l  sa fe ty  experience (10 days maximum, 
Team o f  7 experts)  t o  i d e n t i f y  pending sa fe ty  issues, t o  r a t e  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  safety,  t o  i d e n t i f y  under l y ing  causes and t o  
p rov ide  conclusions on adequacy o f  c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  implemented 
a t  p l a n t s  i n  t he  software and hardware areas t o  prevent  i nc iden ts  
i n  the  fui-ure. 
Such ASSET miss ions  a r e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  o l d e r  p l a n t s  
t h a t  cons ide r  i m p o r t a n t  t o  c a r r y  o u t  a thorough check up  o f  p l a n t  
management p o l i c y  f o r  p reven t i on  o f  i n c i d e n t s  a f t e r  some years o f  
o p e r a t i o n .  The prepara to ry  work r e q u i r e d  f rom p l a n t  ope ra to r s  
f o r  an  ASSET m i s s i o n  i s  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  p r o v i d i n g  a l i s t  o f  
o p e r a t i o n a l  i ssues  repo r ted  s ince  commercial o p e r a t i o n  and a copy 
o f  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  body r e p o r t i n g  c r i t e r i a  i n  E n g l i s h .  
The IAEA daes not r e q u i r e  any . fee  f o r  the expe r t s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  
Sa fe ty  Se rv i ces  p rov ided  by t h e  ASSET. The expenses r e l a t e d  t o  t r a v e l  and 
subs is tence  a l lowance  o f  t h e  ASSET members i n  connec t ion  w i t h  t he -wo rk  carir ied 
o u t  a r e  e i t h e r . b o r n e  by t h e  IAEA Techn ica l  Co-operation Department i n  t h e  case 
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INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ON 
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY 
B. Wahlstrom', E. Swaton2 
Abstract. An analysis of accidents and performance of industrial plants demonstrates the 
importance of adequate management. Management sciences have provided many insights 
in the management of business corporations. Less attention has been given to the 
influence of organization and management on the safety of potentially hazardous 
industrial installations. The paper is discussing safety oriented organizations and their 
requirements on management practices. It is argued that organizational deficiencies can. . . . .. . 
provide major safety threats by making human errors more likely. A continued safety and 
good performance of a plant will rely on an early detection and correction of such 
deficiencies. Organizational safety reviews are proposed as an approach for detecting and 
correcting organizational deficiencies. Present frameworks of organizational reliability are 
however still based more on intuition and common sense than on theoretical models. The 
paper concludes by arguing for more research in how organizational factors influence 
kdustrial safety. 
INTRODUCTION 
The interest in organization and management as providing preventive insights to industrial safety is relatively 
recent.' ' The connection has certainly been recognized earlier, but comparatively little has been 
written in the field before the late eighties. The TMI, Bhopal, Challenger and Chernobyl accidents revealed 
however that human errors together with deficiencies in organization and management can provide major 
threats to the safety of technological  system^.^ 
The importance of organization and management has manifested itself not only in the accidents but also in 
the operational performance of the plants. Comparative studies on nuclear power plant performance have 
conclusively shown that their performance is depending on how they are managed. These findings are actually 
not surprising, but it is perhaps more astonishing that to date only a few systematic attempts have addressed 
these issues. 
Human factors research in the nuclear power field took off as a major activity in the aftermath of TMI and 
has been oriented towards control room design, operational procedures and operator training. The Chernobyl 
accident brought violations as a third category to earlier discussed human error categories of slips and 
mistakes! There is an emerging consensus that organization and management can make human errors more 
likely. Proper responses to issues of organization and management is one of the remaining challenges in the 
human factors research. 
The management sciences could provide guidance also in how safety oriented organizations should be 
managed, but they have mainly been oriented towards problems in the business world. The management of 
potentially hazardous industrial installations is today relying more on managerial intuition than on a theory 
of organizational reliability. A careful housekeeping is certainly one of the components behind a safe plant, 
but the question is to what extent such prescriptions can be generalized and made more concrete. The 
management has control over some of the factors behind a good performance, but others are determined 
by plant design and the industrial environment. 
' International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria. 
' International Atomic Energy Agency, P.O.Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria. . 
MANAGING A POTENTLALLY HAZARDOUS PLANT 
Managing any large installation involves a multitude of different roles and tasks. Managers are defining tasks 
and responsibilities for subordinates, they are supervising how the tasks are executed, they are maintaining 
contacts to other organizations, they are formulating strategies as a part of the planning procedures, etc. The 
influence of good management can be seen as a smooth operation at all levels. Managing a potentially 
hazardous plant is a typical managerial task, but the requirements of the technology gives it a distind flavor. 
A modern chemical or nuclear plant can have large amounts of toxic and highly reactive substances confined 
in the processes presenting potential threats to human health and the environment. A large plant is a very 
complex piece of equipment, which requires experts skill in many different fields. Day-to-day operation 
requires accuracy and good quality control. Disturbed operation can require delicate judgment and is usually 
extremely stressful for the organization? 
The initial design of a plant sets the baseline of its safety. The way it is operated will however influence its 
safety. Wear in components and systems is depending on operational strategies and have to be compensated 
by preventive maintenance. Selection and training of p e r s o ~ e l  is like the maintaining of plant documentatien.. 
a continuing effort. A large plant will also typically require modifications, because actual demands are seen 
only whenihe plant is in operation. The management of changes becomes therefore an important task with 
safety implications. 
The performance of a potentially hazardous plant is a combination of safety and econoby. Safety is however 
hard to quantify, which means that operational performance can be difficult to define and measure. There 
can also be different interpretations of good performance even within the same organization. It is not likely 
that a single measure describing performance can be found. Instead it is necessary to assemble some suitable 
set of performance indicators. 
Industries with a potential for hazards are regulated with the intent of ensuring an acceptable safety for the 
society. The regulation is typically written as a set of licensing requirements to which the industry has to 
comply before permits to plan, construct and operate the plant are granted. The regulation is also requiring 
regular inspections and different analyses to be performed when the operational permits are renewed. 
Managing the safety of a potentially hazardous plant can be seen as a control system with several feedback 
loops and participating organizations.1° There are many similarities but also differences between regulations 
in diferent countries. Reasons for the differences are contained in the legal system, in social values and in 
traditions rather than technical." 
The management of safety within the industry is not restricted to the plants only. It is necessary also to 
consider the environment in which a plant is operating. This means a consideration of the company structure 
and the framework of national legislation. The interactions with plant or system vendors can also prove 
crucial in unexpected situations. The societal infra-structures such as communication systems and institutions 
for education and training are also important for a continuing safety at the plants. In the safety 
considerations it is necessary to understand that each of the interacting organizations have their own goals 
and accountability. 
LESSONS FROM ACCIDENTS 
An accident will seldom be the cause of some single event. Instead there are many events interacting in a 
complex web of contributing technical, human and organizational causes. An analysis of the causes for an 
accident has therefore to follow a multiple path, where the underlying causes are searched for on each level. 
The accidents should actually be analyzed in a multiple framework of technical, organizational and p e r s o ~ e l  
 perspective^.'^ l3 Sometimes it is actually necessary to expand this analysis beyond the plant and the 
company operating it, to the regulatory system and the governmental decision-making processes. 
Five particular management problems have been identified as contributors to human errors." These are 
(1) time pressures, (2) observation of warnings of deterioration and signals of malfunction, (3) design of an 
incentive system to handle the tradeoffs between safety and productivity, (4) learning in a changing 
environment and (5) communication and processing of uncertainties. 
Any thorough analysis of accidents reveals several layers of problems relating to design, manufacturing, 
construction, maintenance, quality control, safety management, communication, training, etc. The work 
routines can be identified as a generic cause for these problems, because the necessary quality of work has 
at times not been achieved. The management is naturally responsible for such slips in performance, but 
simply laying the blame on management is not construdive, because it will not give suggestions for 
improvements. A more productive approach is to identify generic problems, propose how they could be 
solved and outline good management practices in principle. 
Analysis of accidents point generic categories of organizational deficiencies. An incomplete identification of 
goals and priorities can cause problems both in the design and in the operation. An unsatisfactory definition 
and distribution of tasks within the organization can introduce many opportunities for later problems. An 
impaired feedback of experience can leave even serious deficiencies uncorrected. Inefficient safety 
management can render risk assessments and procedures for quality assurance practically useless. 
COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF NPP PERFORMANCE 
The performance of nuclear power plants in the world varies. Some plants regularly achieve a power 
availawty in the region of 85% and other plants have difficulties even to reach the world average of about 
70%. A careful housekeeping of a large number of different ingredients seems to be one of the components 
contributing to good performance. Some of those ingredients can be influenced by management and others 
A set of studies have tried to identify how organizational characteristics are related to different performance 
measures.16 " The finding indicates different correlations between organizational design parameters and 
safety indicators. A more recent report1' stresses that efficiency, compliance and innovation should be the 
outcome of a better understanding between safety and organizational factors. 
A comparison of nuclear power plant performance is usually based on annual load factors. A study 
comparing performance in France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and USA concluded that a strong 
focus on on-site operations, planning, and maintenance is important for achieving high perforrnan~e?~ A 
systematic effort at training and learning from the past is also needed. Their data illustrate that it is possible 
to create industry-wide programs that can lead to substantial improvements. The report speculates also on 
reasons for the inadequate performance of nuclear power in the United States and claims that the industry 
has not succeeded in learning from experience. 
Another comparative study of eight well-performing nuclear power stations with a total of 22 operating units 
shows that similar patterns emerge." The following factors are identified as important: 
- Goals are well defined and communicated to the staff. Progress in achieving goals is monitored. 
Improvements are identified, prioritized, and implemented. 
- The organization is well defined. Responsibilities, levels of authority, and individual accountability 
are defined. Teamwork is supported. 
- Managers and supervisors interact with staff members and are involved in plant activities. Relevant 
experience is sought and used to improve performance. 
- Quality assurance principles are applied. Operations and maintenance work are controlled and 
executed in a disciplined manner. 
- Staff proficiency is established and maintained. Effective working relationships with outside 
organizations are established. 
CONCEPTS FROM MANAGEMENT SCIENCES 
The management sciences have been oriented towards the needs'in the business world. Different schools of 
thinking have been emerging and the theories have been anchored in many diverse fields such as operations 
research, psychology, sociology and political sciences. The theories have created typologies and models aiming 
at providing a better understanding of the complex interactions which can be observed in real organiza- 
tion~.'~ The goals for business organizations are different from those of a safety oriented organization, but 
it can still be expected that the concepts developed are applicable in general." 
Designing an organization for a specific purpose involves several different tasks such as (1) deciding on an 
organizational structure, (2) defining positions, (3) building the executive systems, and (4) specifying the 
information systems. Organizational design involves many different parameters such as the span of control 
for the managers, the size of the organizational units, the number of hierarchical levels, the degree of 
formalization of the tasks, etc. The control of an organization is exercised at each hierarchical level through 
the tasks of (1) objective setting, (2) strategy formulation, (3) generation of predictions (feedforward control), 
(4) providing feedback (5) coordination, and (6) allocation of resources." 
The performance of an organization is usually assessed as a continuing effort to make it possible for the 
organization to improve and to adapt to changes in its environment. This function is often implemented as 
a part of the strategic planning process, in which strengths and weaknesses of the organization are identified 
to provide the basis for setting a target state and define the strategy of getting there. The performance is 
immediately measurable for some organizations, but has often to be assessed using qualitative indicators. 
Organizational effectiveness is a concept closely related to performance, but is in addition also considering 
the available resources. Effectiveness has attracted a good deal of attention within the management sciences, 
and popular books, which have become bestsellers, have been written on the subject." In spite of a 
considerable amount of work in the area of organizational effectiveness there is still no generally accepted 
theory a~ailable.~' There is however an agreement that the management can make a difference and that 
good management and effective organizations are correlated. It appears however that effective organizations 
are able to handle seemingly contradicting attributes (cf. Table I).% 
If the effectiveness of an organization is declining 
as compared to its competitors it will ultimately die. 
A large interest in the reasons for such decline 
arose in the early eighties when the business 
failures in USA increased rather significantly." In 
this context it would be interesting to know what is 
causing organizational decline and what kind of 
responses should be initiated. A rough division of 
the causes for organizational decline separates 
between internal and external causes, where the 
external causes often are connected to changes in 
the environment of the organization.'' 
Leadership involvement is a critical element in 
ensuring safe and reliable operational performance 
for safety oriented organizations." Still it is not 
clear to what extent visions and charisma will be 
needed in the same way as in a rapidly changing 
business organization. Authority and a recognized 
Loose - Tight coupling. 
High specialization - Generality of roles. 
Continuity of leadership - Infusion of new 
leaders. 
Deviation amplified - Reduction processes. 
Expanded search of information - Avoidance 
of information overload. 
Disengagement and disidentification with 
past strategies - Reintegration and reinforce- 
ment of roots. 
Table 1. Contradictory attributes of an efficient 
organization. 
technical background seems to be more important in providing the necessary stability of high reliability 
organizations. The incentive systems of business organizations have been receiving a considerable attention. 
To what extent different kinds of incentives can be used in high reliability organizations is stiU to be 
investigated. 
An organizational theory has to approach the relationships and the interactions between the formal and the 
informal organizations. The formal part of the organization is defrned in organizational schemes, internal 
procedures and job descriptions. The informal part, which reflects on how things are handled in reality, has 
also to be addressed systematically. There are many dangers in allowing the informal organization to depart 
too far from the formal organization, but there is also a danger in requiring a strict adherence to inflexible 
routines. 
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR SAFETY ORIENTED ORGANIZATIONS 
The design of safety oriented organizations has not been addressed explicitly from a theoretical point of view. 
Practical guidance for a country entering a nuclear power program can however be found.% Similar 
guidance for maintaining the qualif~cation and competence of the operations personnel at a nuclear power 
plant is als? available?' The general safety principles for the whole nuclear industry in general have also 
been addressed?' There is an indication that the number of organizational levels correlates negatively with 
common safety indicat~rs .~  A comparison of actual practices in different countries reveals considerable 
differences both in the span of control for a plant manager and for the depth of the organization. 
An important part of the organizational design is the allocation of tasks into specified positions. In the 
operation of an industrial plant certain well defrned functions have to be maintained and they will also be 
reflected in the organizational structure. The corresponding positions will usually be implemented in a 
relatively straightforward way, based on more or less formal job and task analyses. The more implicit tasks 
of planning, quality control, feedback of experience, etc. are not equally well defined. There might also be 
areas in the borderlines between different positions and different organizational units causing confusions. A 
special requirement is the provision of organizational redundancies for the case of emergencies. 
Efficient organizations are highly adaptive, but in high reliability organizations a certain stability has to be 
ensured. The stability is needed both for the planning and the execution of tasks, because a good 
predictability is mandatory for assessing implications on safety. A certain compensatory behavior over 
organizational borderlines can be observed, where a less satisfactory performance in one unit can be 
compensated by a higher performance in another.   he allocation of tasks between positions and 
organizational units would ideally proceed in a top-down manner, but this will seldom occur in practice. 
Multiple iterative cycles, which are combining top-down planning with bottom-up implementation are more 
common and actually more useful. The actual division of responsibilities in an organization is therefore the 
outcome of partly systematic planning and partly a historical development process. 
Operational performance of an industrial plant is relatively easy to assess, but an assessment of its safety is 
far more dficult. In pursuing plant effectiveness it is also relatively easy to forget long term goals in the 
pursue of short and intermediate term goals. Well-defined performance indicators can supply valuable 
information and can also be helpful in directing the attention to proper control. Performance indicators can 
provide a framework for comparing plants and organizational structures to support the exchange of 
operational experience and managerial practices. Ideal characteristics of a set of performance indicators have 
been developed (Table 2)." The performance indicators should, in addition to the straightfornard 
performance related measures, also reflect more subtle factors such as resource management, employee 
satisfaction, and public relations, which can only be expressed in qualitative terms. 
Planning and analysis are two important components in the execution of any task within a safety oriented 
organization. In the planning a proper balance between general lines and small details has to be found. 
Strategic planning can in this context be seen as an important component, although not directed explicitly 
towards management of change. By carrying out the strategic planning as an exercise involving several 
organizational levels and units, it can in addition to 
its primary output also provide an important Close relationships to risks and/or safety, 
training function in rehearsing the relationships 
between means and ends in the organization. The Data readily available, 
strategic planning provides also a suitable forum for 
a comparison of actual performance with the Quantitative (show range of performance), 
targets set and with other similar organizations. 
Unambiguous, 
A balanced level of safety over the whole opera- 
tional life of a plant needs to be achieved in spite Unlikely to cause undesiraue actions, 
of personnel turn over, new regulatory require- 
ments, aging of the plant, etc. Maintaining the Significance should be understood (objective 
operational quality of the organization over the a d  fair), 
complete life cycle of the plant implies also one or 
more turns of generations in personnel. Regularly Industry wide applicability, 
executed organizational reviews can provide means 
for maintaining vigilance both of individuals and the ~ o t  susceptible to manipulation, 
organization as a whole. 
Physical results, 
The management can in a way be seen as the 
control system for the organization reacting on Independent indicators essential, 
feedback signals and providing the control actions. 
With this metaphor it is easy to understand why an Manageable set, 
impaired feedback of actual performance and 
experienced problems can be dangerous for safety. worthy goal. 
The planning and analyzing can in this context be 
as providing feed-forward where a Table 2. Ideal characteristics of a set of performance 
prediction of future performance is used to select indicators. 
present control actions. The pursue of a higher 
effectiveness operates like an adaptation mecha- 
nism, where control parameters continuously are adjusted for a better performance. A problem with safety 
oriented organizations is that a very high performance tends to leave little for that adaptation mechanism 
to work on, which may lead to an adaption to unacceptable goals due to a low signal to noise ratio. 
The large amount of stabiity and routine poses the problem of maintaining vigilance over time for all tasks. 
When a routine becomes boring it is likely that shortcuts will be taken. A continuing safety relies on 
alertness, where deficiencies are actively sought and corrected. Sometimes it can be necessary to react 
quickly, which means that procedures for obtaining authorization for specific actions should be simple. This 
could be reached by a proper delegation of authority and keeping organizational lines of authorization short. 
The need to coordinate all activities on the plants have led to the adoption of a formalized work order 
system, where each activity should be approved by specific persons before they are allowed to proceed to 
the next planning step or to be executed. This system is sometimes considered to be a burden at the plants. 
However one of the main tasks of management is to make staff aware of the importance of certain 
administrative requirements. 
The feedback of operational experience is one of the most important functions in improving and maintaining 
safety. Incidents from the own plant and from other similar plants should be thoroughly analjzed .for 
collecting the lessons to be learned. The results of the analysis should then be innovatively used in order to 
detect possible safety threats of similar kinds. One scheme of analysis taking into account the multiple 
perspective of the technical, the human and the organizational systems is suggested in Appendiv 1. 
A good baseline of performance gives an opportunity to fine-tune the routines and therefore make an 
improved safety possible. It can therefore be argued that earlier success should make future success more 
likely. On the other hand there is also the possibility that earlier success makes the organization over- 
confident~.with a resulting degradation of future .performance?~~ailures can also make additional failures 
to appear more probable, when they are indicating 
that over-optimistic safety estimates have been 
used. An organizational reliability curve of Figure 
1 can actually by hypothesized, where two different 
mechanisms of errors are interacting. 
In approaching the intersection between safety and 
organization a common prescription is to support 
a safety culture." There are however many views 
on the content of such a concept. Even the use of 
the word culture contains the inherent assumption 
that the concept cannot be defined accurately. One 
part of the concept implies that people should care 
and take responsibility. Everybody should thus react 
on and report unsafe practices. There is, however, 
a cultural bias toward reporting, which could be 
demonstrated by a reluctance to get involved in 
another's business or to-squeal on a colleague. 
e r r o r s  Of 
Ignorance 
Figure 1. Errors of ignorance can be substituted by 
errors of overconfidence resulting in a bathtub curve 
of organizational reliability. 
- 
A d . c u l t  question is connected to honesty in the communication to the outside. Organizational performance 
relies on team-work with an implicit division into we and they. Here is a danger that the organization is - 
closing itself to the outside, where even cover up actions are carried out for the protection of the 
establishment. A very open communication is certainly not appropriate for a safety oriented organization, 
because it could endanger some of the crucial safety precautions and it could also unnecessarily make 
individuals vulnerable to unfair attacks from the outside. Completely closed channels of communication are 
also less desirable, because important feedback channels and lines of accountability would in this case be cut. 
There seems to be a need for a continuous probing and reformulation of means and ends, which cannot be 
given up if the organization should remain healthy. 
ORGANIZATIONAL REVIEWS 
Recognizing the importance of organizational and management issues it would be desirable to develop 
methods that can detect and -correct organizational deficiencies before an incident occurs. The use of 
organizational safety reviews could provide one approach for detecting weak signals of a deteriorated safety. 
It might be difficult for an organization to improve from the inside, but it is also difficult to initiate the 
correcting actions from the outside. Here is actually a CATCH-22 situation, because an initiative from the 
inside of the organization can be considered as a proof of healthiness, whereby an initiative coming from the 
outside is likely to be rejected by an unhealthy organization. It is evident that all practical means to detect 
and correct organizational deficiencies require both diplomacy and knowledge. 
One procedure for carrying out organizational safety reviews was developed as a part of the Nordic research 
program in nuclear safety." The procedure was based on a structured interview carried out with a guide 
providing a model of a successful organization. The procedure was tested on three cases in Sweden, and a 
follow-up study has been carried out in Experience indicates that such an exercise could be 
valuable as an instrument for internal safety reviews. 
The OSART review procedure, developed and carried out by the IAEA, is another example of reviews that 
includes organizational issues in an assessment of ~ a f e t y . ~  Results from the reviews show that not all 
nuclear power plants have taken the necessary structured approach to safety.@ Among the comments were 
that workers do not always follow established guidelines and that managers and supervisors should involve 
themselves more in plant operation. Each plant practiced some good safety measures, but even the 
best-performing plants had areas for improvements. In most cases the deficiencies were known, but had not 
been resolved effectively before the OSART mission. The missions seem in general to have provided a 
valuable exchange of technical information, concrete recommendations for improvements and many informal 
occasions to exchange operational experience. 
A third framework intended for the review of emergency preparedness has been developed?' This review 
is also touching on several organizational issues. 
Identifying and correcting organizational deficiencies can be difficult, because social institutions are not 
nwssarily receptive to outside critique.42 It is also difficult to create reliable and valid methods for 
measuring psychological and sociological variables. It is necessary to build confidence in the fairness and 
intent of the review. One possibility is to cany out organizational reviews as internal exercises. It is, however, 
easy to be unaware of immediate problems, and it can therefore be valuable to involve outsiders in the 
review. An outsider may also fmd it easier to discuss sensitive matters with individuals at different levels in 
the organization. 
An early commitment of management has to be obtained before any review can be effective. Carrying out 
the study as a training exercise c o ~ e c t e d  either to strategic planning or to the analyzing of an incident can 
provide the justifications. It is also then possible to collect ideas for responses to the deficiencies. It is also 
possible to initiate a horizontal exchange of information between adjacent organizational units or to exercise 
a vertical training effort of transferring and interpreting goals that involves two or more levels in the 
organizatiqn. 
A structured interview seems to be suitable in the light of available experience. The review should 
concentrate more on improvements and exchange of good operational practices than on details of past 
performance. A general structure for an organizational review is proposed in Appendix 2. It is also proposed 
that the interview should be carried out as an internal exercise, but with an outside moderator. If the 
moderator has personal experience from other plants, he could cross-fertilize the discussion by bringing up 
e-xamples from other plant milieus. By combining the review either to the strategic planning process or to 
the analyzing of some incident it should be possible to avoid dead-locks caused by a lacking grass-root 
realism or undiplomatic moves. 
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
There have been problems in bringing the psychological aspects of human factors research into the 
engineering process of design and construction. The additional need to understand groups of humans does 
not make this task easier. In the search for quantifiable performance indicators it is not expected that any 
set of objective measurements of organizational effectiveness can provide the answer. The assessment of 
organizational performance has therefore to be based on expert judgment. This brings up the question how 
such experts could be selected and trained. If an organizational theory could be developed for the safety 
oriented organizations it might. be possible to remove some of the arbitrariness from this kind of judgment. 
It is not likely that any single optimal solution will be found, because it is always necessary to adapt to 
cultural norms, available educational systems, technical infrastructures, etc. There seems also to be feedback 
mechanisms producing dynamics within the social systems, where good performance provides opportunities 
for further improvements, but bad performance can lead to a downward spiral of decline (cf. Figure 2). 
People and organizations need signals to react on. The accidents and incidents can be seen as such signals 
necessary for detecting safety threats. The accidents of TMI, Bhopal, Challenger and Chernobyl have initiated 
intense periods of organizational learning. The argument that the accidents have been more expensive than 
the benefits of the lessons learned 43 is still relevant, because most of the findings from the accidents were 
actually available before, but not seriously considered. 
There is a dilemma of high reliability organizations that continued high performance does not provide the 
immediate feedback on the safety level achieved. This may give a false impression that it still is possible to 
squeeze a higher efficiency out of the organization without obstructing safety. The increasing hurry among 
high-level managers and executives provides one example of stretching of resources, because individual and 
. . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . 
organizational attention is a scarce r e s o ~ r c e . ~  The 
search for an ever increasing effectiveness might be p e r f o r m a n c e  
a generic symptom for a structural change in the 
contemporary society, but for the potentially haz- 
ardous industrial installations it can prove danger- 
ous. Only a continuing assessment of how all small 
components are contributing to safety can provide 
the necessary signals for increasing dangers. 
good housekeeping a t t r a c t  ) +  and 
and procedures keep good people In hindsight it is always easy to identify a better 
decision. It is far more difficult to detect and 
correct deficiencies before they have been made 
obvious by an accident. There seems also to be a lqgure 2. 
+u 
Improved performance can lead to 
problem in bringing available knowledge into still better performance and vice 
practice. The research in human errors has been versa. 
very intensive since the TMI accidentAs and just 
scanning what is available, it seems that enough 
guidance has been produced. It seems however difficult to apply the results for the concrete day-to-day 
routines inthe safety oriented organizations. The diffusion of new knowledge will always take time, but one 
may ask if this diffusion is efficient enough or if additional ideas and resources will be needed for the intake 
and digestion of new findings. 
The discussion has been directed to the safety oriented organizations as a whole, but one specific question 
is h o ~  the managers of these organizations should be selected and trained. How could the feedback of 
experience be supported by national and international institutions and how should these be managed. What 
kind of systems could be built to promote the transfer of good operational practices. What kind of regular 
organizational reviews should be carried out and how should the issues relating to organization and 
management be regulated. These questions will not have any simple answers, but it can be expected that 
international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World 
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) in the area of nuclear applications could be instrumental in 
coordinating research and harmonizing practices. 
The safety of any industrial installation is ultimately societal concern. In spite of the diminishing dimensions 
of the world there are still large differences in the views on an acceptable level of safety. It is also necessary 
to understand that investments in the safety of one technology may decrease similar investments in another. 
The balancing of resources has on this level to be treated in the national and international policy making 
processes. In creating an environment, where it is possible for high reliability organizations to carry out their 
tasks credibility and confidence in the institutions has to be built. Otherwise societal hostility can influence 
the long-term effect on safety by feedback mechanisms in the society. 
Very basic conceptions of responsibilities, work and people, which are anchored in the culture can also have 
an important influence on the operation of a safety oriented organization. It may even be hypothesized that 
high reliability organizations would be easier to operate in certain societies. If this is true it could lead-to 
changed views on international cooperation and development assistance. The concentration of all potentially 
hazardous installations to only a few areas in the world might however not be possible due to the problems 
of transporting the products. 
There is a need for a better understanding of how organizational factors affect safety. Theories developed 
should be able to provide a tangible improvement as compared to managerial intuition. It would actually be 
necessary to take a step beyond anecdotes and personal experience in order to arrive at usable prescriptions 
for safety oriented organizations. Any research in the intersection between safety and organization has to be 
multi-disciplinary with close contacts to operational plants. A high level support from the regulators and from 
the industry seems to be necessary to initiate such work. In applying such theoretical work it is still necessary 
to rely on the insight and skills of the managers and the workers within the industrial community. 
Management involvement and workers' commitment will also be important components in achieving the 
functions necessary for safety 46. 
APPENDIX 1. 
A SCHEME FOR ANALYZING EVENTS, INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS. 
There is a common understanding that events, incidents and accidents have to be analyzed in a large degree 
of detail to provide the lessons to be learned. In the analysis process generic models of cause and 
consequence relationships have to be c o m b i  with an understanding of the sihlational characteristics to 
yield the generic lessons. These lessons could then in an effort of synthesis be combined with information 
in the PRA to propose possible chains of events that could pose threats towards the safety. These threats 
could be reacted on by specific improvements in the plant construction or in the procedures applied. The 
analysis is usually understood to proceed towards the identification of a "root cause" ie. a place where it is 
possible to break the sequence of events by an improvement of the system. In this context it is understood 
that multiple root causes might be. identified. In the identification of root causes it is necessary to take a step 
beyond the simple explanations behind the primary causes and search for secondary, tertiary, e t c  causes. In 
this search the stopping criterion is rather pragmatic, because the identification of a place where an. 
improvement would make the sequence impossible is not well defined. The synthesis effort where the 
ultimate consequences of a specific event chain is also governed by a similar pragmatic stopping criterion. 
Figure 3. Analyzing events, incidents and accidents in the context of plant improvements. 
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The causes could on the most general level be divided into technical failures and human errors. A further 
consideration of different classes of technical failures however often points to human errors as a secondary 
cause. A consideration of causes for human errors is in the same way proposing organizational deficiencies 
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as tertiary causes to the observed failure. Proceeding with the analysis through the diagram three classes of 
generic causes for accidents are proposed. If the potential dangers of the sequence in consideration have not 
been recognized before the incident we may speak about new experience which has been obtained. If the 
dangers have been identified, but not accounted for then available knowledge has not been utilized properly. 
If the danger of the sequence has been understood and properly reflected in the risk assessments carried out 
it may be necessary to attribute the sequence to bad luck in a conscious gambling situation 
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Figure 4. An analyzing scheme for unexpected events which is taking into account the multiple 
layers of causal factors behind an observed failure or error. 
APPENDIX 2. 
A TENTATIVE CHECKLIST FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REVIEWS 
GOAL FORMULATION. 
Performance targets. Organizational policies. Principles of setting performance targets. Performance 
in comparison with other similar organizations. Systems for monitoring performance. Definition of 
performance targets for organizational units. 
Priorities. Selection of priorities between different goals (eg. safety, economy). The price of safety. 
Goal conflicts. Procedures for detecting and settling goal conflicts. Conflicts between members of 
the organization. 
The safe operational envelope. A definition of the safe operational envelope. Safety technical 
specifications. 
TASK DEFINITION. 
Task structure. Hierarchical layers in the organization. Rigidity of the hierarchical organization. The 
division of task between different organizational units. Informal organizational structures. 
Responsibilities. The division of responsibilities between different units and different levels in the 
organization. 
Task characteristics. Shift schedules. Task demands and stressfulness. Normal operation compared 
to refueling operations. 
Exchange of information. Procedures for distributing information. Management of information 
overload. 
Operating procedures. Instructions and operational procedures. Verification of the procedures. 
Updating of the procedures. 
Changes in task structure. Examples of, reasons for and experience of organizational changes. 
FEEDBACK OF EXPERIENCE. 
Reporting. Systems (formal/informal) for reporting of incidents. Cases of unreported events. 
Responsibility for reporting. Company policy towards reporting. 
Analyzing. Principles for analyzing incidents. Identification of root causes. 
Improvements. Actions generated from incident reports. Systems for handling the reports. 
Utilization of international experience. Procedures for utilizing event reports from other plants. 
Contacts to staff from other similar plants. 
SAFETY ANALYSIS AND QUALITY ASSURANCE. 
Safety analysis. Plans for carrying out a probabilistic safety analysis (PSA). The utilization of the 
results from the PSA. The concept of a living PSA. 
Quality control. Internal principles for quality control. Quality control for contracts and sub- 
deliveries. 
Inspection. Inspection of critical components. Contacts with the regulatory body. 
Audits. Internal safety audits. External safety reviews. 
Informal work practices. Measures for the identification and correction of work practices not in 
accordance with task deftnitions. 
MAINTAINING KNOWLEDGE AND SUPPORT. 
O~anizational change. Transfer from the pioneer to the continuous operation. Mechanisms for 
responding to ambitions in the organization. Principles for promotion. 
. 
New staff. Turn over of personnel (too large/too small). Number and level of applicants for new 
positions. The use of internal recruiting. 
Training. Principles of training. Emphasis on understanding in the training. Use of training 
simulators. Use of training tools. Training for team work. Execution of drills for emergency 
responses. Follow up on the development of trainees. 
Outside support. Maintaining channels to outside support. Contacts to vendors. Plant user 
organizations. 
Fostering a safety culture. Management commitment to safety. Moving around in the plant. A grass- 
root understanding of the dangers involved in operation. 
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A. RASTAS 
INDUSTRIAL POWER COMPANY LTD. 
MANAGEMENT-RELATED PRACTICES I N  
INDUSTRIAL POWER COMPANY LTD (FINLAND) 
I n d u s t r i a l  Power Company L t d  (TVO) o p e r a t e s  two BWR u n i t s  o f  
710 MW e a c h  i n  O l k i l u o t o ,  F i n l a n d .  They have  been  t a k e n  i n t o  
o p e r a t i o n  i n  1978  a n d  1980 ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Dur ing  r e c e n t  y e a r s  
t h e  c a p a c i t y  f a c t o r s  have  been a b o u t  90 p e r  c e n t .  
The O l k i l u o t o  p l a n t  u n i t s  c o v e r  a r o u n d  one  f i f t h  o f  F i n l a n d ' s  
e l e c t r i c i t y  consumpt ion .  T h e r e f o r e  t h e  good pe r fo rmance  o f  t h e  
u n i t s  i s  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  t h e  whole  c o u n t r y  where no  f o s s i l e  f u e l  
r e s o u r c e s  are f o u n d ,  t h e  c l i m a t e  is  c o l d  and  t h e  i n d u s t r y  is 
energy-demanding.  
TVO is owned m a i n l y  by F i n n i s h  i n d u s t r y  and  s u p p l i e s  e n e r g y  
t o  i t s  s h a r e h o l d e r s  a t  c o s t .  The s t r a t e g y  o f  t h e  company is  
v e r y  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d ,  t o  p r o d u c e  maximum amount of e l e c t r i c i t y  
a t  minimum c o s t  m a i n t a i n i n g  h i g h  s a f e t y  s t a n d a r d .  
TVO was s t a r t e d  f rom s c r a t c h .  The company o r g a n i z a t i o n  w a s  
c r e a t e d  i n  s t e p  w i t h  b u i l d i n g ,  commiss ion ing  and  o p e r a t i n g  o f  
t h e  p l a n t  u n i t s .  T h e r e  w e r e  no o l d  t r a d i t i o n s  t o  h i n d e r  t h e  
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  most s u i t a b l e  p r a c t i c e s  b e i n g  i n  l i n e  
w i t h  t h e  company s t r a t e g y .  
F o r e i g n  p r i n c i p l e s  and  p r a c t i c e s  are se ldom f o l l o w e d  a s  s u c h  
b u t  r ev i ewed  c r i t i c a l l y  and  a d a p t e d  t o  t h e  F i n n i s h  c o n d i t i o n s .  
T h i s  p o l i c y  h a s ' l e d  t o ' s o m e  p r a c t i c e s  which may n o t  be common 
e l s e w h e r e .  
Q u a l i t y  a s s u r a n c e  h a s  had a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  a l l  t h e  a c t i v i -  
t i e s .  The p o l i c y  i s  t o  a c h i e v e  h i g h  q u a l i t y  by making,  n o t  o n l y  
by  c o n t r o l l i n g .  
The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  are c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d  i n  a 
manual a lways  k e p t  u p - t o - d a t e .  Ad hoc  g roups  are e s t a b l i s h e d  
t o  s o l v e  s p e c i a l  p r o b l e m s .  C o n s t a n t  emphas i s  is p u t  on t h e  good 
teamwork and  e f f e c t i v e  r e p o r t i n g  mechanism. 
The s t a f f ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  r u n  t h e  p l a n t  i s  main ta ined  and improved 
by con t inuous  t r a i n i n g  and e d u c a t i o n .  A t t e n t i o n  i s  a l s o  p a i d  
t o  t h e  work m o t i v a t i o n  a s  w e l l  a s  t o  t h e  menta l  and p h y s i c a l  
c o n d i t i o n .  
The s t a f f  t a k i n g  c a r e  of t h e  d a i l y  o p e r a t i o n  and maintenance  
i s  s uppo r t ed  by a  s t a f f  c o n c i s t i n g  of h i g h  l e v e l  s p e c i a l i s t s .  
The m o t i v a t i o n  and t h e  competence of t h i s  t e c h n i c a l  s u p p o r t  
ha s  been main ta ined  and enchanced by many s p e c i a l  p r o j e c t s ,  
s uch  a s  t h e  c a p a c i t y  u p r a t i n g  of t h e  p l a n t  u n i t s ,  t h e  c o n s t r u c -  
t i o n  of an  i n t e r m e d i a t e  s t o r a g e  f o r  s p e n t  f u e l ,  b a c k f i t t i n g  
o f  t h e  con ta inments  a g a i n s t  degraded c o r e  a c c i d e n t s ,  PRA-study 
and c o n s t r u c t i o n  of t h e  f i n a l  r e p o s i t o r y  f o r  r e a c t o r  waste .  
Co-opera t ive  r e l a t i o n s  a r e  ma in t a ined  w i t h  t h e  o r i g i n a l  vendor 
and s u p p l i e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  Prompt a c c e s s  t o  t e c h n i c a l  s u p p o r t  
s e r v i c e s  is  s ecu red  by frame c o n t r a c t s .  
I n  u t i l i z a t i o n  of o p e r a t i n g  e x p e r i e n c e s  t h e  major  emphasis  is 
pu t  t o  t h e  own p l a n t  and t o  t h e  sister p l a n t s  i n  Sweden. 
A competent ,  e f f e c t i v e  and s t r i c t  s u p e r v i s o r y  a u t h o r i t y  is  a  
n e c e s s i t y  f o r  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  o p e r a t i o n .  I n  F in land  t h e  a u t h o r -  
i t i e s  a r e  h i g h l y  q u a l i f i e d .  An a c t i v e  and open communication 
is  main ta ined  t o  bo th  d i r e c t i o n s .  
A s t r i c t  boundary between s a f e t y  and non-sa fe ty  m a t t e r s  is  n o t  
a p p l i e d .  Almost a l l  t h e  m a t t e r s  a r e  i n t e r p r e t e d  t o  be s a f e t y -  
r e l a t e d ,  o n l y  some more t h a n  some o t h e r s .  The s a f e  o p e r a t i o n  
of t h e  p l a n t  and i t s  h i g h  a v a i l a b i l i t y  a r e  s een  most o f t e n  a s  
synonyms. They a r e  seldom i n  c o t r a d i c t i o n .  
System Safety and Safety culture1 
Bernhard Wilpert 
Technische Universitat Berlin 
1. Introduction 
Safety and reliability of complex technical systems is usually, 
from an engineering point of view, treated as a problem of 
probabilistic risk analysis. A relatively large portfolio of 
approaches and techniques exists for this problem. Quantitative 
methods for analysis of the human, social and organizational 
factors contributing to systems safety rely on the same 
probabilistic rationale as the technical risk analysis, although it 
is becoming increasingly clear that this logic is inappropriate for 
the analysis of human failure propensities. What is required here 
are causal models of the human, social and organizational 
conditions and mechanisms leading to systems (un) reliability (Rouse 
& Rouse, 1983). - 
In addition, based on empirical evidence of accident and near 
accident analyses (Munipov, 1990 ; Reason, 1990 ; Wilpert & Klumb, 
1991), it is safe to claim that safety and reliability must be 
considered as a performance result - like product quality - of the 
whole socio-technical system. "Safety culturen has become a 
fashionable catchword to denote this holistic perspective that 
encompasses the total socio-technical system. Hence, reflections on 
organizational and managerial factors contributing to safety 
performnance must be guided by systemic thinking. A first part of 
this paper, therefore, discusses the implications of 
comprehensively taking into account the total system. A second part 
then, by way of a case analysis, illustrates social, organizational 
and managerial factors contributing to system (un)reliability. The 
conceptual bases of safety culture and its potential role in 
systems safety is treated in the concluding part of this paper. 
2. Total Syetem as Point of Reference 
The first problem that presents itself here is the question 
regarding system boundaries, i.e. what are the constituting 
elements and parts belonging to the "systemm in question? A 
simplified, but nevertheless convincing illustration of the US 
accident prevention system of civil aviation can be found in a 
'paper prepared for the joint IAEA, IIASA meeting on "The 
Influence of Organization and Management on the Safety of NPPs and 
other Industrial Systems", Vienna, Austria, 18-20 March 1991 
presentation by Miller (1988): 
Fig. 1 about here 
The picture neatly brings into focus all those factors of the 
comprehensive system contributing to a given performance task, 
namely safety. Beginning from collectively shared knowledge of 
known precedent, leading to specific requirements imposed by the 
Federal Aviation Agency which constrain certain manufacturer 
solutions, offering the public choices of purchasing decisions 
which are implemented on the operator level. Each incident/accident 
and the ensuing investigation then constitutes the basis for new 
known perecedents and sets into motion various feedback circles 
into the whole system. 
System safety, a term first entering the literature around 1954, 
may with Miller (1988:72) then be defined as 
the result of the solution of engineering, operational and 
managerial tasks to avoid accidents and incidents of a given 
system. 
This is what I meant with the notion of safety as a performance 
result of all relevant elements of the total socio-technical 
system. This encompassing conceptual approach has important 
implications for what we consider "the system". The following case 
analysis may illustrate this point. 
3. An Illustrative Case 
In an analysis of an incident that occurred in the reactor block of 
Biblis A in December 1987, where we utilized a total systems 
analysis approach, we could show that indeed the incident must be 
described as an event in which complex technical, organizational, 
social and individual factors that converged as necessary 
conditions for the occurrence of the incident (Wilpert & Klumb, 
1991). "Human failure of the team of operators", "operator errorn 
(and ensuing culpabilization of ther individuals envolved) played 
a rather marginal role according to our opinion. This, by the way, 
corresponds to a re.sult of the Institue of Nuclear Power Operations 
which analyzed 180 NPO incidents and attributed only 16 % of them 
to "front line errorsn (INPO, 1985). Also in the Biblis A case we 
found conditions, decisions, design faults and incorrect judgements 
of management that were far "upstream" of the actual incident, i . e. 
factors which Reason (1990) calls "latent failures". What then was 
the matter with Biblis? 
A detailed account of the events that, on December 17, 1987, lead 
to the emission of a small amount of radioactive substance into the 
environment of reactor block Biblis A has been given elsewhere 
(Nucleonics Week, December 1988; Wilpert & Klumb, 1991). Suffice it 
to say here that during the course of an operation reactor restart, 
an incorrectly open valve caused a sequence of events that 15 hours 
later were recognized by the then second subsequent shift as 
potentially harmful. A risky "last minuten maneuver of the shift to 
close the open valve had the emission consequences. The ensuing 
public debate was filled with contentious charges ("near 
catastrophy of Tchernobyl dimensions") and countercharges ("easily 
controllable incident") concerning safety and trust of the German 
nuclear power industry. 
Our (here reduced) list of the incident producing factors we were 
able to indentify exclusively on the basis of published reports 
included: 
(1) Faulty design 
- The exact position of the open valve was difficult to determine 
since there existed no additional criteria for the verification of 
a faulty position: lackof requisite redundancy. 
- Technical constraints reduced the exactness of measurement 
indicators. 
- Alarm signals were often ambiguous. 
- Software and physical arrangements for error protocols tended to 
reduce the significance of a given alarm. 
(2) Organizational factors 
- Work load under certain task conditions (e.g. reactor restart) is 
such,that certain information cannot taken into account. Economic 
considerations may add to these constraints. 
- The original risk analysis evidently failed to take into account 
"unimaginable" circumstances and, hence, developed no technical 
defences against them. 
- The "siege climate" between public and NPO-management increases 
proclivities of management to "play down" events. 
(3) Contributing social factors 
- Processes of "group think" (Janis & Mann, 1977) may have 
prevented the third shift to recognize the emergent system state - 
or the competence mix of the shift team was inadequate. 
- Previous experience with (sometimes faulty) error messages may 
produce in the team a tendency to "rationalize away" signals that 
do not fit the socially shared interpretation of the situation. 
(4) Contributing individual factors 
- Erroneous generalizations of previous experiences may lead to 
faulty learning: what has proven in 99% of the cases an adequate 
action may, und "unimagibale circumstances", turn out to be a fatal 
mi s j udgemen t . 
- Research on handling complex problems (Doerner et al., 1987) has 
shown that people have a hard time to evauate exponential system 
development states and to think in terms of non-linear causal nets, 
a factor that seems to have influenced also the events in Biblis A. 
* .*  Reason (p. 148) 
Reason (1990:148) in his important recent book on human error gives 
a succinct representation of the relationships described. They 
require a much larger problem horizon than usually employed. I 
would even go so far as to expand his model even further by 
including also the governmental control agencies and the public at 
large. A case in point is the reaction of the Biblis management to 
the public debate when it instituted new organizational safety 
control units and procedures within the plant. Another point in 
case is what might be called the dysfunctional effects of 
regulation overload often stipulated by over-anxious official 
regulators: rather than leading to a "Sicherheitskultur" ( =  safety 
culture) regulation overload leads to an nAbsicherungskultur', a 
set of mind and behavior in which every person tries to cover their 
behinds by making sure that he/she has ticked off all required 
items on a control list in order not to be made liable in case 
something goes wrong. A behavior thus induced is tantamount to 
flight from responsibility and may interfere in necessary 
corrective actions by the operator. This already leads into the 
next part: 
4. Safety Culture 
The concept of culture, coming from social and cultural 
anthropology, has in recent years invaded organization sciences. 
Organizational culture has become an ubiquitous term probably for 
two reasons: it caters to the emerging need for more holistic 
concepts and everyone can easily associate something meaningful 
with this umbrella term: collective will, invisible force behind 
organizational phenomena, personality of an organization, shared 
attitudes, philosophies, assumptions, values etc. In short: the 
term is in need of conceptual clarification. 
Already in cultural anthropology culture found a multitude of 
definitions. One of the central discussions related to the question 
whether culture should be defines exclusively on the cognitive, 
attitudinal and evaluative level ("programming of the mindn, 
Hofstede, 1980) or whether the term ought to cover also behavioral 
and structural aspects of a social unit. 
Concerning the concept of organizational culture a contentious 
debate concerns the question whether organizational culture is 
something an organization has or something an organization is. In 
the former understanding organizations have certain characteristics 
that can be added to the organization and the term organizational 
culture is seen as a kind of managerial technology, comparable to 
the concept of corporate identity. This is a functionalist notion. 
In the latter sense, organizational culture is something that grows 
from the interaction of its members, something that is collectively 
constructed, which expresses itself not only in norms, attitudes 
and values, but also in behavior. In this sense organizational 
culture denotes the essence of the organization. 
I favor the notion of organizational culture referring to the 
essence of an organization, mainly because we know from theoretical 
reasoning as well as from empirical and everydays evidence that 
attitudes, norms and values do not necessarily tranylate into 
corresponding behavior. People deviate from norms, act by trade off 
judgements among values. But also because the essential notion of 
organizational culture avoids the erroneous belief that culture can 
be turned on and off ad libitum. The development of organizational 
culture is a laborious collective process enveloping the whole of 
the organization. 
Safety culture then should, to my mind, be understood in that 
latter sense of the term as well. 
Pafety culture is the shared consciouaneaa and corresponding 
behavior of all systems members that promote safety of the 
total system. 
Safety culture, if the concept is to make practical sense, must 
pervade the whole system, i.e. with this understanding concern for 
safety cannot be delegated to a part or subsystem of the system 
(safety engineers, management, regulators). It cannot be introduced 
per ordre de moufti but requires a lenghty process of 
organizational development of the total system to arrive at 
collective mental representations of all system members concerning 
the role and production goal of safety with their corresponding 
behaviors. In that sense safety culture is a notion that attempts 
to look at the causal social and organizational conditions for safe 
and unsafe behavior beyond the probabilistic understanding of the 
occurance of certain human acts. 
We can now have a brief look at the most authoritative document on 
safety culture in NPOs, the Report by the International Nuclear 
Safety Advisory Group on Safetv Culture (Safety Series No. 75- 
INSAG-4, 1991) . I shall address four points that I consider of 
critical importance for our discussion: 
(1) Total systems perspective . 
(2) Definition of safety culture 
(3) Developmental approach 
(4) Learning system 
In raising some' critical points I do not want to denigrate the 
value of this important and future oriented document, but simply to 
identify some points that may deserve more attention. 
(1) Total systems perspective 
The document clearly views safety culture in a total systems 
perspective, which we postulated above as crucial, covering the 
whole gamut of parties involved, from regulators to operators, this 
being a necessary condition for safety culture: 
. . .the discussion extends to Safety Culture in all 
concerned, because the highest level of safety is achieved 
only when everyone is dedicated to the common goaln (point 3). 
(2) Definition of safety culture 
The INSAG-definition reads: 
"Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and 
attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes 
that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues 
receive the attention warranted by their significance" (p. 1 
and point 6). 
The document is a bit amiguous with regard to the central defining 
elementssa of Safety Culture. In the Sumxnary it emphasiszes that 
Safety Culture 'is attitudinal as well as structuraln and that it 
concerns perceptions and action. But the next sentence elaborates 
again that Safety Culture relates 'to personal attitudes and habits 
of thoughtm (p. 1). This ambiguity prevails throughout the 
document. By linking the definition of safety culture predominantly 
to attitudes and cognitive, at best motivational, attributes (point 
81, it leaves the essential behavioral and structural dimensions 
elaborated above only implicit. They are, of course, recognized in 
the whole document as important, but without their integration into 
the definition. As it was said before, it is an error to assume 
that behavior necessarily corresponds to attitudes. Behavior is a 
consequence of cognitive as well as social, structural and 
organizational, situational conditions. 
(3) Developmental perspective 
The document advocates an approach of turning a NPO-system into a 
safe system which starts at the apex of the system and works itself 
top-down . The operating staff is expected to respond (part 3.3 ) to 
the nationally legislated and managerially layd-out policy 
framework and requisite managerially induced working environments. 
In other words, the underlying developmental model is what we call 
in psychology an S-R-model: a stimulus (S) is set and the 
individual is expected to give the appropriate response (R). 
Adequate reinforcement will help the individual to learn and 
stabilize the requisite response. 
It seems doubtful that the organizational development required in 
order to turn NPO-systems into safe systems of excellence can be 
described by such simple models. If safety culture is conceived as 
the consequence of the interaction of all system members in the. 
collective construction of safe organizational realities, more 
emphasis is needed on these dynamic interactive processes. They 
imply the involvement and participation of all systems levels in 
such a systems development beyond the mere reflexive response to 
stimulus conditions. 
(4) Learning system 
Cybernetics and systems theory teach us that living systems mainly 
learn from their mistakes. Quite in line with this received insight 
the INSAG document advocates self-regulatory strategies to 
facilitate such learning through regular review of safety relevant 
activities, feedback of operating experience in order to learn and 
to avoid a punitive search for schortcomings (point 3.1.4). 
I wonder whether we might not go one more step beyond by 
introducing anonymous reporting systems on incidents, potential 
incident conditions and imaginable technical, social and 
organizational trigger factors which are systematically documented 
and anonymously analyzed by independent institutions, similar to 
the Aviation Safety Reporting System of the USA. Thus the 
organization develops an organizational memory requisite for 
systems learning. The anonymity and independence of the proposed 
analyses seem to be essential conditions in order to overcome what 
the INSAG-document calls the "siege mentalityn in the public debate 
and the 'punitive search for shortcomings0 within organizations. 
5. Conclua ion 
Safety, reliability and risk of complex socio-technical systems are 
traditionally analyzed from an engineering point of view that 
favors probabilistic risk analysis techniques. Such techniques 
attempt to include also assumptions about probabilities concerning 
the occurrence of individual behaviors. Relatively rare are 
investigations that study human reliability and error behavior in 
a more holistic and systemic perspective which comprises the 
technical, individual, social and organizational conditions for the 
occurrence of particular human activities. This in itself 
surprises, since safety and reliability cannot be described except 
in terms of performance characteristics of the total system. A 
crucial and at the same time difficult problem, therefore, concerns 
the boundaries of the focal system. In line with present trends of 
thinking we have argued that these boundaries must not be drawn too 
restrictively. 
At the same time one must note that the development of theoretical 
concepts and methodological techniques which would facilitate such 
comprehensive sytemic approaches are still in statu nascendi. The 
concept of safety culture may, with proper specifications, serve as 
a model for new ways of thinking about safety in complex industrial 
systems. 
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